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Abstract
In a multi-user environment with a large shared database, it is necessary that
the security of data in the database is considered. To enforce security of data
in a database, we start with an access control model. The model defines which
users have what privileges to which information. There are three different types

of access control policies: discretionary access control (DAC)) mandatory access
control (MAC)) and role-based access control (RBAC). A discretionary access
control specifies users' privileges to different system resources, including their

ability to transfer their privileges to other users. In a mandatory access control,
the access of data by users is based on authorized security clearance levels. MAC
policies are of concern in multi-level databases) which are databases that contain
information of different security levels. A role-based access control manages access
to data based on a user's responsibility within an organization. Each role has an
associated collection of privileges. This collection is automatically transferred to
a subject who plays the role
Most of the current access control models in database systems are developed for relational databases. Since the object-oriented database (OODB) model
differs substantially from the relational model, results obtained for relational
databases as well as models proposed for relational databases are not necessarily
applicable to OODB systems. Amongst other issues, inheritance and the encapsulation of methods in the database information pose challenges in designing new
authorization models for OODB systems. It is therefore necessary to extend the
research on secure databases to include the 0-0 model. This thesis presents a
study of security in OODB systems. Access control protection forms a substantial
component of this work.
Principles from the 0-0 model are used to express rules for computing implicit
privileges from explicit ones. It requires an efficient mechanism which evaluates
implicit rights each time an access

IS

requested. A cryptographic mechanism

VI

vii
which is based on unique and secure access keys for each entity (object or class)
is proposed. The proposal ensures that access keys for implicit authorizations
were derived from related entities by applying pseudo-random and SIFF functions
during query processing. The security of the system is based on the difficulty of
predicting the output of pseudo-random functions andfindingextra collisions for
SIFF functions. Both are known to be computationally difficult.
Another major requirement for the access control model is the implementation of content-dependent authorization. The content-dependent authorization
incorporates the value of attributes in the access control model. The accessible
data are determined by checking the requested attributes. A content-dependent
access control model based on views is proposed. Rules for computing an implicit
authorization from the explicit ones are also formulated.
Finally, a new design approach for a secure multi-level O O D B system based on
views is proposed. The central idea is to provide the user with a multi-level view
derived from a single-level secure O O D B system. Hence the database operations
performed on the multi-level views are decomposed into a set of operations on
the single-level objects. They can then be implemented on any conventional
mandatory security kernel.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

Introduction

The increasing development of information technology in the last decade has led
to the widespread use of computer systems in various public and private organizations such as banks, universities, manufacturing or service companies, hospitals,
libraries, etc. This means that organizations maintain more and m o r e computerized information in databases, and they increasingly depend on that information
for their correct functioning. Hence, information needs protection against unauthorized access and any possible threats which might be launched by insiders
and outsiders, either malicious or accidental. This explains the need for secure
databases which are of concern to the database security. T h e database security aims at preserving the secrecy, integrity, and availability of the information
stored in it. Secrecy ensures that database information is readable to authorized
users only. It ensures the confidentiality of the information. Integrity of information covers methods and techniques which are used to protect information
against illegal or accidental modification. Availability of information ensures
that authorized users can have access to information whenever they need them

[65].
In order to obtain security in a database, Denning [65] lists four kinds of
controls: access control, information flow control, cryptographic control, and inference control. T h e access control ensures that any users access to the system is
authorized according to access rules given by the security policies. T h e information flow control makes sure that the protected information "contained" in some
objects does not flow explicitly (through copy) or implicitly to other protected
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objects of lower security levels. It also regulates how the information is accessible
(irrespective where it is stored). The cryptographic control makes data unintelligent to anybody except someone who knows the correct cryptographic key. The
inference control protects information against its disclosure via different ways of
deduction.
Research effort regarding secure databases has mainly focused on relational
databases. Since the object-oriented database ( O O D B ) model differs substantially from the relational model, results obtained for relational databases as well as
models proposed for relational databases are not necessarily applicable to O O D B
systems. Amongst other issues, inheritance and the encapsulation of methods in
the database information pose challenges in a secure O O D B system. It is therefore necessary to extend the research on secure databases to include the 0-0
model. Some works have been done so far to address some issues concern of 0-0
model see for example [4, 29, 30, 32, 78, 80, 97, 130, 169].
The access control model for O O D B systems which supports different granularity such as class-based, object-based, instance-variable-based, and/or contentbased authorization, still needs more investigation. There is also a need for the
design of a more efficient mechanism to derive implicit privileges during query
processing.

1.2 Goals and Outline of the Thesis

The primary goal of this work is to present the results of my investigation an
study of data security for object-oriented database ( O O D B ) systems, and to design a more efficient mechanism to enforce access control and new security models
for open problems such as instance-based, and content-based authorizations in
O O D B systems. The thesis is arranged as follows.
Chapter 2 deals with the basic concepts of O O D B model. The key concepts
of 0-0 data model (such as types, classes, objects, complex objects, aggregation,
inheritance, encapsulation, and methods) are discussed. Database functionalities
such as persistence, secondary-storage management, security, authorization, concurrency, and recovery are described. The view concept is also introduced in this
chapter.
Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the database security. Some basic
facts, methods, and terminology are discussed. Security threats, requirements,
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and problems that arise in the pursuit of meeting these requirements for security in O O D B systems are illustrated. The chapter also shows how much effort
has been put info the design of access control models. The two major access
control approaches, mandatory access control ( M A C ) and discretionary access
control ( D A C ) , are illustrated. Access matrix and Bell-LaPadula models as the
most widely used for access control are presented. Then, several proposals for
discretionary and mandatory security models for the protection of conventional
databases and O O D B systems are presented and some drawbacks of the solutions
are pointed out.
Chapter 4 describes a cryptographic mechanism for the discretionary access
control in O O D B systems. The solution applies pseudo-random functions, sibling
intractable function families (SIFF), and an authorization class (instead of access
control lists). Pseudo-random functions and SIFF are used in such a way that
unique and secure access keys for each entity (object or class) can be derived for
the objects which are in relationship or by users who are members of the proper
group. The security of the system is based on the difficulty of predicting the
output of pseudo-random functions andfindingextra collisions for SIFF functions,
both of which are known to be computationally difficult.
In Chapter 5, we describe a solution for content-based authorization in O O D B
systems employing views. The chapter provides discretionary security requirements for authorization systems and presents rules for computing an implicit
authorization from the explicitly defined one along with the three authorization
dimensions, users, access privileges, and views.
Chapter 6 shows how to use the view concept to implement a multi-level security policy on the top of a single-level O O D B system. The chapter describes
the multi-level view, the content and context-classification, and the dynamic classification and ways of their handling in context of the view model. Finally the
aggregation and inference problems are investigated in the view context.
Chapter 7 concludes the thesis and discusses some possible directions for the
future work.
Appendix A describes a method of the authentication of data in database
systems based on the use of pseudo-random functions and the SIFF suggested by
Hardjono, Zheng and Seberry [101].
In Appendix B, a sketch of the implementation of SIFF function is presented.
Parts of this work have been published as references [17, 18, 20, 21, 19]. The
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papers represent a joint collaboration with m y supervisor A/Prof. J. Pieprzyk,
and m y co-supervisors, Dr. R. Safavi-Naini and Dr. J. R. Getta. The problem
definition and the preliminary versions of all four papers were the result of m y own
works. Further modifications of some technical points and improvements of their
presentations were handled through fruitful discussions with A/Prof. Pieprzyk,
Dr. Safavi-Naini, and Dr. Getta. Hence it would be fair to say that I did at least
85 per cent of the whole works.

Chapter 2
Object-Oriented Database
System Concepts
2.1 Introduction

Since the theme of this thesis is access control methods in the object-orient
database ( O O D B ) systems, we need an object-oriented (0-0) framework. This
is required by the fact that there is no standard 0-0 data model. Although
O D M G ' 9 3 [11, 135] and others are striving to achieve an international agreement
towards acceptable standards, a prospect of working out standards for the 0-0
data model still looks distant. In this chapter, we first present some 0-0 concepts
which, in our view, can be incorporated within any 0-0 data model. It is not
our intention to specify all details of 0-0 data model. W e are going to present
concepts and properties which are used further in our work. The model discussed
here has been widely accepted (see for example [7, 10, 11, 12, 23, 14, 28, 45,
47, 131, 135, 126]) in the 0-0 modeling world. W e discuss key concepts for an
0-0 data model such as types/classes, objects, complex objects, aggregation,
inheritance, encapsulation, and methods.
In recent years there has been considerable efforts in the research and development of 0-0 databases ( O R I O N [124], O N T O S [164], <92 [74], Objectivity/DB
[159], and V E R S A N T [218]). Despite these efforts, the term O O D B system is
not well defined. The ambiguity in the term O O D B system is largely a result
of different emphasis on either the database or 0-0 programming language side.
Historically, the notion of an O O D B system has its roots in 0-0 programming
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languages. In fact, some 0-0 languages and their implementations have been
extended to incorporate database functionality such as persistence, secondarystorage management, security, authorization, concurrency, and versions. Hence,
we discuss database functionalities which every O O D B system must have, and
present a list of features for which O O D B systems may differ and may be used
as a basis for comparison with different systems.
Finally, the concept of a view is discussed because we believe that the use
of views can help in solving some security problems of access control system in
O O D B systems. It is possible to define views with different granularity such as
class-based, object-based, instance-variable-based, and/or content-based authorization. In Chapters 5 and 6, we present new models based on views for this
purpose.

2.2 Object-Oriented Data Model-Concepts

Unlike relational database systems whose model was clearly defined by Codd [52
the O O D B systems do not have any widely accepted model. There are, however,
some basic 0-0 concepts that are generally accepted (see [7, 10, 11, 12, 14, 16,
23, 24, 28, 45, 47, 131, 135, 126]).
The basic concepts of an 0-0 data model include:
• Objects and identities. Each real-world entity is modeled as an object with
a unique identifier.
• Classes and types. A collection of similar objects forms a class. All objects
of one class contain the same properties (or instance-variables). Each object
is an instance of some class.
• Complex (or composite) objects. The internal structure of an object is defined by class properties and their domains. The domains of properties
can be complex or simple. In the case of complex domain, the value of a
property can be an object or a set of objects.

• Class hierarchies and inheritance. Classes are organized into a hierarchical
structure. There are two types of hierarchies which are orthogonal to each

other: class-composition hierarchy and class-inheritance hierarchy [126].
The class-composition hierarchy captures the z's-par£-o/relationship between
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a parent class and its component classes, whereas a class-inheritance hierarchy represents the is-a relationship between a superclass and its subclasses.
Properties are inherited by the subclasses of the class in the hierarchy.
• Encapsulation. Each object contains and defines both methods (or procedures) and the interface that can be used to access and modify the object
by other objects. The interface of an object consists of the set of operations which can be invoked on the object. Only the methods implementing
operations for the object are allowed to manipulate the state of the object,
i.e., users can only access the values of properties through methods.
• Polymorphism and binding. Different methods can be associated with a single operation name, leaving the system to determine which method should
be used in order to execute a given operation. The overloading of operations, early binding at compilation time, and late binding at runtime are
allowed.
Now, each of these concepts will be described in more detail.

2.2.1 Objects and Identity
In 0-0 systems, all real world entities are modeled as objects.

Every object

encapsulates a state and a behavior. The state of an object is implemented by
properties (or instance-variables), and the behavior of an object is encapsulated in
methods that operate on the state of the object. As a result, an object is something
that owns "resources" and provides some services based on these resources. These
resources are simple data elements (properties), and services are methods (or
behaviors).
Each object is associated with a unique identifier called object identifier (OID)
and may also be given a name.1 The identity of an object exists independently of
the values of the object properties. The system should guarantee that the OID
is never reused and identifies only a single object during its lifetime.
x

T h e idea of unique system-generated identifiers for objects is necessary to eliminate the
shortcomings of primary keys and value-based models. T h e use of unique identifiers for objects
has been a feature of semantic data models for a number of years under the n a m e of surrogates
[53]. For the detailed discussion of problems of identifying an entity on the value of an attribute
that is called primary key and advantage of using O I D s over key, the reader is directed to [28, 47].
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Object identity generates at least two notions of equality for objects. The fi
is identity equality: if they have the same OIDs. The second is value equality: two
objects are equal if they have the same value. Hence, two objects are different if
they have different OIDs even when their properties have the same values.

Definition 2.1 An object o is a quadruple: object identifier, its name, its cl

and its state that is o=(OID, oname, class, state) where OID is the unique obje

identifier, oname is the name of the object given by the creator, class specifie

the class of which the object is an instance, and state represents the value of t
object [24, 131, 155]. •

2.2.2 Classes and Types
The primary schema level concepts of database models are types and classes. In
the relational model, tables are considered to be types (the definition of table
attributes includes the type definition while rows of a table are instances of the
type). In 0-0 data models, this issue is ambiguous, i.e., some 0-0 systems
support only types (all systems from the Smalltalk family and derived from LISP
such as Gemstone [43], Orion [124], G-Base [156], etc.); others support only classes
(all systems from the C + + family, like Objectstore [128], 0 2 [74], etc.), and some
support both.
A type defines the c o m m o n features of a set of objects with the same characteristics. It corresponds to the notion of an abstract data type [24] and has
two roles: (i) to denote structure and (ii) to identify extensions, i.e., domains of
elements. In general, in type-based system, types are mainly used at compilation
time to check the correctness of the program.
A class is a set of objects which have exactly the same internal structure
and therefore the same properties and the same methods. The class defines the
implementation of a set of objects, while a type describes how such objects can
be used.
Often the concepts type and class are used interchangeably. But, when both
are used in the same system, the type refers to the specification of the interface
of a set of objects, whereas the class refers to the implementation [11, 134]. A
class can implement several types. If a class implements a type, it automatically
implements all the supertypes of that type.
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Concepts

Definition 2.2 A class c is a triple: class name, its structure, and its methods,
i.e., c=(cname,

class-struct, method-list) where cname

is the name

of the class,

class-struct is its structure, and method-list is the list of methods that are used to
access and modify instances of the class [24, 155]. •
The class-struct defines the properties of the instances of cname and their
domains. T h e method-list contains a roster of methods that can access instances
of cname and manipulate them. A method consists of two components: signature
and body. T h e signature specifies the n a m e of the method, the n a m e s and class
of input arguments, and the class of output values as well as any exceptional
conditions [28, 135]. Therefore the signature is the specification of the operation
implemented by the method. T h e body specifies code (or procedure) to manipulate
the values of input arguments, and to generate output.

2.2.3 Complex (or Composite) Objects
A n object is described by properties (or instance-variables) which m a k e up the
descriptive part of the object. Objects with their descriptive parts only are called
objects. A n object m a y have internal structure that is composed of low level components such as relationships, or other objects that together form structural part
of the object. Objects with internal structures are called complex (or composite)
objects.
A complex object can be constructed using: tuples, sets, bags, lists, arrays,
etc. A n y system must have at least set, list, and tuple as a constructor. A n y
constructor should be applicable to any object. Note that the support of complex
objects also requires that appropriate operators are provided to deal with such
objects. For example, it must be possible to retrieve, copy, or delete an entire
complex object and to maintain referential integrity a m o n g related objects.
Definition 2.3 A complex (composite) object is comp = [Pi : Pi(T{),..., Pk •
pk(Tk)}, where Pi is a name

of property; T,- is a type name

of the respective

property and pi is an optional type constructor, e.g. set-of, collection-of, arrayof, ordered list, etc. The set of type names includes the names

of atomic data

types like integer, real, string, etc. as well as the names of classes that have been
defined earlier. •
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The domain of a property of a composite class c m a y be another class c'.
c' can be in turn defined in terms of other classes. The set of classes in the
schema is then organized in a composition (or aggregation) hierarchy [126]. The
composition hierarchy captures the is-part-of relationship among objects. The
class c is a parent of c' or c' is a descendent of c. For example, in Figure 2.1, ex
represent computers in the real world. Computers have central processing units
(CPU), memory units, and I/O units. These facts are modeled in the database
by a hierarchical structure where cx is the root and the classes c2, c3, c4 create
thefirstlevel of nodes. This structure can be extended to include classes c5,...,
c8 which are children of c2, c3, c4. The hierarchy forms a composite class in which
the classes c2, c3,..., c8 are parts of the class cx (or they are descendants of class
Ci), and
Ci=[CPU:c2, Memory-unit:set-of (c3), I/0-unit:c4],
c2=[ALU:c6, Control-unit:c5], ...

Computer set

2
Memory Unit

CPU

J
ALU

v.

Control Unit

I/O Unit

Keyboard

Printer

Figure 2.1: Computer set class.

It is worth noting that classes in a composition hierarchy can be defined
recursively, so this is not a hierarchy in the strict sense of the word.

2.2.4

Inheritance and Class Hierarchy

The concept of inheritance is a mechanism of reusability. Bancilhon [14] points
out that the inheritance concept is the most powerful concept of 0-0 data model.
One of the most important advantages of inheritance is that it helps to separate
shared specifications and implementations in applications. With inheritance, a
class called a subclass can be defined on the basis of the definition of another
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class called a superclass. The subclass inherits the properties, and methods of
its superclass. In addition, a subclass can have its own specific properties, and
methods.
For example, imagine that we must create two classes which contain information concerning students and employees of a university. The information about
student consists of identity number, name, age, address, sex, subject, start date,
graduate date, and the greatest average point. The information concerning employees are: identity number, name, age, address, sex, rank, hire date, status,
profession, and salary. In the relational model, two relations must be defined,
one for students STUDENT(sidno,

name, age, address, sex, subject, start-date,

graduate-date, GAP) and one for employees EMPLOYEE(eidno,

name, age, ad-

dress, sex, rank, hire-date, status, profession, salary). Using the inheritance con
cept, it is recognized that students and employees are human beings and they then
have certain c o m m o n features, and other features which differentiate them. First
the class PERSON

is introduced. This class has the c o m m o n properties idno,

name, age, address, and sex. The classes STUDENT

and EMPLOYEE

contain

only the properties that are different for them. The resulting inheritance hierarchy is shown in Figure 2.2. Thefigureshows two arrows from classes

STUDENT

PERSON
idno
name

age
address

sex
is-a
iMPLOYEE

is-a

STUDENT
subject

rank
Start-Date
profession
salary

Graduate-Dafc

GAP
Figure 2.2: A n example of inheritance hierarchy.

and EMPLOYEE

to class PERSON. Both STUDENT and EMPLOYEE

are sub-

classes of PERSON and vice versa PERSONIs the superclass for STUDENT and
3 0009 03178495 7
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EMPLOYEE. •
In certain systems, a class can have multiple superclasses. 0-0 data models
which allow an object to have multiple types/classes are called multiple inheritance models. Other models that allow a single superclass only are called single
inheritance models. Multiple and single inheritance are useful in reducing the
number and complexity of classes required in a data schema. However, conflicts
may arise if two or more superclasses have the same name for their properties but
are from different domains. Generally, appropriate rules must be in place to solve
such conflicts. Note that the need for multiple inheritance is rarer than the need
for single inheritance [126]. Thus some 0-0 data models do not handle multiple
inheritance. Also the implementation of the multiple inheritance is difficult.
The essential aspect of inheritance is the relationship between: superclass and
its subclasses. The superclass, in turn, can be a subclass of other classes. Classes
can be organized into the inheritance (or generalization) hierarchy , which is an
orthogonal organization with respect to the composition (or aggregation) hierarchy [41, 126, 197]. The composition hierarchy captures the is-part-of relationship
between a parent class and its component classes, whereas an inheritance hierarchy represents the is-a relationship between a superclass and its subclasses.
The most significant difference of the inheritance hierarchy compared with the
composition hierarchy is that the inheritance graph (representing the hierarchy)
cannot be cyclic. The composition graph (representing the hierarchy) may have
cycles. Inheritance hierarchy can be represented by a directed acyclic graph (or
a lattice) [16]. Inheritance is often called subtyping, and subclassing.
In [10, 28, 47], four types of inheritance are identified: specialization inheri-

tance, substitution inheritance, classification (or inclusion) inheritance, an
straint inheritance.

The differences between the various inheritance concepts

depend upon the significance of the class (or the type). For the sake of our
discussion, assume that c is a subclass of a class c'.
1. Specialization inheritance. Subclasses have more properties or methods
than their superclasses. For example, STUDENT
classes of PERSON.2

or EMPLOYEE

are sub-

Each of them has additional properties:

STUDENT

has subject, Start-Date, Graduate-Date, and GAP and EMPLOYEE2

See Figure 2.3 in Section 2.2.7 for the detail specification of STUDENT,

PERSON.

EMPLOYEE,

rank,
and
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profession, and salary. If the subclass does not override inherited properties, it m a y be useful to think of it as the concatenation of its own definition
with the definition of its superclasses.
2. Substitution inheritance. The structure of c and c' is the same. The
only difference is that c' contains more methods. Any occurrence of c' can
be substituted by c.
3. Classification (or inclusion) inheritance. This inheritance happens if
every object of class c is also an object of class c'. This type of inheritance
is based on structure and not on behavior. Subclasses just may be used as
sets to classify objects, i.e., to define different extent. For example, we could

classify an EMPLOYEE
or PROGRAMMERS

as a TECHNICAL-STAFF,

ACADEMIC-STAFF,

even if all three have the same structure and methods

associated with them.
4. Constraint inheritance. Subclasses are defined using class predicates.
A class c is a subclass of a class c' if it consists of all objects of class c'
that satisfy a given constraint. For example, MANAGER
EMPLOYEE

is a subclass of

because managers don't have any more properties or methods

than employees but they obey of more specific constraints, their profession
are managers (profession =
MANAGER

"manager"). As observed, each instance of

is an instance of EMPLOYEE.

This type of inheritance is a

subclass of the inclusion inheritance.

It is important to note that the different types of generalization are provid
by the same subclass mechanism.

2.2.5 Encapsulation
The idea of encapsulation addresses the following:
1. the need to clearly distinguish between the structural definition of object
(specification) and the implementation of operations;
2. the need of modularity;

3. the need to define a specific set of operations (or methods) for each comp
object type; and

Chapter 2.

Object-Oriented Database System Concepts

14

4. the protection of data part of an object from an unauthorized access [10].
Therefore, a number of 0-0 systems allow the definer of a new class not only
to give the structure of that class, but also to determine the set of methods by
which the user can access and manipulate objects of the class. W e can say that
the methods (or operations) are encapsulated with the specification of object. In
other words, a behavioral description of object has been given, i.e., the structure and methods. The properties associated with an object are private, and
only object methods m a y access or modify these data; the methods are publicly
accessible.3
Some 0-0 systems apply strict encapsulation of object only, so publicly defined methods only are visible to users of the system. There are however cases in
which encapsulation is not necessary. The usage of the system can be significantly
simplified if strict encapsulation is not forced. For example, with ad-hoc queries
the need for encapsulation is reduced since queries are very often expressed in
terms of predicates on the values of the attributes. Therefore, some O O D B systems allow direct access to properties and supply system-defined operations to
read and modify the properties. In [28], the authors mentioned two advantages
of direct access to the properties. They are:
• there is no need to develop a large number of generally conventional methods, and
• the efficiency of the applications increases as direct access is implemented
using system-provided operations.
Obviously, the violation of encapsulation can cause problems. Un-authorized
access to the values of properties may occur. Authorization systems can be used
to control access to certain properties and methods.
A problem of considerable importance concerns whether code of methods of
derived classes (subclasses) must have free access to the properties and methods
defined in their superclasses. Where inheritance applies, the set of properties of
3

There are two views of encapsulation: the programming language view, and the database
view [10, 28, 145]. Encapsulation in programming language derives from the concept of abstract
data types. In abstract data-type declarations, an object has the interface part and the implementation part. T h e interface part is the only visible part of the object and provides methods
to access the object. T h e data structure is part of the implementation and is not visible. In
databases, it is not clear whether the structure is part of the interface or not. S o m e databases
allows data structure to be in the interface and publicly visible.

pp. 15-31 missing from original copies of this thesis

Chapter 3
Security In Databases
3.1 Introduction
Information is a critical resource in today's enterprises, whether they are military, industrial, commercial, educational, medical, etc. These organizations are
n o w automating not only their basic operational functions, such as invoicing,
payroll, and stock control, but also management-support functions such as sales
forecasting, budgeting, andfinancialcontrol. In order to support these functions,
enterprises maintain m o r e and m o r e computerized information in databases, and
they increasingly depend on that information for their correct functioning. T h e
continued successful operation of an enterprise d e m a n d s that:
1. Confidential data is available only to authorized persons, so that privacy
requirements are satisfied and the sensitive information is protected.
2. The data accurately reflects the state of the enterprise, that is, the data is
protected against either malicious or accidental modification.
These requirements are of the concern of database security. Database security comprises a set of measures, policies, and mechanisms to provide secrecy,
integrity, and availability of data and to protect the system from possible attacks
which might be launched by insiders and outsiders, either malicious or accidental
[46, 176]. T h e aim of secrecy (or confidentiality) is to keep information unreadable for outsiders while making it available for authorized users. Integrity of
information covers methods and techniques to protect information against illegal
modification. Availability of information ensures that authorized users can have
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access to information whenever they require it [65]. To achieve security in the
database environment, it is necessaryfirstto identify threats so later a selection
of proper security policies and mechanisms can be made. Security policies define
what the security system is expected to do [163]. Security mechanisms define how
the security system should achieve the security goals [25].
In order to obtain database protection, Denning [65] lists four kinds of con-

trol: access control, informationflowcontrol, cryptographic control, and infer
control. A n access control ensures that all direct accesses to the system are authorized according to access rules given by the security policies. The access control
governs who can access objects. Once the access is granted, the involvement of
the access control ends. Often, leakage of information happens not because of a
defective access control, but as the result of lack of a proper policy about information flow. The informationflowcontrol makes sure that protected information
"contained" in some objects does not flow explicitly (through copy) or implicitly
into less protected objects, and regulates how the information is accessible (irrespective where it is stored). The cryptographic control makes data unintelligent
to anybody except someone who knows the correct cryptographic key. The inference control protects information against its disclosure via different ways of
deduction.
In this chapter, a survey of the access control models is presented. The emphasis is put on access control models in O O D B systems. The survey discuss neither
the application of cryptographic techniques in databases security nor inference
control. For references, see [3, 46, 65, 103, 132, 166, 168, 191, 224].
Sections 3.2 and 3.3 state threats to database security and the security requirements for databases, respectively. Section 3.4 describes the concept of the
access control, the policy choices, and classifies the access control policies. In
Sections 3.5 and 3.6, discretionary access control in conventional databases and
O O D B systems are discussed. Sections 3.7, 3.8, and 3.9 are devoted to mandatory
access control ( M A C ) . The Bell-LaPadula security model, M A C models in conventional databases, and M A C models in O O D B systems are presented. A brief
discussion of role-based access control is presented in Section 3.10. Three types
of architecture for multi-level databases are discussed in Section 3.11. Sections
3.12 and 3.13 provide a general concepts of inference control and cryptographic
control. Section 3.14 summaries the chapter.
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3.2

Threats to Database Security

Usually, a threat can be identified with a hostile agent who either accidentally
or intentionally gains an unauthorized access to the protected database resources
[46]. Threats to the database security m a y be physical or logical. Physical threats
range from a forced disclosure of passwords, a theft, a destruction of physical
storage devices to a power failure. T h e protection against these threats comprises
a variety of different methods and techniques. T h e restriction of physical access
to database storage facilities and the database backup and recovery are c o m m o n
protection methods.
Logical threats involve unauthorized logical (i.e. via software) access to information. T h e y can result with: disclosure of confidential information, illegal
modification of data, or destruction of database resource. T h e logical threats can
be classified as follows [46, 67]:
• Disclosure of information which includes direct or indirect access (by inference) to protected information.
• Illegal modification of data which is caused by improper possibly accidental
data handling or intentional modifications by an illegal user (these threats
relate to all attacks to data integrity).
• Denial of Service which results from the monopolization of system resources
in such a w a y that other users cannot access them. This involves all attacks
on availability.
These threats can occur intentionally or accidentally. Accidental threats include: natural disasters such as earthquakes or water/fire damage, errors or bugs
in hardware or software, or human

errors. Intentional threats can be caused by

authorized users w h o abuse their privileges and authorities, or by hostile users
w h o execute s o m e hidden codes within some legitimate functions in order to
violate the security of the system.

Trojan Horses, viruses, and trapdoors are

examples of hidden codes. A Trojan Horse is hidden code that under a legitim a t e function collects information which is later used to break the security of
the system. A virus is a code that is able to copy itself and d a m a g e permanently
the environment where it resides. Trapdoors are code segments within programs
that allow their owners to skip the protection mechanisms and to access data or
system sources beyond their rights.
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3.3

Database Security Requirements

To eliminate logical threats, it is necessary to define a proper security policy. The
database is considered to be secure if a protection mechanism correctly enforces
the security policy. Note that there can be m a n y security mechanisms which
realize the s a m e security policy.
A security policy must have appropriate security features. These features
should be implemented by a security mechanism. T h e following list gives a typical
collection of security policies for databases [46, 71, 166].
• Access control policy ensures that all direct accesses to the system objects proceed according to the privileges and the access rules. Access control
policies can be either mandatory

or discretionary. A discretionary access

control policy specifies users' privileges to different system resources, including their ability to transfer their privileges to other users. A

mandatory

access control policy restricts the access of users to system objects on the basis of their security clearance and security classification assigned to objects.
Mandatory access control policies are of concern in multi-level databases.
• Inference policy specifies how to protect classified information from disclosure w h e n the information is released indirectly in the form of statistical
data.
• User identification/authentication policy indicates the requirements
for correct identification of users. T h e user identification is the basis of every
security mechanism. Users are allowed to access data after the identification
as authorized users.
• Accountability and audit policy provides the requirements for the record
keeping of all accesses to the database. It is an useful deterrent tool for data
physical integrity, as well as it is useful for the analysis of the access profile.
• Consistency policy defines the states in which the database is considered valid or correct and includes operational integrity, semantic integrity,
and physical integrity of database. Operational integrity aims to ensure
the logical consistency of data in a database during concurrent transactions. Semantic integrity ensures the logical consistency of modified data
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by checking if data values are in the allowed range. Physical integrity of
database aims to ensure that the database is immune to (or reconstructable
after) physical threats such as power failures.

Most of the effort of the research in the database security has been spent on
thefirsttwo issues.
It is crucial to be able to evaluate to what degree the security features have
been incorporated into the mechanism. The evaluation of security (trusted) systems (mechanisms) is an integral part of the design process. Here is a list of the
existing evaluation criteria:
- Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria - TCSEC

(also known as the

Orange Book), U S Department of Defense [73],
- Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria - ITSEC (also known
as the White Book), Commission of the European Communities [54], and
- Canadian Trusted Computer Product Evaluation Criteria - CTCPEC),

Cana-

dian System Security Centre [44].
The evaluation of trusted systems (products) can be characterized by:

1. Completeness. This is measured by a list of possible threats against which
the system is immune.
2. Confidence. The degree of trust that the system is immune against the
specified threats.

3. System flexibility. The system should be able to implement different variants of security policies.
4. Ease of use. The system should not impose unnecessary or cumbersome
restrictions.
5. Tamperproof. If a security mechanism itself is protected from unauthorized
modification, then this mechanism is said to be tamperproof. This is an
essential characteristic, since even if a security mechanism was proved to be
correct, any later modifications to it could degrade its security.
6. Low overhead. The difference in performance of the system with and without its security mechanism should be as small as possible.
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7. Low operating cost. This includes the cost of special hardware or software,
the cost of security audits, salaries of security officers and others w h o are
involved in performing security-related functions.

3.4 Access Control
There are two classes of resources in any computer system: (active) subjects
and (passive) objects. T h e w a y a subject accesses an object is called the access
privilege (or access m o d e ) . Access privileges allow subjects to either manipulate
objects (read, write, execute, etc.) or modify the access control information
(transfer ownership, grant and revoke privileges, etc.).
T h e correctness of access control heavily relies on the following:
• the proper user identification, and
• the protection of access control mechanism.
T h e access control m a y be based on different policies. T h e choice of a security
policy is important because it influences theflexibility,usability, and performance
of the system [82]. While working out a proper security policy, it is necessary to
proceed with it according to "a good design guide" which includes the following
principles [46, 82, 130]:
M i n i m u m vs m a x i m u m privilege principle. According to the

minimum

privilege principle, subjects should be given the m i n i m u m set of privileges necessary for their activity (also called the least privilege). T h e opposite of this is
the maximum

privilege principle which is based on the principle of the m a x i m u m

availability of data in a database. Subjects are given access to the largest range
of system resources.
O p e n vs closed s y s t e m principle. In an open system, all accesses that are
not explicitly forbidden are allowed. While in a closed system, all accesses are
allowed only if explicitly authorized. A closed system is inherently m o r e secure.
W h e n security is an important objective, a closed system should be implemented.
Centralized vs decentralized administration principle. T h e principle
addresses the issues w h o is responsible for the maintenance and m a n a g e m e n t of
privileges in the access control model. In centralized administration, a single
authority (or group) controls all security aspects of the system, while in a decentralized system different authorities control different portions of the database.
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The choice between centralized or decentralized administration has to be made.
There are some advantages and disadvantages related to each choice (for detailed
discussion of those, the reader is directed to [34]). There are, however, some intermediate choices such as: delegation, owner-based administration, and co-operative
administration.
Delegation can be used in a centralized database system to avoid bottleneck
and support local autonomy in a distributed database system. A central authority
delegates their administrative rights over a subset of the database to the local
authority. The central authority can nominate and dismiss local authorities.
Owner-based administration - the central authority passes all responsibilities
and rights to the owners of objects. The central authority assigned a collection
of system privileges to every user when is admitted to the database system.
Co-operative administration - some privileges are reserved to groups. To exercise the access, a single member of the groups needs to get permission from the
rest of the group.
Granularity principle - a clear specification of size and structure of the
smallest object to which access control can be handled. Five types of granularity
can be distinguished [65, 82]:
1. Name-dependent (also called content-independent). All accessible objects
are identified by their unique names.
2. Content-dependent (also called constraint-based). Accessible objects are
determined by checking the requested attributes. This granularity can be
veryfinedepending on the selection of the applicable attributes.
3. Context-dependent. The access is granted to the object whose structure is
defined by a rule which checks not only names and attributes but also their
structural relation (context).

4. History-dependent. This is a generalization of the context-dependent granularity in which the current access request is checked also against all previous
access requests.

5. Time-dependent. The collection of accessible objects can vary in time ( for
instance, a subject may be authorized to read from the class
only between 8:00am and 5:00pm).

EMPLOYEE
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A c c e s s privilege (or access m o d e ) principle. A basic collection of allowable access privileges includes: read, write, delete, execute, and create. They
m a y be ordered. So if a user (subject) has a privilege of higher order, this implies
that (s)he has also all privileges of lower order. Users can be assigned explicitly
a collection of suitable privileges for each protected object - this is also called
positive authorizations. O n the other hand, in the negative authorizations, users
are given a collection of privileges which are explicitly denied.
There are three different types of access control: discretionary access control
(DAC),

mandatory

access control (MAC),

and role based access control

(RBAC).

A system m a y employ D A C , M A C or their combination of both, or R B A C for
protection.
A discretionary access control specifies privileges of subjects in accessing objects, and the rules whereby subjects can, at their discretion, grant and revoke
their privileges to other subjects.
A mandatory

access control identifies the rules whereby subjects can obtain

direct or indirect access to classified data. T h e rules can also be used for sanitizing
and reclassifying data. T h e M A C applies only to multi-level databases, which are
databases that contain information of different security classification.
A role-based access control enforces the least privilege and the separation of
duties. This is especially important in some database applications where subjects
(users) can be assigned roles to perform specific tasks (defined by the role). Each
role has an associated collection of privileges. This collection is automatically
transferred to a subject w h o plays the role.

3.5 Discretionary Access Control Models
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) allows privileges to be granted to other subjects by the object owners. In discretionary security the w a y in which individual
users (subjects) manipulate specific objects is determined explicitly through access rules. T h e y are fundamental to operating systems (as a m e a n s of protecting
files, m e m o r y segments, etc.) as well as database systems. D A C has been studied
in the context of the access matrix model.
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Access Matrix Model

The access matrix model was developed by Lampson in 1971 [129] and extended
by Graham and Denning [93]. Later, Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman [106] developed a more general version of the model. They defined the safety problem and
showed that it was undecidable. The access matrix model is defined for three
components: subjects (active entities such as users, their processes, etc.), objects
(passive entities such asfiles,records, classes, instances, views etc.), and the collection of privileges (read, write, delete, create, execute, etc.). Note that the class
of objects contains all subjects. Having these three components, it is possible to
define an access matrix A. Rows of A are indexed by all subjects (their names)
(S) and columns - by names of all objects (O). Each entry A[s,o] contains a collection of privileges held by subject 5 to object o. A representation of an access
control matrix is shown in Table 3.1.

Objects
Subjects Ox
A[sx,Ox,
Sx

A[SX,OJ]

o3

om
A[sx,om]

•

St

A[si,ox

A[si,Oj]

A[si,om]

*~>n

A[sn,ox]

A\sn,o3)

s*-[Sn, O m J

Table 3.1: Access matrix
The access control matrix can be used for protection in both operating systems and databases. In databases, access control matrix needs to be extended.
Every entry A[s,o] of the matrix contains (apart from privileges) a suitable condition which needs to be satisfied by the subject s to access the object o. The
condition can incorporate different types of access such as content-dependent,
context-dependent, etc. ( for full list of access types, see Section 3.4). Fernandez
[81], and Conway [56] showed how to generalize the access matrix model by using
predicates and other components.
Observe that in general, an access control matrix A is sparse. A direct storage
of the matrix A wastes a lot of memory. A simple solution is to store the matrix
A as a sequence of either rows (Capability List) or columns (Access Control List).
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For each subject s, there is the unique capability list (row of A). Each element
of the list indicates an object and the collection of privileges the subject has to
the object. Note that the list does not contain empty entries. If there is no list
entry for a given object, the subject cannot access it. Capability lists (CL) allow
the system to identify quickly the collection of all accessible objects for a given
subject. The opposite, i.e.findingthe collection of all subjects who have access
to a given object, is difficult and time consuming. Capability lists are used by
the operating systems only [71].
Access control lists (ACL) are associated with their objects (columns of the
access control matrix A). For a given object, the list consists of all non-empty
entries of the column of A. This implementation allows for quick identification
of subjects who can access an object. O n the other hand, the recreation of the
capability list for a subject from A C L is difficult. A C L are used in both operating
systems and database systems [71].
Note that in both implementations the storage requirements increase with the
growth of the number of subjects and objects. In particular, the maintenance of
such lists is expensive in terms of time and consumed computing resources.
However, the access matrix provides a flexible model which can be used to
analyze its security properties. It is known [46, 147] that the general safety
problem is undecidable, i.e., there is no algorithm which can be used to verify
the security of the access control matrix model. But it is still possible to restrict
the model and design an algorithm which can be used to prove some security
properties. Some work has been done to extend the access matrix model to
make the safety problem decidable. This includes the Schematic Protection Model
[9, 178, 179] and the Typed Access Matrix Model [181].

3.6 DAC Models in OODB Systems

In recent years there has been considerable efforts in the research and develo
ment of object-oriented databases. O R I O N [124], O N T O S [164], 0 2 [74], Objectivity/DB [159], Iris [222], and V E R S A N T [218] are examples of such efforts. The
driving forces behind these efforts are the advantages offered by 0-0 approach
to database modeling. In particular it is possible to represent the composite (or
complex) structure of objects and to simulate the behavior of objects through
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operations encapsulated within the classes. In order to fully exploit the benefits of the 0 - 0 paradigm, it is important to consider h o w the 0 - 0 data model
impacts on access control models. T o avoid confusion, w e will use the term entity to refer to a passive item in protection system instead of object, and the
term object has the meaning usually associated with the 0 - 0 environment. Note
that the term object is usually used in literature for such a passive item. Let
us consider the following important issues related to D A C in 0 - 0 environment
[34, 46, 144, 199, 206].
• Access privileges (or access modes). One of attractive features of OODB
systems is encapsulation. Encapsulation allows data to be stored as values of properties (or instance-variables) that are encapsulated in an object
and available only through the methods defined for the object. In order to
take advantage of the encapsulation feature, the access control model (or
authorization model) should support privileges to execute these methods
(instead of traditional privileges such as read, write, and create). Moreover since methods can call other methods, it would be appropriate also to
consider methods as subjects.
• Propagation of privileges (or authorizations). OODB systems allow that
classes are organized into a hierarchy of classes. There are two types of hierarchies which are orthogonal to each other: a class-composition hierarchy
and a class-inheritance hierarchy [126]. T h e class-composition hierarchy
captures the is-part-of relationship between a parent class and its component classes. Whereas the class-inheritance hierarchy represents the is-a
relationship between a superclass and its subclasses. There is a question h o w to assign privileges to objects in these hierarchies? In particular w e
would like to k n o w whether a privilege the subject has to a class, is valid also
to all descendants of the class for the class-composition hierarchy (visibility
from above [130]). O r whether a privilege to a subclass is valid to the property values of the superclasses on the higher levels of the class-inheritance
hierarchy (visibility from below [130]). Additionally, O O D B systems must
provide a policy for solving possible authorization conflicts between explicit
privileges (privileges assigned directly) and implicit privileges (privileges
derived through the hierarchies).
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• Authorization administration. In most access control models when a user
(subject) creates a new element, (s)he becomes its owner. The owner controls the distribution of privileges to it. So, the unit of ownership cannot be
a class since classes often represent just templates for users to derive their
own instances. Hence, there is a need to allow class instances to be units
of ownerships. Being more specific, the access control policy must clearly
spell out how the class owner can affect the privileges of other users especially in the context of instance-of, class-inheritance, and class-composition
relationships.
• Granularity of authorization.

It should be possible to control access to

single object-instances, entire classes, and properties (instance-variables)
[169]. For the class-based authorization, a subject can access a class and
all its instances. For the instance-based authorization, instances of a class
are units of authorizations. A subject may have authorization to a subset
of the instances of a class. For instance-variable-based authorization, access
control on instance-variables or properties is allowed. A subject can be
limited to access only a part of an object. Moreover, the model of access
control should take into account semantic constructions such as composite
objects and versions.
• Content-based authorization. Authorization may be defined in terms of the
ability to invoke a certain method on an object. The access control policy
must specify how we can access the object content for checking the condition
if a method which can access the required properties cannot be invoked?
Access control models for O O D B systems are still being investigated [27].
Although there is an undeniable progress in the area, there are few O O D B systems
only (Orion [169] and Iris [4]) which provide access control models similar to those
provided by the current relational databases.
Dittrich [75] divided O O D B systems into three categories: structurally, behaviorally, and fully O O D B systems. Structurally O O D B systems can handle
composite (or complex) object structures (i.e. objects that may result from the
aggregation of other objects) using generic privileges. Behaviorally O O D B systems provide an interface to deal with objects and methods on different levels
of the inheritance hierarchy. Fully O O D B systems combine the properties of
structurally and behaviorally O O D B systems.
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Access control models for these categories of O O D B systems were discussed
in [4, 29, 30, 32, 78, 80, 97, 130, 169, 170]. The models promise to offer some
solutions to the forthcoming issues. However, each of them addresses only some
of the issues, therefore many problems remain open.

3.6.1 DAC in Structurally OODB Systems
In structurally O O D B systems, the privileges are typically generic system-defined
operations such as read, write, delete, and read-definition.

DAMOKLES Access Control Model
Dittrich, Hartig, and PfefTerle [78] developed a D A C model for the D A M O K L E S
system [76]. D A M O K L E S is a structurally O O D B system for C A S E and similar
applications and its data model is called D O D M (design object data model) [77].
T w o types of objects are supported by the model: D O D M objects, and D O D M
relationships. The access control allows a user u to grant a privilege to other users
if u is the owner of an object. W h e n a user creates a database object, an object
or a relationship, (s)he becomes the owner of the created object. The ownership
m a y be transferred (by the owner) to other users or user groups. However, at any
time there is exactly one owner for every object. In other words, the ownership
is transferable but is not transitive. In the model, each access must be explicitly
authorized. The absence of appropriate privileges is interpreted as access not
allowed. The model handles both composite objects and versioned objects as
well.
The model applies the following access privileges:
• Exist - this privilege allows a user to read keys of objects.
• Read - permits a user to read object properties, objects components and
relationships roles.
• Write - allows a user to modify objects properties and roles, to insert new
components /create new versions, and to remove components/delete versions.
• Delete - enables a user to remove objects.
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The privileges are partially ordered. If a user holds a privilege of a higher order,
then they also hold all privileges of lower order. The assumed order is: exist <
read < write < delete.
The triple (s,o,r) specifies a single access rule. It means that a subject s is
assigned an access privilege r to an object o. The subject 5 is a pair s = (u,p)
where u is a user or a group of users and p is a program or program group. The
pair (u,p) can be read as "user u while executing p". The object o is a protection
object (p-object). In D A M O K L E S data model ( D O D M ) , every object (in the 00 sense) is further broken down into smaller access units called protection objects
(p-objects).

These p-objects are: the descriptive part D (object's properties),

the structural part S (the components/composite objects), version part V (the
object's versions), and role part p consisting of the relationship's roles that is
participating objects. Note that the access is explicitly granted to the D part of
a p-object. However once granted, the access extends to all object's properties.
There are two types of authorization: simple and complex. In the simple authorization, a p-object o is D, S, V, or p part of a complex object. In the complex
authorization, a privilege is given to an entire object including its components
which belong to the same owner. Thus if an object actually contains components
of various owners, a subject has to get permission from all of them to be able to
work with entire object.

LPGSF Access Control Model
Larrondo-Petrie, Guides, Song, and Fernandez [97, 130] developed an access control model ( L P G S F model). The model is based on a set of policies that define
authorization inheritance through class hierarchies. Negative authorizations can
be used to override implied privileges. Predicates (content-dependent) with positive authorization and instances along the class hierarchy can also be applied.
The model allows a decentralized administration of authorizations by users.
The access control model uses the following access entities as elementary protected objects: classes, instances of classes, and their properties (or instancevariables).
A n access rule is a tuple (5, o, r, [c]). The subject 5 is a user or a user group, r
is a privilege or a set of privileges. They can be positive or negative. The object
o is a class, an entire object O or its components, or a set of its properties, i.e.,

Chapter 3. Security In Databases

0

46

= {0.px,0.p2,...}. Properties Pi (i = 1,2,...) must be either defined for the

object 0 or inherited by it. c is a condition that must be satisfied for the object
o so that the subject 5 can use the privilege r. T h e model enforces the following
policies:
Inheritance policy. A user who has access to a class, is allowed to have the
same

type of access to subclasses and to the properties inherited from the class

satisfying the inherited conditions.
Visibility f r o m b e l o w policy. The access to a class implies the access to
the properties defined in the class as well as to properties inherited from the higher
classes (this is applicable to the class-relevant values of these attributes only). If
there is more than one ancestor (in the case of multiple inheritance), the access
to the union of the inherited properties is granted. Note that properties defined in
subclasses are not accessible by any of their superclasses.
Visibility f r o m a b o v e policy. The access to an object of a composite object
implies the access to all components of the object.
Overriding policy. An explicit positive authorization is a triple (s,o,+r).
An explicit negative authorization is a triple (s,o,—r).

An implicit positive au-

thorization is a triple [s,o,+r]. An implicit negative authorization is a triple
[s,o,—r] where s is a subject, o is an object, and r is an access privilege. We
have the following order to solve possible authorization conflicts: (s,o,—r)

>

(s,o,+r) > [s,o,-r] > [s,o,+r].

ORION Access Control Model
In 1991, Rabitti, Bertino, K i m , and Woelk [169] developed a D A C model which
has been implemented for O R I O N [124]. Their model handles the following types
of authorization: implicit, explicit, positive, negative, strong, and weak. Implicit
authorizations are deduced from explicit authorizations stored in the system.
Positive authorizations grant users access privileges to objects whereas negative
authorizations (or lack of authorizations) deny access privileges to objects for
users. A strong authorization cannot be overridden whereas weak authorizations
can be overridden by a strong or other weak authorizations. Triples (s, o, + r ) and
(s,o,—r) denote a strong positive authorization and a strong negative authorization, respectively. Triples [s,o, +r] and [s,o, —r] are a weak positive authorization
and a weak negative authorization, respectively. A s usual, s (subject) is a user
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or a group of users, o is an entity protected by the system, and r is an access
privilege.
In the model, two access bases are defined. The strong access base SAB
contains all explicit strong authorizations including both positive and negative.
The weak access base WAB

contains all explicit weak authorizations including

both positive and negative.
A privilege r is granted to an object o for a subject s ( or the access request
(s,o,r) is authorized) if the return value of the following function is true.
Function f(s, o, r)
if there exists an explicit or implicit (s,o,-\-r) in SAB
then return True
else if there exists an explicit or implicit (s,o, —r) in SAB
then return False
else if there exists an explicit or implicit [s,o, +r] in

WAB

then return True
else if there exists an explicit or implicit
[s,o, -r] in

WAB

then return False
end
Note that the function works correctly if there exist at least a weak authorization
for each possible privilege.
The cornerstone of the discussed access control model is the implicit authorization which can be propagated along each of the three dimensions (parameters)
of access rules namely: subjects, entities, and access privileges. To reduce the
number of subjects involved in explicit authorizations, users and groups of users
are assigned roles. Roles can be arranged into a role hierarchy (see Figure 3.1).
The following two rules govern the propagation of authorization for roles.

Implication Rule 1 Explicit positive authorizations for roles result in implic
positive authorizations for all higher-level (upper) roles. •

Implication Rule 2 Explicit negative authorizations for roles result in implic
negative authorizations for all lower-level roles. •
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Admirynanager

Academic-manager

Academic-c lerks

Accounts-clerks

Employee

Figure 3.1: A sample of role hierarchy.
Access privileges also create a privilege hierarchy. An example is given in
Figure 3.2. T h e next two rules specify h o w to generate authorizations along the
privilege hierarchy.

Read

Create

ReadDefinition
Figure 3.2: A sample privilege hierarchy.

Implication R u l e 3 If a positive authorization is given for an access privilege
in the privilege hierarchy, then this implies the right of all access privileges below
it. •
Implication R u l e 4 If a negative authorization is given for an access privilege
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in the privilege hierarchy, then this also implies the negative authorization of all
access privileges above it. •
Entities are also organized as the entity hierarchy. T h e entity hierarchy is the
instantiation of the entity schema.

Figure 3.3 shows an example of the entity

hierarchy and the entity schema.
System

Datab

System [ Compa

Database

Database [Personal]

Class
Class[Person]

Class[Employee]

Class[Supplier]

Extension

Object
ol .name
Property

Figure 3.3: A sample Entity Schema and Entity Hierarchy.
The deduction of authorization in the entity hierarchy depends on not only
the entity but on the m o d e of privilege involved, as well. For example, the
read and the write access privileges for certain objects require the corresponding
class definitions to be readable. This means that the direction of the implication
is upward in the entity hierarchy. O n the other hand, the read permission on
the extension of a class implies the read permission on all the instances of that
type. In this case, the direction of the implication is downward.

S o m e privileges

do not have any implications, such as creation (definition) of a n e w class. So
all access privileges can be split into three classes: (1) OpUp
access privileges having upward implications, (2) OpDown

contains those

includes those access

privileges having downward implications, and (3) OpNil contains those privileges
having no implications.
Implication R u l e 5 Let r G OpUP.

The explicit right (s,o,r) yields the im-

plicit authorization (s,o',r) for any entity o' above o in the entity hierarchy. •
Implication R u l e 6 Let r G OpUP.

The explicit authorization (s,o,-r) yields

the implicit right (s,o',-r) for any entity o> below o in the entity hierarchy. •
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The explicit authorization (s,o,r) yields

the implicit right (s,o',r) for any entity d below o in the entity hierarchy. •
Implication Rule 8 Let r e OpDown. The explicit right (s,o,-r) yields the
implicit authorization (s,o', -r) for any entity o' above o in the entity hierarchy.

a
Implication Rule 9 Let r € OpNil. The explicit authorization (s,o,r) generates no implicit ones. •
Note that the read right on methods forces the execute privilege. Any access which is performed during the execution of the method must be authorized
independently. For example, if during the execution of a method invoked by a
subject s, an attempt is m a d e to update a particular property value o of an instance, the triple (s,o, write) needs to be verified. Other hierarchical structures
(which are orthogonal to the entity hierarchy) are inheritance, composite, and
version hierarchies.
There are two approaches to give privileges on instances of a subclass. In the
first one, the creator of a class should have no implicit right on the instances of
a subclass derived from the class. This approach encourages the reuse of existing
classes without diminishing privacy. However if a query has the access scope
which is a class and all its subclasses, it will only be evaluated for those classes
for which the user has the read privilege. In the second approach, the creator of
a class should have implicit rights on instances of subclasses. This means that a
query (whose scope of access is a class and a class sub-hierarchy is rooted at the
class) will be evaluated against the class and its subclasses. T h efirstapproach is
used as the default while the second one is an option.
Implication R u l e 10 A read (or write) privilege on a class of a inheritance
hierarchy implies read (or write) rights on all classes in the inheritance hierarchy.
•
T h e following rule enforces consistency between the S A B and W A B for positive
and negative authorization in multiple inheritance hierarchy.
Implication R u l e 11 The ordering between the access privilege subclass-generator
and other access privileges is: write>subclass-generator> read-definition.

So a

user with the privilege write on a class receives implicitly the subclass-generator
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right, i.e., the user can derive subclasses from the class. A user with the privilege
subclass-generator on the class C implicitly receives the read-definition right, i.e.,
the user can read the class definition of C. •
Implication Rule 12 Authorization on a composite class C implies the same
right on all instances of C and on all objects that are components of the instances
of C. Similarly, privilege on a composite object implies the same privilege on each
component

of the composite object.U

To solve conflicts caused by the combination of strong/weak, explicit/implicit,
and positive/negative authorizations through the composite hierarchy, the following order of authorizations is assumed:

(s, o, + r) > (s, o, -r) > (s, o, + r ) > (s, o, = r ) > [s, o, +r] > [s, o, -r] > [s, o,
>[s,o, — r j , where r indicates an implicit privilege.
There are suggestions that the composite object should be considered as a
unit of authorization, i.e., giving privilege to a composite object implies the same
privilege to all components of the composite object. T w o types of authorization:
partial and total are defined. T h e next two rules specify h o w to enforce partial
and total authorizations.
Implication Rule 13 If a user has total write (read) privileges on a component
of a composite object, then (s)he has the same

rights on all descendants, and

partial write (read) rights on all top-level entities in the entity hierarchy. •
Implication Rule 14 If a user has partial write (read) privileges on a component of a composite object, then (s)he has authorization on the object only, not its
descendants, and the same rights on all top-level entities in the entity hierarchy.
D
There are two ways to bind an object with a versioned object: static and
dynamic. In static binding, thefirstobject directly references the second object.
In dynamic binding, thefirstobject references a generic instance of the second
object. A generic instance maintains the history of the object versions derived so
far. W h e n a generic instance receives a message, the message is forwarded to one
of the versions, which has been designed as the default version. Furthermore, on
the basis of the types of operation that m a y be allowed on versions, two types of
versions: transient and working can be distinguished. A transient version m a y be
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modified or deleted by the user w h o has created it whereas a working version m a y
be deleted but not updated. A n e w version cannot be derived from a transient
version. A transient version mustfirstbe promoted to a working version before a
n e w version m a y be derived from it.
Implication Rule 15 An authorization on a set-of-generic-instances implies the
same right on all generic instances of the class. The write privilege on a generic
instances allows the user to modify the generic instance itself . It also implies
authorization on the object versions described by the generic instance. The read
right on a generic instance means that the user has the same right on all versions.
The write privilege on the set-of-versions implies the same right on the versions
described by the generic instance and also gives the right to create a new version
from a working version of the instance. •
The model does not address content-dependent and method-based authorizations. Bertino and Weigand [30] extended the model so it could handle contentdependent access rules. They introduced two different modes for authorization
administration, centralized and decentralized administrations. In the decentralized administration, every user creating an instance of the class is considered to
be the owner of the instance and, therefore, can grant and revoke other users'
privileges to the instance. For the centralized administration, all instances of a
class are considered to have the same owner w h o is called the class administrator.
Instances of the class created by any user belong to the class administrator (see
[30] for detailed discussion). T h e main problem of the model is h o w to efficiently
evaluate conditions associated with authorizations. In particular, the processing
of the conditions could require two references to the object (one to evaluate the
conditions and the second to filter data that satisfy the user query).

3.6.2 DAC in Behaviorally OODB Systems
T h e models presented so far take into consideration m a n y of the characteristics of
0 - 0 data models such as inheritance hierarchy, versions, and composite objects.
However, they do not apply encapsulation of the 0-0 model. In a behaviorally
O O D B system, all interactions are conducted through messages that are parts of
object interfaces. A subject invokes an initial method mx which in turn calls m 2 ,
and so on. In an access control model for behaviorally O O D B systems, w e are
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concerned with how the subject gets permission for methods in the sequence of
calls.

Faatz-Spooner Access Control Model
Faatz and Spooner [80] describe a D A C model for 0-0 engineering databases. In
the model, objects consist of the structural and operational parts. The structural
part includes instance-variables that hold the data associated with the object.
The operational part contains a set of methods or procedures that can be performed on the data in the structural part of the object. Only methods defined
for an object can be used to manipulate the contents of the object instancevariables. These variables are not visible outside the object. The access control
model applies object interfaces (object views) in order to restrict the number of
messages an object accepts from other objects. Users are allowed to interact with
the objects only by calling methods defined in their interface.
Although the above approach requires no extensions to the 0-0 paradigm, it
provides only a partial solution to the access control. A complete solution has to
handle access control to object classes with hierarchical structure. It also has to
work properly in the context of the inheritance.

Iris Access Control Model
In 1992, Ahad, Davis, Gower, Lyngback, Marynowski, and Onuegbe [4] developed
a D A C model which has been implemented for Iris [222]. In the Iris data model,
both instance-variables and methods are represented as functions. Instancevariables are defined as stored functions, and methods - as derived functions.
Objects are encapsulated by a set of functions that users can call. The access
control model is based on a concept of the function call control and the evaluation
of calls.
The access entities are: stored functions, derived functions, generic functions,
guard functions, and proxy functions. Stored and derived functions are instancevariables and methods, respectively. A generic function is the specification of a
function which m a y have a set of associated specific functions that are defined
for different types. W h e n a generic function is called, a specific function based
on the type of the argument object in the call is selected for execution. If a
function has an associated guard function, the function can be executed only if the
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guard function returns true. Proxy functions provide different implementations
of specific functions for different users. A function m a y have several associated
proxy functions. W h e n a user calls a function, the appropriate proxy is executed
in place of the original function.
The access control is implemented using functions that are allowed to be called
by a subject (user). A n access rule is a triple (u,f,t) where u is the user name,
/ is a function or a set of functions, and t is the type of the argument to the
function. Note that the access of u is limited by the set of functions / the user
is allowed to evaluate. Functions / can be either stored or derived. Access to
derived functions can be static or dynamic. If a user u has a dynamic access
to the derived function /, u must have a permission to call all the underlying
functions. For a static access, the user u dose not need to have call privileges1 to
the underlying functions. While creating a derived function, the user must specify whether the access to the underlying functions should be static or dynamic.
Note that the creator of the derived function must have call privileges to all the
underlying functions. The access control model supports time-dependent and
content-dependent authorizations using guard and proxy functions, respectively.
Derived functions can also be used to support content-dependent authorizations
including conditions.
The concept of ownership is supported as well. A user who creates a function
is its owner. The owner of a function automatically has a call privilege to the
function. If the dynamic access is specified while the object is created, the owner
can freely grant call privileges for other users. By contrast, for static access,
the owner cannot grant a call privilege unless he has grant privilege to all the
underlying functions. Access to a function can be granted and revoked to/from
other users by users who have grant privilege over that function.
The model supports also the database administrator ( D B A ) concept. The
system m a y have a D B A or a group D B A who has the privileges implied by the
owners of functions. Moreover (s)he can grant call privilege to functions with
static access to selected users.
1

A user w h o has a call privilege on a function is authorized to evaluate the function.
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Bertino Access Control Model
An interesting example of another access control model is given by Bertino in
The model uses methods such as a tool to control the access to objects. This is
why it is also called the Data-hiding model. There are two types of methods:
private and public. Private methods can be invoked by other methods only when
they present in the list associated with the method. The list is called invocation
scope of the method. O n the other hand, a public method can be called by all
users and methods.
The access control can have two levels: external or internal. For the external
access control, a triple (s, o, m) indicates that a user s can call the method m on
the object o. The internal access control is content-dependent and is implemented
as a part of the method. Users can have privileges to public methods only. For
instance, if a user u invokes a method mx on o which in turn calls m2, then mx
has to be public and u has to have execution right for mx. If m 2 is public, the
entry (u,o,m2) must exist. If m2 is private, m x must belong to the invocation
scope of m 2 .
A user u can grant the execution right on an object if u is the owner of the
object. A n object m a y have several owners. Only the creator may grant/revoke
ownership authorizations to/from other users. However, the creator may grant
the creator privilege to a user u. W h e n the creator does so, u becomes the
only creator of the object. The old creator looses all privileges on the object.
Sometimes it is useful to enable a user to execute a method m without giving
him/her the execute rights on all public methods that are invoked by m. The
model introduces the notion of protection mode. If the user u grants the user u'
the right to execute method m in the protection mode, then all invocations of
public methods made by m are checked for authorizations against u (instead of
u') when u' executes m.
The reader is directed to [32], for formal definition of the model and its detailed discussion. The main problem with the model is the lack of flexibility as
content-dependent authorizations are parts of method implementations. Changes
in authorizations would require a change in the specification of the methods. As
pointed out in [206], the impact of inheritance hierarchy on the model needs more
investigation.
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Mandatory Access Control Models

Some databases contain sensitive or classified data. A record (tuple) may be
composed with elements of different security level (or classification). The security
of entity can be classified on n levels (in practice n = 4) and can be further
subdivided into compartments by category. For example, multi-level databases
store data with different security classification (or security classes). The security
class is a pair (L, C) where L represents a security level and C denotes a category.
The security level can be unclassified, confidential, secret, and top secret. Note
that they are partially ordered by the the relation ">". The category can be
the n a m e of the application that the entity is associated with. In general, they
have no ordering, but may be further subdivided. There are two hierarchies for
both security classification of stored data and users of the database. Users are
classified according to their clearance.
Unlike the discretionary access control, the mandatory access control ( M A C )
makes sure that the flow of information complies with a well-defined security
policy. M A C enforces that users with their clearance can only access entities on
"proper" security levels. The mandatory access control is also called the multilevel access control.
Bell and LaPadula in [26] introduced their M A C model. This is an extension
of the access matrix model. The Bell-LaPadula model is based on two properties:
the simple security property and the ^-property. According to the simple security
property, a subject (or an active entity) is allowed to read information from
an object (or a passive entity) if the clearance level of the subject dominates the
security level of the entity. The *-property requires that a subject has write access
to an object if the subject clearance level is dominated by the security level of the
entity. Informally, a subject can read-down (simple security property) and can
write-up (*-property). For example, consider two security classes X = (LI, Cl)
and Y = (L2, C2). X dominates Y (denoted by X > Y) if and only if LI > L2
and Cl is a compartment of C2 or is equal to C2 (Cl C C2). X strictly dominates
Y (denoted by X > Y) if and only if LI > L2 and Cl C C2. The set of possible
access privileges (or access modes) in the model is determined by the combinations
of these properties. The privileges are: neither observe nor alter, observe only
( R E A D - O N L Y ) , alter only ( A P P E N D ) , observe and alter ( W R I T E ) , execute a
program ( E X E C U T E ) .
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A generalization of the Bell-LaPadula M A C model was suggested by Denning
[65, chapter 5 ] and called the information flow system. It is based on a lattice
of security levels. Information in an entity is allowed to flow (either directly or
indirectly) only to entities with higher security levels.
The application of the Bell-LaPadula model to the protection of database
systems introduces new security requirements such as entity integrity, referential

integrity, and polyinstantiation integrity. Entity integrity requires that no t
can have null values for any primary key attribute. Referential integrity insists
that no tuple in a relation can refer to a nonexistent tuple.

Polyinstantiation

means that one record can appear (be instantiated) many times, with different
security levels. In order to deal with these new security requirements, extensions
of the Bell-LaPdula model have been proposed for multi-level security databases
( M L S / D B S ) . The relational data model has dominated much of the work on
M L S / D B S [59, 69, 79, 99, 109, 112, 116, 117, 118, 141, 184, 188, 200, see for
example]. M L S / D B S have been developed not only as prototypes but also as
products [142, 208]. Security issues have also been investigated in other systems
such as O O D B systems [33, 38, 39, 114, 123, 149, 150, 210], entity relationship
systems [87] and knowledge based systems [212] among others. A detailed report
on the recent development in database security is given in [211].

3.8 MAC Models in RDBS

A multi-level relational database system (ML/RDBS) supports data with differe
security levels (or classifications) and users with different security clearances.
The granularity of a multi-level system is the smallest unit of data which has
its own security level. Sometimes, data may be classified at the attribute level
(all the data associated with a particular attribute has the same security level);
at the tuple level (every tuple has a single security level); at the relation level
(all the data in the relation has the same security level); at the data element
level; or combination of these (we have the following order: relation level < tuple

level < attribute level < element level). A relation with these security levels is
called a multi-level relation. A multi-level relation R is represented by a schema
R(Ax, Ci,..., An, Cn), where each data attribute Ai has a corresponding security
level attribute d- Multi-level security affects the data model because not all data
seen differently by users with different clearances).
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N o w consider how entity integrity, referential integrity, and polyinstantiation
resolved in M L / R D B S .
For a tuple, all the primary key elements must have the same security level or
be at least as low as the security levels of other elements in the tuple. Otherwise,
a user with low clearance would see nulls for the primary key which violates entity

integrity.
In a M L / R D B system, referential integrity means that a tuple of a low security
level cannot reference a tuple of a high security level because the referenced tuple
would appear to be nonexistent to users with a low clearance.

Polyinstantiation emerges in the form of: polyinstantiated relations, polyin-

stantiated tuples, and polyinstantiated elements [69]. A polyinstantiated relat
occurs when two subjects with different views of the real world entity try to create
a relation of the same name [210]. A polyinstantiated tuple happens when a user
inserts a tuple that has the same primary key value as the existing but invisible
tuples (because they have higher security levels). A polyinstantiated element is
created if a user writes a new element in a tuple. The entry which corresponds
to it is seen as a null before the write operation. The element is not null and it
contains data with a higher security level. Thus a second tuple is added to the
relation with the same primary key but a different security level [144].
Several mandatory access control models for R D B S have been proposed so
far [68, 69, 88, 99, 110, 117, 141, 142, 148, 200]. The main difference among the
models is the way they solve the integrity and polyinstantiation problems. Let
us consider three such models whose security evaluation classification was aimed
to be at Class A l 2 level. They are as follows.
• SeaView. The SeaView project has its roots in the Summer Study on
Multi-level Data Management Security held by the Committee on Multilevel Data Management Security of the U.S. Air Force Studies Board [55].
The project was a three-year joint work by SRI International, Gemini Computers, and Oracle Corporation sponsored by the U.S. Air Force, R o m e
Laboratory. The SeaView was developed at SRI by Lunt, Denning, Schell,
Shockley, Heckman, and Neumann and provided element-level labeling with
Class A l assurance for mandatory security.
2

SeaView generates virtual

In the evaluation criteria defined by U S Department of Defense ( D O D ) [73], security systems
is classified on four hierarchical division (D, C, B, A ) . Class A l specifies a system whose security
has been formally verified.
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multi-level relations from physical single-level relations. The physical relations are stored in segments managed by an underlying mandatory security kernel. SeaView uses G E M S O S Trusted Computing Base ( T C B ) as
the kernel [187]. G E M S O S enforces the mandatory security policy using a
label-based mechanism. Whenever a subject attempts to retrieve a physical object, a label comparison is performed. SeaView supports element,
tuple, and relation polyinstantiation. A multi-level query language called
M S Q L is used in SeaView to define and manipulate multi-level data. Furthermore, to deal with the polyinstantiation, M S Q L provides the following

functions: highest-class, highest-tuple, most-recent-tuple, and most-rece
The function highest-class returns the tuple with the highest security level
for a potentially polyinstatiated element. The highest-tuple function returns
the tuple with the highest tuple level from among a set of polyinstantiated
tuples. The function most-recent-tuple retrieves the most recently updated
or inserted tuple from among a set of polyinstantiated tuples. The mostrecent function returns the tuple with the most recently updated or inserted
value for a potentially polyinstantiated element. For a detailed discussion
of the model, the reader is directed to [141, 142] [46, Section 10 of Chapter

2].
• Lock D a t a Views ( L D V ) . The L D V is a M L / R D B system that was developed by a group at Secure Computing Technology Corporation (SCTC). It
is designed to run on SCTC's LOgical Coprocessor Kernel ( L O C K ) Trusted
Computing Base ( T C B ) [37]. LDV's security policy builds on the security
policy of L O C K . Its design is based on three assured pipelines for the query,
update, and meta-data management operations. It allows an application to
specify classification constraints for how incoming and outgoing data are to
be labeled. L D V supports the tuple polyinstantiation. Tuples are polyinstantiated based on their maintenance levels. The maintenance level of a
tuple is a security level at which the tuple was inserted into the database.
However because of classification constraints, some of data elements that
make up a tuple could be stored at security level above the tuple security
level. T C B enforces the constraint that the level at which data is stored is
the lowest security level at which the data can be retrieved. See [200, 201]
for detailed discussion.
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• A S D - V i e w s . The ASD-Views is a prototype developed at T R W Defense
System Group. The main aim for the ASD-Views project was to achieve a
suitably-sized Trusted Computing Base ( T C B ) that would meet the criteria for evaluation of class B 2 and above. The main feature of the project
is that the A S D allows an interconnection between the mandatory and
discretionary access control. Moreover, only one copy of the shared data
is stored within the system. This copy is accessible to users at different
security levels. The A S D allows to create a subset of rows (tuples) and
columns (attributes) from a singular underlying base relation. Joins, aggregate functions and arithmetic expressions are excluded, as they do not
support polyinstantiations [88, 110].

3.9 MAC Models in OODB Systems
A number of security models for OODB systems have been proposed ([33, 39,
114, 121, 122, 123, 143, 144, 149, 150, 160, 210, 215, as examples]). Nonetheless,
the design of an 0-0 multi-level security model is still an active research topic
and there is no dominant design. The main difference among various models is
the way how they assign security levels to data stored in objects.
Some proposals consider single-level objects. That means that for every object,
a unique security level is assigned and this level applies to all components of the
object (properties and methods) [33, 114, 149, 210]. This approach is attractive
for its simplicity and compatibility with the security kernel. Its most important
advantage is that the security kernel is small enough so that it can be verified.
Moreover there is no need to handle the multi-level update problem [210].
However in the real world, there are situations when it is necessary to classify
instance-variables of an object at different security levels. That is, the security
model has to support multi-level objects. There have also been proposals that
introduce afinergrain of classification by assigning a security level to each instance variable of an object [122, 140, 160]. Unfortunately, these proposals require
a trusted enforcement mechanism on the object layer and a complex security kernel.
In order to maintain the security kernel compatibility of the single-level object and to overcome the difficulties of the handling of multi-level objects, some
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researchers proposed to design a schema which manages various security constraints (simple, content, and context constraints) [114, 149, 210]. For example,
if we want the GAP

instance-variable of the class STUDENT3

need to create a class STUDENT
subclass of the class STUDENT

HAP

to be secret, we

with security level S E C R E T to be a

(see Figure 3.4). The main drawback of this
STUDENT(U)
subject
Start-Date
Graduate-Date
takes*

COURSE (U)

1\
is-a

S T U D E N T - G A P (S)

GAP
Comp-GAP()

Figure 3.4: A n example of representation of simple constraint.

approach is that it requires information to be replicated at different levels.
the problem of data consistency starts to play a crucial role.
A n alternative approach for modeling multi-level entities through single-level
objects were proposed independently by Bertino and Jajodia in [33], and BoulahiaCuppens, Cuppens, Gabillon, and Yazdanian in [38]. Bertino's approach is based
on the use of composite objects. Instead of replicating low security level data in
higher security level objects, a reference to the object containing the low level data
is inserted in the higher level object. The class STUDENT-GAP

has a compos-

ite property say Student-Specification whose domain is the class

STUDENT

(see Figure 3.5). Note that in this approach properties of a multi-level entity are
stored in different objects. Thus if a user wants to see the entity, more objects
must be accessed.
Boulahia-Cuppens and his group used the decomposition of a multi-level entity
into single-level entities. Data on each level are stored in a single-level database.
Dynamic links are also created between the objects of these single-level databases
for properties with low security levels. For instance a multi-level object O, which
3

The specification of S T U D E N T is shown in Figure 2.3 in Section 2.2.7 of Chapter 2
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STUDENT-GAP(S)

GAP
is-part-of
Student Specification

STUDENT( U)
subject
Start-Date
ASSIFTED

Graduate-Date

ET

takes*

COURSE (U)

Figure 3.5: A n example of representation of a multi-level entity through composite
objects.

is an instance of a multi-level class STUDENT, will be decomposed to U-0, C-0,
and S-0 levels. Each of them is actually a single-level object corresponding to
unclassified, confidential, and secret levels which are physically stored in singlelevel databases. In the S-0 level there are pointers to the confidential properties
stored at the C-0 level and consequently in the C-0 level, there are pointers to
unclassified properties. This means that if an classified user updates the unclassified properties of the U-0 level, this update will be automatically propagated to
the instances at both C-0 and S-0 levels. Note that the values of the properties
which point to low-level objects can be updated by the users cleared to access
them. If this happens, the pointer to the low-level database is broken, and the
value of the object at the low-level database is considered to be a cover story.
By employing a view model mechanism, we also propose a new design approach to model multi-level entities through single-level objects (see Chapter 6).
The central idea behind our approach is to provide the user with a multi-level view
derived from a single-level secure O O D B system. Hence the database operations
performed on the multi-level views are decomposed into a set of operations on
single-level objects. The operations can be implemented with any conventional
mandatory security kernel. The detailed discussion is presented in Chapter 6.

3.9.1 Security Models
S o m e of the proposed security models for O O D B systems are discussed briefly.
For detailed discussion, the reader is directed to the cited papers.
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Jajodia-Kogan Security M o d e l
Jajodia and Kogan [114] proposed a security model for O O D B systems that
controls access by using the encapsulation characteristic of 0-0 systems. In 0-0
systems, communication between two objects can be done via the exchange of
messages only. The model controls the information flow byfilteringthe messages
transmitted between objects. That is why it is also called the messagefiltermodel.
The model is defined in terms of subjects and entities. Entities are objects which
m a y have dual roles of either entity or subject. A n active object can act as a
subject by sending messages. A security level is assigned to each object at the
creation time, and isfixedfor the life-time of an object. In the model, all objects
are single-level ones. Every message exchanged between objects is done via the
messagefilter.The messagefilterdecides how to handle the message based on
the security levels of the sender and receiver, and security level of information
encountered in a chain of method executions. The list of possible actions that the
messagefiltercan undertake, includes: leaving the message unaltered, blocking
the message, and enforcing restriction on the execution of the method invoked by
the message.

SORION Security Model
S O R I O N is a security model proposed by Thurainsingham [210] to incorporate
a secure access control into the O R I O N model [16, 124]. The S O R I O N model
is defined in terms of subjects, entities, and access privileges.

A subject is an

user of the system. Every user is assigned a security level (clearance). Entities in

the system are classes, objects, properties, and methods. Object may be primitive
objects or composite objects. The model allows the read, write, and execute access
privileges. The access to an entity is controlled by checking security level of the
subject (who wants to access the entity) and the security level of the entity which
is computed according to the security rules of the system. For full detail and
the list of security rules, the reader is referred to [210]. The model requires all
objects to be single-level ones. However, as we have already observed, real-world
entities are often multi-level. The representation of multi-level entities through
single-level objects are then proposed to design the schema which handles various
security constraints (simple, content, and context constraints).
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Millen-Lunt Security M o d e l
Another security model that enforces a mandatory security policy in O O D B systems is that proposed by Millen and Lunt [149]. Their security model is defined

in terms of subjects, entities, and access privileges. A subject is an active entit
that executes methods upon reception of messages and can also send messages.

Entities are classes, and objects. Access privileges axe create, delete, addmess
getvar, and setvar. The model requires all objects to be single-level ones. Each
request from a subject to execute a method or to write/read instance-variables
is allowed only if it satisfies the security properties. A list of security properties
that must be satisfied by the system is provided (see [149]).

SODA Security Model
S O D A , proposed by Keefe, Tsai, and Thurainsingham [121, 123], is a security
model for O O D B systems with multi-level entities. The model is based on the
Smalltalk model [91]. The S O D A model is defined in terms of subjects, and
entities. A subject is any user of the system. Entities are objects or properties
(instance-variables). Objects may be entities or subjects. Objects or properties
(instance-variables) are assigned ranges of security levels. Subjects are assigned
clearance levels. Every message that travels through the system carries with it a
current security level and a clearance level of the subject. The current security
level is the least upper bound of all security levels of information the message
has read or has access to, and is adjusted whenever an object or property with
higher security is accessed. Classification rules (based on the current security
level and clearance level of a message and on an object or property security level)
determine whether a method should be allowed to access an object or property.

3.9.2 Security Rule Requirements for a Secure OODB
system
Olivier, Sebastiaan and Von Solms [160, 161] gave a taxonomy for secure O O D B
systems. They specified security issues and properties that are relevant to the
modeling and implementation of a secure O O D B system. The taxonomy identifies eight major design parameters every designer of a multi-level secure O O D B
system must consider. These eight parameters are grouped into three categories:
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labeling semantics, structural labeling, and dynamic

labeling. T h e first group

(which consists of two first design parameters) answers the two following questions. What

is a protected entity? How

is an entity protected? T h e structural

labeling talks about protected entities, the w a y security labels are assigned to
them, and specifies the restrictions imposed on security labels by the relationship a m o n g the entities. T h e last group of parameters ensures that the secrecy
is not compromised by activities in an O O D B system. For detailed discussion,
the reader is directed to [160, 161]. In the next section, w e use this taxonomy
and represent s o m e security classification rules that must be satisfied for a secure
O O D B system. Note that the term labeling refers to the assignment of a security
levels to an entity.
In any secure model, it must first be clarified what is exactly protected. It
is possible to protect (control) the access to an entity (called access protection
model) or to hide the fact of existence of an entity (called existence protection
model).

Note that in an existence protection model, since the existence of a

high security-level entity is hidden from lower-clearance subjects it is possible
that the entity is re-created by the subjects. T h e system must therefore support
polyinstantaition.

3.9.3 Mandatory Classification Rules
In general, an O O D B system consists of a non-homogeneous collection of entities
(objects, methods, instance-variables, classes, class methods, class variables, etc.).
These entities are related by relationships such as encapsulation, instantiation,
inheritance, composition, association, and data structure membership.
• Encapsulation - the relationship that exists between an object and its facets.
• Instantiation - the relationship that exists between a class and its objects.
Each object is an instance of a class.
• Inheritance - the relationship that exists between a class and its subclasses.
• Composition - the relationship between objects that are combined into a
large object.
• Data structure membership - the relationship that exists between data structure (such as a list) and m e m b e r of the data structure.
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• Association - the relationship that exist for an object associated with other
objects.
In this section, the influence of the structure of data on the classification of
entities is considered. Denote by L U B the least upper bound, G L B the greatest
lower bound. T h e function Level(e) displays the security level of an entity e. T h e
function class(e) returns the class of an entity e. c and o denote a class and an
object, respectively. Denote by sup(e) the set of superclasses of an entity e, and
< x, c > a facet x of a class c where x can be a property or a method.

Security Classification Rules
T h e first classification rule that w e consider are imposed by the encapsulation
of an object. A n object encapsulates everything inside it. This implies that an
encapsulated facet cannot be accessed by a subject w h o is not allowed to access
the corresponding object.
Classification R u l e 1 (Encapsulation property) The security level of a facet of
an object (class) dominates the security level of the object (class)
(Vo(Vx e o))[Level(< x,o >) > Level(o)]
or
(Vc(Vx G c))[Level(< x,c>)>

Level(c)].D

T h e second group of classification rules is imposed by instantiation.
Classification Rule 2 (Instantiation property) The security level of an instance
must dominate the security level of its class either in an existence protection model
or in an access protection model, i.e.,
(\/o)[Level(o) > Level(class(o))].a
Classification Rule 3 (Facet property) The security level of a facet in an instance must dominate the security level of the facet in the class and must also
dominate the security level of the instance itself. This is expressed by
(\/o(Wx e o))[Level(< x,o > ) =

LUB(Level(<

x,class(o) >),Level(o))}

(for existence protection) or
(Vo(V:r e o))[Level(< x,o >) >
(for access protection). •

LUB(Level(<

x,class(o) >),Level(o))}
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A class m a y have several subclasses. T h e following properties regulate the
classification of subclasses and inherited facets.
Classification Rule 4 (Inheritance property) The security level of any subclass
must dominate the security level of its superclass(es)
(Vc(Vo?G sup(c)))[Level(c) > Level(d)].U
Classification Rule 5 (Facet inheritance property) In the case of the access
protection, if any class c inherits a facet x from a superclass d G sup(c), then
Level(< x,c>)> LUB(Level(< x,d >),Level(c)).
In the case of the existence protection, one of the following must be held:
1. if a class c inherits a facet < x,c>,

the security level of < x,c > may only

be different from its security level in the superclass when
Level(< x,c>) ~ Level(c)

2. if a facet is defined in the one only superclass of a given class c (or the class
c has the one only superclass, or the 0-0 model allows single inheritance
only), that facet may be inherited provided
Level(< x,c>) > LUB(Level(c), Level(sup(c)))

3. if a facet x is redefined in c, then the security level of < x,c > must be
dominated by the security level of every liked-named facet (facet with the
same

name

x) in any superclass of c (whenever the security level of the

facet dominates the security level of c) and
(\/d G sup(c))[Level(c) < Level(< x, c >) < LUB(Level(< x, d >), Level(c))]

4- if x is inherited from a specific superclass dl G sup(c), then for every superclass d G sup(c) that has a facet x,
LUB(Level(< x,d' >),Level(c)) < Level(< x,c >)
and
Level(< x,c >) < LUB(Level(<

x,d >),Level(c))
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must be dominated by the

security level of all like-named facets in superclasses of c, whenever the
security level of the like-named facet dominates the security level of c. •

The last point of the rule above indicates two strategies in the existence pro
tection that can be used to resolve the conflict caused by multiple inheritance.
The strategies are:

1. the like-named facet with the lowest security level is always inherited, or

2. the security level of the class is an upper bound for the security levels o
concerned facets in superclasses.

If an object o is constructed from objects Ox,o2,... ,on by using array or set,
then the following classification property must be satisfied.
Classification Rule 6 (Data structure membership property)

If array-like structure (or homogeneous structure) is used to construct o, the
all members of the array must have the same security level in the existence protection, i.e.,
Level(o) — Level(ox) = Level(o2) = ... = Level(on).
If o is a set-object, the security level of o is the least upper bound of the
levels of the element objects,
Level(o) > LUB(Level(ox), Level(o2),..., Level(on)).0

Classification Rule 7 (Association property) If an association R is defined be
tween objects ox and o2, then the security level of R must satisfy
Level(R) > LUB(Level(ox,o2).0

3.9.4 Dynamic Labeling
As long as an encapsulated object moves as a unit from one to another location
in the system (probably as a parameter of a message), security of information will
not be compromised. For example, suppose that S A L A R Y object has PrintSalary
method. A subject that obtains S A L A R Y from E M P L O Y E E object will still not
be able to invoke the PrintSalary method if it is not authorized even though the
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subject accessed the S A L A R Y . Encapsulation feature of 0-0 model, combined
with security level labels, provides very natural mechanism of protection.
However if, in the example above, the salary was not encapsulated in a
S A L A R Y object, but rather stored as a real number, the value would have no
natural protection once it leaves the E M P L O Y E E object. A similar problem
occurs when methods return values of instance-variables. Therefore, a secure
system must impose some restrictions on the flow of authorizations and the flow
of information to ensure that the security will not be compromised.
• Authorization flow restrictions. Messages act on behalf of a subject and
therefore the clearance of a message depends on that of the subject. The
system must specify how the clearance (or authorization) of a message is
determined, and how the security level of a message is determined.
• Information flow restrictions. If some of the classified information contained in a message is stored in variables of the receiving object, it must be
ensured that an unauthorized subject cannot now access the information
in this object. The system should indicate any flow restrictions and any
conventions for reclassification.

For full details of how the clearance of a message is determined, how clearanc
are combined, and possible strategies to control theflowof information, the reader
is referred to [160, 161].

3.10 Role-Based Access Control Models
Like military agencies, civilian government agencies and commercial firms are
much concerned with the confidentiality of their information. This includes the
protection of personal data, marketing plans, product announcements, formulas,
manufacturing and development techniques. Many of these organizations have
even greater concern with integrity of information [49]. Integrity is particularly
relevant to such applications as funds transfer, clinical medicine, environmental
research, air traffic control, avionics, etc.
Each organization has unique security requirements, which are often difficult
to enforce using traditional access control policies such as M A C and D A C . In
m a n y organizations, the end users do not "own" the system objects. In these
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organizations, the corporation or agency is actual the "owner" of system objects
as well as the programs that process them. The control is often based on the
employees' position with in the organization hierarchy rather than their data
ownership rights. Access control decisions are often determined by the roles
individual users take on as a part of their jobs. The roles are usually specified by
user responsibilities, and qualifications. For each user, a role-based access control
(RBAC)

policy determines the collection of roles the user is allowed to perform

(undertake) within the organization. With each role, there is a associated set
of functions (transactions) which are allowed to be executed by a holder of the
role. The user cannot pass access permissions to other users [84]. This is the
fundamental difference between R B A C and D A C .
A role can be thought of as a set of transactions that a user or set of users
can perform within an organization. A transaction can be considered as a transformation procedure (TP) (a program or portion of a program) plus a set of data
items accessed by the TP. Each role has an associated set of individual members.
The set of roles and their association with transactions is defined by the system
administrator. Moreover, the membership in a role is granted and revoked by the
system administrator [84].
The usual grouping mechanism of D A C can be used to implement roles [182].
The difference between groups and roles is the same as the one between a security
policy and a security mechanism. T w o very important differences between groups
and roles are as follows [183]:
1. Groups are essentially a discretionary mechanism whereas roles are nondiscretionary. The ability to assign permissions to a group is usual discretionary. O n the other hand, the allocation of permissions to a role, as
well as determination of membership in a role, are both intended to be
non-discretionary.
2. The nature of permissions allocated to a role is significantly different than
the usual read, write, execute, etc.
A c o m m o n challenge in the design of roles is to ensure separation of duties.
This requires that for particular sets of transactions, no single individual is allowed to execute all transactions from the set. The separation of duties can be
either static (being built directly into the role definitions) or dynamic (with access constraints based on the previous access history of the affected entities) [2].
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The static separation requirements can be implemented simply by the assignment
of individuals to roles and allocation of transactions to roles. A more difficult
case is the dynamic separation of duty, where the compliance with requirements
can only be determined during the system operation. For example, the dynamic
policy will allow an individual to take on both the initiator and authority roles
for payment, with an exception that no one could authorize payments they had
initiated. The system must use both the role and the user ID to check access
to transactions based on audit records of previous accesses. The audit records of
previous accesses introduce the following problems. H o w long must audit records
be retained? H o w are they managed in a distributed environment? Sandhu [180]
discusses an automated separation of duties with the use of roles and transactions
control expressions (TCE).
For detailed discussion of the definition of R B A C , different possible approaches
for role organization, and different proposed solutions for separation of duties, the
reader is directed to [8, 49, 83, 84, 85, 90, 108, 152, 154, 165, 180, 183, 185, 186,
193, 206, 207, 214, 215].

3.11 Implementation Strategies
The 1982 Air Force Summer Study [55] suggested two architectures for building
secure multi-level database management systems ( D B M S ) : Trusted Subject Architecture and Woods Hole architectures. The Woods Hole architectures are the
Kernelized, the Replicated architectures, and the Integrity Lock. In the Trusted
Subject Architecture both a trusted D B M S and a trusted operating system (OS)
are used, while in the Woods Hole architectures, an untrusted D B M S is employed
with an additional trustedfilter.Thus, the Trusted Subject Architecture requires
either the development of a new D B M S from scratch, or the extension of the security features of an existing D B M S . In the following, we present a brief review of
these architectures. For detailed discussion, the reader is directed to [46, chapter

4]In the Kernelized D B M S , the multi-level database is partitioned into singlelevel databases which are stored separately. A trusted O S which is responsible for
the physical access to data in the database is used to enforce the mandatory access
control. The decomposition and recovery algorithms must be properly defined to
guarantee the correctness and system efficiency. The decomposition algorithm
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partitions a multi-level database into several single-level databases [38, 69, 115,
see for example]. The recovery algorithm is performed on single-level entities
when they are retrieved to generate a multi-level entity containing only the data
the user is cleared to access [119, as an example]. This architecture is used by
SeaView [141, 142], the commercial D B M S Oracle [46], and in the most current
secure databases [33, 38, 149, 210, as examples].
In the replicated architecture, there is a database at each security level which
contains all data whose classification are less or equal to the database security
level. Each database is associated with a separate D B M S . In this architecture,
we need to replicate lower security-level data in all database containing higher
security-level data. There are only a few research projects which are based on
this architecture [58, 59, 146].
In the Integrity Lock, each data element is assigned a checksum that indicates
its security level which initially is on either secret or confidential level. The Integrity Lock consists of three main components: the Untrusted Front End

(UTFE),

the Trusted Front End (TFE), and the untrusted D B M S . The T F E authenticates
and verifies a user, updates tuples, and handles all projections and creations of
new data entities. The U T F E handles parsing query, formatting output, and
computations. The untrusted D B M S handles searches of the database, selects
requested tuples, inserts data tuples into the database, reorganizes database, and
manages the storage. Integrity Lock can provide security at the record, attribute,
or data element level. This architecture is vulnerable to Trojan Horse attacks,
and inference attacks (see [67, 114]). Denning [67] proposes a new approach called
a commutative filter. The commutativefilteris inserted between the users and
the D B M S in order to assure the elimination of the inference attack provided that
the D B M S is free of Trojan Horses that leak data. The implementation of the
integrity lock design was done in the M I S T R E S S database management system
with the Unix operating system [94].

3.12 Inference Control
The word "inference" means "forming a conclusion from premises". Users of
any database can draw inferences from the information they have obtained from
the database and from some prior additional information (called supplementary
knowledge) they have. The inference can lead to information disclosure if the
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user is able to deduce the information they are not authorized to access. This
is the inference problem in the database security. Thus for database systems
that can contain sensitive information about individuals or companies, (such as
statistical databases or multi-level security databases), information flow controls
m a y be inadequate. N e w solutions and mechanisms are required to deal with the
inference problem.

3.12.1 Statistical Databases
A statistical database (SDB) is a database that is used for statistical queries (for
example, averages, counts) on subsets of the database entities. Inference in an
S D B allows to reveal confidential information of single entities by the analysis
of statistical queries [46]. A lot of work (see [65, chapter 6], [46, chapter 5], [3])
has been done and many solutions are proposed to make S D B secure against
inference. The solutions can apply different mechanisms to restrict the access
and prevent against inference. Typically, these mechanisms are based on query

restriction, data perturbation (or masking), output perturbation, and conceptual
restriction. For detailed discussion of these mechanisms, the reader is directed to
[3, 46, 65].

3.12.2 Multi-level Databases
In multi-level security database systems ( M L S / D B S ) , the inference problem arises
whenever some low-level data x can be used to derive partial or exact information
about some other high-level data y. In some cases, even the learning of the
existence of the information may be unacceptable. A n inferential link that may
allow information toflowfrom a high security class to a low security class is called
an inference channel or a covert channel. Wiseman [224] identifies four aspects
of the inference in multi-level security databases: addressing inference channel,

relationship inference channel, aggregation problem, and architectonic problem.
The addressing inference channel arises through the data role in addressing
rather than from it being accessed. In the access protection model, labeling does
not prevent the data from being addressed, only prevents from being seen directly.
A user can receive the unauthorized information by addressing the data using the
query mechanisms and inferring its existence from the result [35, 68, 223].
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The relationship inference channel arises whenever system objects are classified lower than the relationships between the objects. To protect a database
against the relationship inference channel, the control mechanism should allow
users with a low clearance to access information only if the relationship with a
higher classification cannot be deducted [132, 168].
The aggregation problem arises when a user can form aggregates of related
unclassified data that infers classified data. Here, the collection of low classified
information has a higher security classification. So it often requires us to assign
a higher security level to the collection [60, 98, 139].
The architectonic problem arises when the structural information of the database
objects (database schema) is classified lower than the database objects. Users
with a lower clearance can use the structure information of database together
with authorized information to deduce information with higher security [198].

Proposed Solutions
Recently some solutions have been proposed to handle the inference problem. The
inference problem can be dealt during the database design [69, 138, 195, 198, 213],
or during the query processing [120, 209, 212].
In thefirstapproach, security constraints during the database design are
handled in such a way that security violations via inference cannot occur. So
many inference problems can be overcome through a good design. The SeaView [144, 141], ASD-Views [88], and S W O R D [177] projects are examples of this
approach. Other works have also been done to provide tools which allow data
designers to analyze a database schema for potential inference problems and remove those. D I S S E C T [89, 168], Multilevel Semantic Net [213], IAT [111], and
Database Inference Controller [42] are examples. There are some non-reference
formal models which can be used to verify any good design against them as well.
The works of [198], [204], [111], [36], and [132] are examples.
In the second approach, the query processor is augmented with a logic-based
inference engine to handle inferences during query processing. The inference engine will attempt to prevent users from the disclosure of the protected information. S o m e researchers argue that inferences can be the most effectively handled
and thus prevented during query processing because the most users build their
supplementary knowledge from responses they receive by querying the database.
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L D V [98] is an example of this approach.

3.13 Cryptographic Control

The information is protected against the disclosure by providing a reliable ope
ing system and a secure access control mechanism for database system. Unfortunately, there is a great deal of evidence that even sufficiently complex operating
and database management systems may have security holes or Trojan Horses
which could be a potential threat to the information security. Better protection
of information can be obtained by using several security measures simultaneously.
The use of cryptographic techniques to protect database systems represents
an important security mechanism. Through these techniques, secrecy of information is assured by making data unreadable to anyone but authorized users with
cryptographic keys [65]. In general, cryptographic techniques might be used: to
provide user authentication, to maintain the integrity (data authenticity) and
the secrecy of data, to protect information during transition and during processing from disclosure, to protect private data from an unauthorized access in the
hierarchical access control, etc.
Application of cryptography has the potential to solve both the problem of
data integrity and the problem of data confidentiality. However, encryption has
some disadvantages particularly in databases. These are: inability of record
searching (particularly in the case of pattern or partial-match and range queries
as the structure of data is lost due to encryption), the necessity of key generation,
data expansion, impossibility to compute statistical data from the encryption
information, and the overhead related to encryption and decryption operations.
The application of cryptography for database security has been a main topic in
[6, 62, 66, 65, 92, 96, 103, 104, 105, 166, 178, 191, 216, see for example]. For
detailed discussion of cryptography and its applications in database security, the
reader is directed to [65, 103, 166].

3.14 Summary and Remarks

In this chapter, we have illustrated security requirements, threats, and discre
tionary and mandatory security models for the protection of conventional database
systems and O O D B systems. W e have also discussed security issues and concerns
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that are being expressed for O O D B systems. Several proposals for discretionary
and mandatory security models for the protection of conventional and objectoriented databases have been presented and some of their drawbacks have been
discussed. The models offer some solutions to the protection of O O D B systems.
However, each of them addresses only some of the security issues, therefore leaving
many questions unanswered. The following topics need further work:
• Design a more efficient mechanism for the access control on the instancelevel. W h e n the number of objects grows, the support of protection matrix
and the search at the granularity of object-instances is extremely hard and
time consuming. Finding implicit authorizations will be even harder.

• Design a general discretionary access control model with flexible and practi
cal solutions to problems such as content-dependent and context-dependent
authorizations with positive and negative authorizations.
• Design an extended multi-level access control model which allows to use the
class, object instance, or the instance-variables as the unit of authorization
and labeling.

• Design a formal verification protocol to check the correctness of the access
control model.

Chapter 4

A Cryptographic Mechanism for
Discretionary Access Control i
OODB Systems
4.1 Introduction
In an OODB system model classes, inheritance, and composite data structures
allow to express rules for computing implicit authorizations from explicit ones.
Hence, an access request to O O D B objects may require to apply authorization
rules on explicit privileges to derive implicit authorizations. A n important question is whether implicit authorizations must be evaluated each time an access
request is processed, or they should be computed and stored as redundant authorizations. If the implicit authorizations are stored, the size of protection matrix
gets too big. As the result, the support of protection matrix and the process
of access requests become inefficient. In this chapter, we are going to suggest a
solution to this problem. The solution applies cryptographic hashing.
Inheritance (inclusion relation) and composite data structure (is part of relation) create hierarchical structures in O O D B systems [219]. A n interesting
question is how to extend the known cryptographic solutions for hierarchical access control in O O D B systems. T w o solutions were published in the literature.
One was based on the R S A cryptosystem [5] and the other applied one way hash
functions [225].
The main drawback of the first solution is that it is only applicable to a fixed
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known hierarchy with no provision for possible changes to the hierarchy. Moreover, the integer values associated with the nodes of the hierarchical structure
become extremely large when the number of nodes is large. W e use the second
solution, proposed by Zheng, Hardjono, and Pieprzyk [225], which is based on
the sibling intractable function families (SIFF), and we show how to develop a
cryptographic solution for discretionary access control ( D A C ) in O O D B systems.
The solution applies pseudo-random functions, SIFF, and an authorization class
(instead of access control lists or protection matrix). The advantages of our
approach are as follows.
1. Pseudo-random functions and SIFF are used to produce a pair of unique
and secure access keys and passwords for each database object (instances
or classes) and its owner. Access keys and passwords for implicit authorizations m a y also be derived from related database objects during query
processing.

2. An authorization class (AC) is employed instead of access control lists (or
protection matrix). A C stores the current state of authorizations and use
SIFF to derive authorization-instance identifiers associated with users. This
results in a system that is more efficient and practical. This is true because
any alteration of the membership of user groups requires manipulation of
AC only rather than checking all access control lists in the database. Moreover, because of data structure consistency, database system operation can
be used to manipulate AC. Hence, an access request may be verified during
query processing.
3. The security of the system relies on the indistinguishability of pseudorandom functions from the truly random one and the difficulty of finding
collisions for SIFF, both of which are known to be difficult [225].
4. Operations such as grant, revoke, propagation of rights, and the required
changes due to the alterations of the user groups and of the class structure
are relatively easy to perform.

5. The existence of multiple owners of a database object (instances and classe
is possible.
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4.2 Background
Denote by & the set of all positive integers, n the security parameter, ]C the
alphabet {0, 1} and l(n), k(n), and m(n) polynomials in n from N to N.

4.2.1 Sibling Intractable Function Families (SIFF)
Zheng, Hardjono, and Pieprzyk [225] introduced the notion of sibling intractable
function family (SIFF) which is a generalization of the concept of the universal
one-way hash function defined by Naor and Yung [151]. A universal one-way
hash function is a class of hash functions with the property that the number of
functions that m a p any collection of r distinct input strings to the same hash value
isfixed.SIFF is the universal one-way hash function family with the additional
property that given a set of colliding sequences, it is computationally infeasible
to find another sequence that collides with the initial sets. This means that if a
SIFF function h maps the bit string xx, x2,..., xt- to the same string, it must be
computationally infeasible tofindanother string x' such that
h(x') = h(xx) = ... = h(xi).
In the following, w e give the definition of SIFF [103, 225] which is used in this
chapter. For detailed discussion, the reader is directed to [103, 225].
Let x €/? X denote an element x which is randomly chosen from the set X
with the uniform probability. A siblingfinderF is a probabilistic polynomial time
algorithm that is given an input X = {xx,x2,... ,X{} and the description of h,
where x{ G £ / ( n ) and h is a hash function that maps x1}x2,... ,x{ to the same
string. The finder F outputs either "?" ("I cannotfind")or a string x' 6 £ / ( n )
such that x' £ X and h(x') = h(xx) = ... = h(xi).
Definition 4.1 Let k(n) be a polynomial with k(n) > 1 and H

= {Hn\n

€

N} be a family of functions that are computable in polynomial time and samplable. Moreover they have the collision accessibility property and map l(n)bit input into m(n)-bit output strings Hn = {h\h : £ / ( n ) -> ]T m(n) }.

Assume

X - {xx,x2,...,Xi} be a set of i initial strings, where 1 < i < k(n). H is a k-

sibling intractable function family (or k-SIFF) if for all 1 < i < k(n), any sibli
finder F, any polynomial Q(n), and for all sufficiently large n,
1

Pr{F(X,h)^}<

QW
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where h is chosen randomly and uniformly from H* C Hn. H* is the set of all
functions that map Xx,x2,...,Xi to the same strings in YT{n)•
Pr{F(X,h)

The probability

^?} is computed over H* and the sample space of allfinitestrings

of coinflipsthat F could have tossed [103, 225]. •

4.2.2 Sketch of Implementation
As mentioned in [225], SIFF can be constructed from any universal one-way hash
function family ( O W H F ) . Figure 4.1 illustrates a possible construction of a kSIFF hash function.

O W H F : OneWay Hash Function
k-UHF: k-Universal Hash Function

Figure 4.1: A sketch of Implementation of k-SIFF hash function.

The OWHF can be any one-way hash function such as MD4, MD5 [172, 173],
or H A V A L [226] for which a fast hardware implementation is available. Note that
the security of M D 4 , M D 5 , or H A V A L has not been proved formally, however no
major weaknesses of these functions have been reported. As stated in [220, 225],
a possible candidate for a k-universal hash function family (k-UHF) with the
collision accessibility property are polynomials overfinitefields.

4.3

Security Policy

The specification of access control may involve a range of policies choices. The
choice of policies for security is important because it influences the flexibility,
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usability, and performance of the system [82]. In this chapter, our considerations
are restricted to the D A C .

4.3.1 General Policies
In the authorization system for an OODB system, the granularity of the control,
i.e., the smallest unit of authorization, m a y be a class, an object-instance, or a
property (or instance variable) [169]. W e choose the units of authorization to be
classes and instances of classes. It means that one user m a y be granted access to
a complete class, while another user m a y be granted access to its instance. W e
will use the term entity to refer to either a class or an instance of a class.
A n authorization system allows a number of possible access privileges on the
protected entities. W e assume the following set of privileges in the authorization
system: read-definition, read, write, delete, execute, and create. T h e privileges
are partially ordered such that authorization to access privileges of higher order
implies authorization to access privileges of lower order. T h e assumed order is:
write > execute > read > read-definition,
create > execute > read > read-definition, and
delete > read > read-definition.
It is worth noting that the execute privilege is used to call and execute methods
associated with the class of an object, and implies read and read-definition rights.
It m e a n s that the method can access the required definitions and value of instancevariables and objects, and the holder of the execute privilege can access the return
result of the method as well. T h e state of the object will not change. In order to
change the state of an object, the privilege write is required.
O u r authorization system is chosen to be a closed system, i.e., each privilege
must be explicitly authorized. Hence, the absence of appropriate authorizations
is interpreted as "access not allowed".

4.3.2 Administrative policies
Administrative policies determine w h o is allowed to grant and revoke authorizations to entities (classes or objects). There are two approaches: centralized and
decentralized administrations. In centralized administration, the grant and revocation of authorizations are done by a special user or users called database
administrator or security officers. T h e centralized administration is sometimes
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too restrictive. In decentralized administration, users are allowed to grant a
revoke authorizations by applying ownership policy or other mechanisms. Here,
we use the decentralized administration and allow each entity to have its owner.
Users are grouped and each group has its sponsor who gives authorizations to
members of the group. The database administrator (security officers) duties include admitting new users to the database system and revoking/replacing the
ownership.
Each entity (object or class) has its owner. Whenever a user creates an entity,
(s)he will be its owner and have the full authority over it. The owner of the entity
grants and revokes privileges for other users. The owner authority is limited to
the entity (s)he created. The owner has only implicit read-definition, read, and
execute privileges to the entities which has relationships with the owner entity.
The owner must get permission explicitly for other privileges such as write, delete,
and create. The ownership can also be granted and revoked by the creator of the
object.
It is worth noting three points. First, each class has its owner and the owner
can be different from the owners of the class instances. Owners of classes have full
authority over their classes, and have implicit read-definition, read, and execute
authorization rights on relevant instances of classes. Second, an authorization on
a class propagates to instances only when the grantor has the same rights or is
their owner. Third, a user must have create privilege in order to create an object
of a class.
A group is defined as a set of users or a collection of smaller groups. Groups
are not necessarily disjoint. This means that a user may be a member of more
than one group. Groups may be members of other groups provided they do
not belong (directly or indirectly) to any of its members. The resulting group
hierarchy has to be a directed acyclic graph. Figure 4.2 shows an example of a
group hierarchy.
Each group has its sponsor who administers it. The sponsor can add new
members to the group or remove members from the group. Any user who has the
sponsorship privilege may create a new group and grant the sponsorship privilege
to other users.
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Figure 4.2: User groups Hierarchy.

4.3.3

Implicit policies

There are two different types of object hierarchies in O O D B systems: classcomposition and class-inheritance hierarchy [126]. T o access the full information
regarding an entity, a user requires to have the same authorizations along the
hierarchies. There are two policies: visibility from above and visibility from below
that define h o w an explicit authorization m a y propagate along the hierarchies

[130].
In the object-composition hierarchy, the root corresponds to a complex object
and other objects in the hierarchy define its internal structure. If users are authorized to access the root, they should also be authorized to access all information
of the descendants of the root. This is called visibility from above.
T h e classes can also be organized in the inheritance (class/subclass) hierarchy.
In this case, the access to a subclass implies the access to all objects of the
superclasses in the inheritance hierarchy.
In order to indicate h o w privileges are propagated along the hierarchy, different
types of authorization should be identified. T w o possible types of authorization
are: partial and full [169].
In the object-composition hierarchy, a user with the full authorization for a
set of privileges (can be read-definition, read and/or execute) over an entity has
the s a m e rights to the components of the entity, i.e., the entities that form the
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structural part of the entity. In the case of the partial authorization, the a
to an entity does not extend to its components.
In the inheritance hierarchy, when users have the full authorization for a set
of privileges (the set can include read-definition, read and execute) over an object
of a subclass, they have implicitly the same rights to the relevant objects of the
superclasses. In the case of the partial authorization, a user can access the object
only. However, users that are given authorizations to an object of a class, will
not be authorized to access the objects of subclasses of that class unless they are
authorized explicitly or are the owners of the objects of those subclasses.
Note that for other privileges such as create, write, and delete, the user must
be explicitly authorized by the owner of the related objects, unless the two objects
have the same owner.

4.4 Notations, Assumptions, and Definitions
4.4.1 Notations
• Oi and 01 Di are the names of the i-th object and the i-th object identifier,
respectively. C; is the name of the i-th class. Ei denotes the i-th entity
name (object or class) which can be either Oi or Ci. Uj denotes the j-th
user login-name. ACIDj^^k is the authorization-instance identifier of the
user Uj for the object Ei granted by Uk- W e use an n-bit string to represent
OIDl, 0{, Ci, Uh and ACIDjti,k.
• PSj denotes the login password of the user Ur This password is chosen by
Uj. It is long enough and is kept secret by Uj.
• || and © denote concatenation and exclusive-or (XOR), respectively.
• TM and DBMS denote a tamper-proof module, and a database management
system, respectively.
• Kdb is the database cryptographic key which is kept in a secure place and
is only accessible to T M . {x}Kdb stands for the ciphertext of x generated
using the key Kdb-
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4.4.2 Assumptions
1- F = {-Fn|w G N} is a pseudo-random function family, where Fn = {/K|/A- :

E n - E n , tf e En}2. H = {Hn\n e N}, where # n = {/i|ft : £ 2 " -> £ " } is a k-SIFF mapping
2n-bit inputs to n-bit output strings. A: is a parameter which is chosen in
such a way that no database entity has more than k relevant entities and
no group has more than k users.
3. Random n-bit strings Krd, Kr,Kw, Ke, Kd, Kc correspond to read-definition,
read, write, execute, delete, and create, respectively. They are accessible to

T M only.

4.4.3 Definitions
Each class and object in our system has the following specification.
Definition 4.2 A class C is represented by a tuple:
(CNAME,
CNAME

PNAME,

"class-struct", "method-list", SECURITY-INFO).

is a unique name of C given by its creator. PNAME

is the parent name

of C. The "class-struct" is its structure, and "method-list" is the list of met
that can be executed by users if they have the execute privilege. SECURITY-INFO

specifies class authorization information which is an aggregation of the CKEYSLIST and H-FUNCTION.

CKEYS-LIST

is a pair of access keys (Kf,Kf) cor-

responding to partial and full authorization. H-FUNCTION

describes the hash

function that must be used by the related classes to derive the access key Kf.

•

Definition 4.3 The class-struct is [Pi : pi(Ti),..., Pk : pk(Tk)}, where Pi is a

name of property, T,- is a type name of the respective property and pi is an option
type constructor, e.g. set-of, collection-of, array-of, ordered list, etc.
type names includes the names of atomic data types like integer, real, string,
as well as the names of classes that have been pre-defined. •
Definition 4.4 An object O is a tuple:
(OID, ONAME,

CNAME,

"state", SECURITY-INFO).

the object and created by DBMS.
creator. CNAME

ONAME

OID is the identifier of

is the name of the object given by its

indicates the name of the class to which O belongs,

"state" i
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the associated state of the object. SECURITY-INFO specifies object authorizati
information which is an aggregation of the OKEYS-LIST
OKEYS-LIST

is a pair of access keys (Kf,Kf)

authorization. H-FUNCTION

and

H-FUNCTION.

corresponding to partial and full

indicates the hash function that must be used by

the related classes or objects to derive the access key Kf of the object O. •
The definitions of superclass and ancestor are as follows.
Definition 4.5 Ancestor of class d is any class Ck such that either

(l)Ck = [...,Pl:Pl(Cl),...} or
(2) Ck = [... ,Pj : Pj(Cj),...] and Cj is ancestor of d. •
Definition 4.6 Superclass of d

is any class Ck such that either

(1) d = (Ci,Ck,...) or
(2) Ck = (Ck, Cj,...) and Cj is a superclass of Ci. •
In order to enforce D A C security requirements and to protect an entity against
unauthorized accesses, the authorization system has to know the exact user privileges. This can be accomplished by storing the explicit privileges and necessary
D A C information in the authorization class (AC).
Definition 4.7 An Authorization Class (AC) is a tuple:
(GRANTEE,
GRANTEE

ENAME,

GRANTOR,

MEMBER-LIST,

DAC-INFO).

indicates the user who is authorized to access the entity. ENAME

specifies the entity which can be a class name or an object identifier. GRAN
names the user who has authorized the GRANTEE

to access the entity. MEMBER-

LIST is the list of users who are the members of the group whose sponsor is th
GRANTEE.

DAC-INFO

specifies DAC information and has the form

(OP-RIGHTS, AUTH-TYPE,
PSWORD).

OP-RIGHTS

SPONSORSHIP,

OWNERSHIP,

H-FUNCTION,

indicates the list of privileges which the GRANTEE

h

on the entity (it could be read-definition, read, write, execute, delete, creat

all; the word "all" is used to indicate all possible access privileges). AUTH-TY
(F or P) specifies full or partial authorization. SPONSORSHIP
indicates if the GRANTEE

(YES or NO)

can be the sponsor of a group (or groups) (indicated

by the GRANTOR),

and is able to propagate their privileges to the group mem-

bers. OWNERSHIP

(YES or NO) specifies whether GRANTEE

privilege. H-FUNCTION

has ownership

indicates the hash function that must be used to derive

the grantor's password. PSWORD

stores the user password. •
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Note that the values of the DAC-INFO and SECURITY-INFO are encrypted

with the Kdb by T M .

4.5 Proposed Solution
Our main goal is to design a cryptographic mechanism for discretionary access
control in O O D B systems. Thus we will not consider other security issues such
as authentication and secrecy of stored data. To enforce authentication and
secrecy, the scheme proposed by Hardjono, Zheng and Seberry [101, 102] for
database authentication based on SIFF can be applied. A discussion of their
scheme is presented in Appendix A. W e assume that the user authentication is
done by the underlying operating system, and is secure. Also, we use a tamperproof module ( T M ) to perform all necessary cryptographic operations, to generate
needed cryptographic elements, and to verify the validity of access attempts. The
security of T M relies on the security of underlying operating system and D B M S .
T M can be an interface between the user and the database system, or between
the database and physical layer, or a separate function in the database system.
Figure 4.3 shows the position of T M when it is a separate function in D B M S .
D B M S provides essential authorization information such as the entity identifier and access privileges in plain form and user password, access key, and SIFF
in encrypted form to T M . Then T M evaluates the request according to the algorithms described in this section and Section 4.6, and passes the result to D B M S .
To protect an entity against unauthorized accesses, the authorization system
needs to know the users authorization rights. There are two possible approaches
to accomplish this. In thefirst,all authorizations either explicit or implicit are
stored. In the second, only explicit authorizations are stored, and implicit ones
are derived each time when the access request is processed. Thefirstapproach
is inefficient and time consuming when the number of object-instances is large.
The second approach is even worse if we use access control lists to store explicit
authorizations. Here, we show how to improve the second approach. To do so, we
propose a cryptographic mechanism using SIFF to evaluate implicit authorizations from explicit authorizations stored in the Authorization Class (AC) each
time for checking validity of access request which is relatively straight forward
and efficient.
To allow access to an entity i (object or class), we must be able to produce
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Figure 4.3: A possible implementation of T M .
access keys Kf and Kf for the entity. Kf and Kf correspond to the partial
and the full authorization, respectively. Kf can be derived from the access key
of the related objects. The relationship can be either the inheritance (is-a) or
the aggregation (is-part-of). In the case of the inheritance, the access key Kf
can be derived from the access keys of the instances of subclasses of the entity
i. Inheritance takes on four different forms specified in Chapter 2. Whereas in
the case of the aggregation, the Kf can be computed from the access keys of the
objects of ancestors of the entity i. In other words, the access key Kf guarantees
partial explicit authorization access, and Kf insures implicit authorization rights
along the hierarchies: inheritance, and composite. Every time a user requests the
access to a specific entity i either Kf or Kf is computed and compared with the
stored one by T M . If they match, the access is permitted otherwise denied.
Next, we discuss algorithms for the generation of access keys ( Kf,
passwords, and SIFF associated with entities and users.

Kf),
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4.5.1 Creating

When a user Uj (with login password PSj) creates an entity Ei by running creat
command, access keys for this entity are generated. Note that the entity can be
either a class C,- or an object Oi.

Case 1. Partial authorization.
Step 1. T M calculates the password njti = fps3(Uj © E{) of the user Uj for the
entity E{.
Step 2. T M selects at random the access key Kf for the entity Ei (Kf ER E n )
for partial authorization.
Step 3. T M selects at random a SIFF hash function hf ER Hn for partial authorization. The function has the following collisions:

hf(nh,\\Krd) = hf(n3A\Kr) = hf(n^\K^) = hf(nJtl\\Kw) = hf(nj,t\\Kd) =

hf(n],l\\K<) = Kf

(1)

TM also encrypts DAC-INFO, {("a//", "F", "yes", "yes" ,hf,nJti)}Kdb. The word
all is used to indicated all possible access privileges.
Step 4. D B M S creates the object (U3,Ei,U3, M E M B E R - L I S T , D A C - I N F O )
which is an instance of the Authorization Class (AC).

Case 2. Full authorization.
Suppose that objects 0\x, 0\2,..., Oip with access keys Kf, Kf,..., Kf

are re-

lated to the object Oi (via either inheritance or aggregation).
Step 1. T M selects at random the access key Kf for the object Oi (Kf £ # E n )
for full authorization.
Step 2. T M selects at random a SIFF hash function hf ER

Hn for the full

authorization. The function has the following collisions:
hf (KfJK^)

= hf(Kf\\IC) = hf(Kf\\K*) = hf(Kf2Wd)

= hf(KfW)

=

h!(Kf2\\K*) = ... = hf(Kfp\\Krd) = hf(Kfp\\I<r) = hf(Kfp\\K<) = Kf

(2)

Clearly, users who have access to related objects 0is (1 < s < p), can also access
the object Oi. The access to the object Oi is granted only if T M can regenerate
Kf from a pair (a related object keys 0\s and a suitable privilege key (Krd,KT,
and Ke))- Note that in the case of inheritance, 0\s (1 < s < p) are instances of
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subclasses of the object Oi. Whereas in the case of aggregation, Ois (1 < s < p
are objects of ancestors of the object Oi.
Step 3. D B M S appends the hash function {hf) to the H-FUNCTION

of the

object Oi.
Note the following two points. In the case of the full authorization of a class,
the associated access key Kf is computedfirst,then the full authorization keys
associated with the related to the class objects are derived from its instances. If
the owner of an entity is replaced by a new one or if the login password of the
owner has been changed, then in both cases the process prescribed above must
be done again.

4.5.2 Authorization Administration
To be complete, an authorization system must include mechanism for the authorization handling. Here, we present algorithms to perform the grant, revoke, and
ownership transfer operations.

Granting
Suppose that the grantor Uj has the password n^; for the entity E{. Assume Uj
wants to give access to Ei for m grantees f//15 U\2,..., Uim (with login passwords
P5/j, PSi2,..., PSim). If Uj runs the grant command, the following steps will be
completed. Uj can be the owner of Ei or the sponsor of a group.
Step 1. T M calculates the password niSjij = fpsh(^i ® Uj) of the grantee Uis
for the entity Ei, s = 1,..., m.
Step 2. T M selects at random a SIFF hash function hjti ER Hn such that
h

jAnh,i,j) = hjAnh,ij) = • • • = hjAnim,u) = ACIDj^k

This step ensures that all grantees Uh,Ui2,..., Ulm (the grantees are member o
the group whose sponsor is the grantor Uj) can directly compute the

ACIDj^^

of the Uj and access the authorization-instance related to the Uj for the entity
Ei granted by UkStep 3. T M encrypts the D A C - I N F O , {("access privileges", "P/F", "yes/no",
"yes/no", hj,i,ni,titj)}Kdb.
Step 4. D B M S creates the object (Uh,Et,Uj, M E M B E R - L I S T , D A C - I N F O ) as
an instances of the class A C (ACIDi^ij) for s = 1,..., m.
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Step 5. DBMS updates the MEMBER-LIST of the authorization-instance related to the grantor Uj.

Revoking
If a grantor Uk wants to revoke Uj authorization over the entity Ei, the following
steps have to be completed.
Step 1. D B M S deletes the associated authorization-instance ACIDjiitk from A C .
Step 2. T M

selects a new SIFF with one less collision for the group whose

sponsor is Uk (the user Uj does not belong to the group anymore).
Step 3. T M replaces the old SIFF in the authorization-instance associated with
users in the M E M B E R - L I S T of the sponsor with the new one.
Step 4. D B M S updates the M E M B E R - L I S T associated with Uk.
Section 4.8 discusses in detail the impact of the group updating on the authorization system.

Ownership Transfer
A n entity (class or object) can have several owners who may act independently.
Suppose that the creator of Ei is Uj and Uj wants to grant the ownership of Ei to
users Ur and Us by executing transfer-own command. The following steps must
be completed.
Step 1. T M computes passwords nTii = fpsr{Ur © Ei) and nSti = fpss(Us © Ei)
for new owners.
Step 2. T M selects a new SIFF hash function with the following collisions:
hf(njti\\Krd) = hf(nJtt\\Kr) = *f(n*||#e) = hf(n3,%\\Kw) = ^ f f c l l ^ ) =
hf(n3A\Kc)

=

hf(nT,\\Krd) = hf(nrA\Kr)

= hf(nr,\\Ke) = hf(nr,t\\Kw) =

hf(nr,\\Kd) = hf(nr,t\\Kc) = hf(ns,\\Krd) = hf(ns,\\Kr) = hf(ns,\\Ke) =
hf(nsA\K-) = hf(ns,\\Kd) = hf (nsA\Kc) =

Kf

Step 3. D B M S updates the instance in the A C for Uj and creates new instances
for Ur and Us.
Note that if the creator of Ei wants to revoke the ownership of Ei from the
user Us by executing revoke-own command. It is sufficient that T M selects a new
SIFF hash function with the following collisions:
hf(nhi\Wd)

= hf(ndA\Kr)

= hf (n^||/^) = h^niti\\Kw) = ti(nj<i\\Kd) =

hf(Ujtl\\Kc) = hf(nr,i\\Krd) = hf(nrA\Kr)

= hf(nr,\\Ke) = hf(nr,\\Kw) =
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hf(nrA\Kd) = hf(nr,t\\Kc) = Kf
As the result, all privileges granted by Us to other users will be deleted as well.
If O W N E R S H I P is on and both G R A N T E E and G R A N T O R are U3, then U3
is considered the creator of the Ei.

4.6 Validation of Access Requests
The processing of a user query starts by checking if the user has appropriate
privileges to the entities specified in the query. This is done by the authorization
system.
In O O D B systems, the hierarchical structure of an entity may, or may not, be
included in the evaluation of the query and hence there are two forms of query:
simple queries and hierarchical queries. A simple query has the following form:
• retrieve Target-clause [from Entry-clause] [where Qualification-clause];
Target-clause denotes target entity names to be retrieved. Entry-clause
(from) denotes sets of entities through which the target entity can be accessed. If the target entity is an object of a complex object, the Entry-clause
m a y denote any of the ancestors of the target entity. In the case of inheritance hierarchy, the Entry-clause may denote any instance of subclasses
of the target entity. It is worth noting that if a user does not have an explicit right to the target entity then it is essential for the Entry-clause to
be specified. Qualification-clause (where) specifies Boolean combination of
predicates that must be satisfied by the retrieved objects.

For a hierarchical query, the scope of the query also includes the hierarchic
structure of the target object. This is specified by putting "*" immediately after
the n a m e of the object. A hierarchical query has the following form.
• retrieve Target-clause* [from Entry-clause] [where Qualification-clause]:
The syntax of the query is similar to a simple query. "*" indicates that the
hierarchy must be included in the evaluation of the query, i.e., the value of
all properties (or objects) of the entity specified in the Target-clause and
its relevant entities must be retrieved.
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4.6.1 Access Validation
The access validation of a query is done in two phases. First, the authority of the
user who issues the query is checked, i.e., it must be checked whether the user
has proper authorization rights to entities which are requested. This is the user
validation phase. Second, the specified privileges to the entity retrieved by the
query are forced. This is the access validation phase.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the user Ui issues the query:
retrieve Ej* from Ei;

Phase 1. User validation.
Step 1. Retrieve the authorization instance related to the user Ui for the entities
Ej or Ei.
retrieve A C where

(GRANTEE = Ui and ENAME = E3 and P S W O R D = fPSl(E3 ©
or

GRANTOR))

(GRANTEE = Ui and ENAME = Et and P S W O R D = fPSl(Ei@ GRANTOR));
The verification that

(PSWORD - fPSl(Ei © GRANTOR)), or (PSWORD = fPSl(E3 ©

GRANTOR))

is done by T M . If there is no such instance of the Authorization Class A C then
the system rejects the request. Suppose that the verification has been successful
and the extracted instance is
(Ut,Ek,Uv, M E M B E R - L I S T ,
{("access privileges", "F", "yes/no", "yes/no", hVtk,niti>tk)}Kdb) where k is either
j or i.
Step 2. Derive the password of the owner of the entity Ek, say Uw, i.e.,
whi\e(OWNERSHIP
If OWNERSHIP

^ "yes")do retrieve

hVtk(PSWORD);

is not on, T M obtains ACIDr,kfW

= h[ljk(PSWORD).

Then

D B M S retrieves the AClD\>,k,w instance of A C . Suppose that the derived password and SIFF for the owner Uw of Ek are nWfk and hf, respectively (k is either
j or i). Then we enter the access validation phase.

Phase 2. Access validation.
Assume that
hp

is SIFF hash function associated with a class,
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hpK and hF are SIFF hash functions used for an object (partial and full),
Kp

and KF

are access keys used for a class (partial and full), and

Kp

and KF

are access keys associated with an object (partial and full).

The validation proceeds as follows.
Step 1. One of the following retrieve statements is executed (this depends on
the type of the entity (object or class)).
• If Ej is an object Oj, then
retrieve Od where
(hp0(nw,3\W)

=

Kp°)or

(hp°(nwA\Kr)

= Kf° and AUTH-TYPE

= "Fn and hf
J

(Kf°\\Kr)=Kf°);
\

C

II

/

J

/ >

• If Ej is a class Cj, then
do (for all object 0S is in Cj)
retrieve 0S where

(hF(nv,j\\K') = Kfc)or
(hpC(nwA\Kr)

= Kf° and AUTH-TYPE

= "F" and hf°

(Kf°\\Kr)=Kf°);

Step 2. Retrieve the objects which are in relation with the entity Ej (via either
inheritance or aggregation). Let 0S denote such an object.
retrieve 0S where
(hp°(nWJ\\Kr)

= Kp°

and AUTH-TYPE

="F" and hf°

(KF°\\Kr)=Kf°)

or
(hpC(nWiJ\\Kr) = KpC and AUTH-TYPE

="F" and

hf°(Kf°\\Kr)=Kf°);

After all 0S have been retrieved, the processfinishes.In the above steps, all
checks are done by T M .
Note that the access key of instances of descendants (in the case of the composite object) or the access key of instances of superclasses (in case of the inheritance
hierarchy) can only be derived from the access key of the entity. This ensures
that the access to the instances which are not related to the entity will never occur. Furthermore, in the case of the partial authorization, the request for indirect
access will fail because the checks in Steps 1 and 2 are not satisfied, .

4.7 Object Restructuring
In an OODB system, objects or relationships might be deleted, added, or modified. In this section, we consider the impact of these changes on our authorization
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system.

4.7.1 Deletion of Objects
Objects in OODB systems can be deleted indirectly by altering database schema
or directly by using the delete privileges. For the indirect deletion, all objects of
database system has to be reorganized according to the new schema. For direct
deletion, we consider three possibilities: deletion from a leaf node, deletion from
an intermediate node, and deletion of a relationship. Deletion of an object from a
leaf node requires the authorization-instances corresponding to the deleted object
to be deleted from A C . Deletion of an intermediate object which is a part of the
composite object causes that the descendants of the deleted object become the
descendants of the parent of the deleted object. This requires the generation of a
new SIFF function that satisfies Equation (2) of Section 4.5.1 and replaces the old
SIFF function. If the deleted object is an instance of a subclass in the inheritance
hierarchy, it is logical to delete all objects of the lower subclasses of the deleted
object. Otherwise the objects of the subclass of the deleted object become the
objects of the superclass of the deleted object. N e w SIFF hash function which
satisfy Equation (2) of Section 4.5.1 must be produced for all objects of the
superclasses of the deleted object and replace the old ones. In both cases, it is
also necessary that the authorization-instances which correspond to the deleted
object have to be deleted from A C .
In an O O D B system, there are three types of relationship: (i) aggregation
relationship; (ii) generalization (or is-a) relationship, and (iii) association rela-

tionship such as teaches, is-taught-by, supplies, is-supplied-by, etc. [174]. Not
that the modification of the data model may cause deletion of relationships aggregation and generalization.

The deletion of the association relationship may

occur if the object is not associated with any objects.
Deletion of a aggregation relation may affect the composite object in two ways.
First, the deletion causes that a part of the component has been removed. In
this case, A C must be updated if the deleted part does not exist in the database
schema any more. Otherwise, due to the changes in the structure of the deleted
part, new SIFF functions for all objects of the deleted part must be regenerated.
A C is left intact. Second, the deletion may cause the changes in the hierarchy of
ancestors. In this case, new SIFF functions for all the objects of the descendants
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must be reproduced.
The deletion of a generalization relationship may affect the hierarchy of objects
in two ways. First, deletion causes the superclasses of the low-level classes to
change. This requires that new SIFF functions for all objects of the superclasses
be reproduced. Second, the deletion causes that the hierarchy of the object is
removed. Hence the authorization-instance of the deleted object must be deleted
from A C . If the changes affects both the subclasses and the superclasses, new
SIFF for objects of the associated superclasses must be reproduced. A C is left
intact. Finally if a relationship with one or more objects is removed. N e w SIFF
functions with one less collision must be selected. SIFF functions are replaced by
the new ones.

4.7.2 Addition of Objects
A n object might be added to the database as an instance of an existing class, or
as a new object of a new class. In thefirstcase (a new object of the old class), it is
sufficient to complete the process described in Section 4.5.1. In the second case (a
new object of the new class), we can distinguish the following three possibilities:
(i) a new class is added to a leaf, (ii) a new class is added to an intermediate
level, and (iii) a new relationship is created.
If a class is added as a new leaf, then a process similar to the one described
in Section 4.5.1 must be completed for all objects of the new class. Moreover,
since the subclasses of the superclasses have changed, new SIFF functions for all
object instances of superclasses must be regenerated.
If a class is added to an intermediate node, first, the process described in
Section 4.5.1 must be completed for objects of the new classes. Next, new SIFF
functions must be regenerated (see Step 2 of Phase 2 of Section 4.5.1).
In the case of the addition of new relationships, a new SIFF function as
described in Step 2 of Phase 2 of Section 4.5.1, must be regenerated for all objects
of its descendants or superclasses.

4.8 Grouping and Group Updating
When users have the grant authorization (specified by SPONSORSHIP), they can
create user groups and become the sponsors of them. They can give the privileges
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to the members of the group by running the grant command (see Section 4.5.2).
Members of a group with the grant option (i.e., if SPONSORSHIP

is on) can

propagate privileges to other users. They have a user group hierarchy similar to
the one shown in Figure 4.2. A n important issue in the group hierarchy is the
group updating. W e can distinguish three possible cases of group modification:
1. a member of a group, who is the sponsor of the group, is deleted,
2. a new user or a group is added, and
3. a member of the group (or the sponsor of the group) is replaced by another
one.
The impact of above mentioned modifications on the group organization and
the updates they necessitate, are discussed below.

4.8.1 Deletion of Memberships
Deletion of memberships, in a group structure, is done by revoking the users
authorizations by the sponsor of the group that (s)he is a member of.
The deleted user is just a member of the group. It is required that the associated authorization-instance is removed from A C , and a new SIFF function,
with one less collision is selected. The new SIFF function replaces the old one
in the authorization-instance associated with users in the M E M B E R - L I S T of the
sponsor. The M E M B E R - L I S T must be updated too.
The deleted user is the sponsor of a group. In this case, the authorizationinstance of the user and entries associated with the users (all members of the
group) must be deleted from A C . Note that even if the entries associated with
the users who are granted access by the deleted sponsor are not deleted, the
access to the entity by these users will be denied immediately after the deletion
of the sponsor. The same process, described before, must be done for the group
in which the deleted user is a member (a new SIFF function for the rest members
of the group must be regenerated).

4.8.2 Addition of New Memberships
A user who has the sponsorship privilege can grant his/her privileges to other
users w h o can be either an individual or a group sponsor. In any case, it is
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required that the process described in Section 4.5.2 be completed.

4.8.3 Replacing
A member in a group can be replaced by a new member, or the login password of a
member in the group can be changed. The member can be the sponsor of a group
or a normal user. It is required that a new password for the member is selected
and then the associated authorization-instance of the member is updated. A new
SIFF for the group which the user is a member, is regenerated. If the replaced
user was the sponsor of the group, a new SIFF function would also be regenerated
for the group.

4.9 Security of the Authorization System

The authorization system is considered secure if it is computationally infeas
for an insider/outsider to gain unauthorized access.
Proposition 4.1 Assume that the tamper-proof module (TM) is secure and is
run by DBMS

only, and the computational power of an outsider is polynomi-

ally bounded. If the authorization system can be broken, then either the SIFF
scheme, or the pseudo-random functions, or the user authentication scheme, or
the cryptosystem used for encryption is insecure.
Sketch of the Proof:
The proposed authorization system is secure if it is computationally difficult
or simply "impossible" for an intruder to discover necessary information required
for request validity check in Step 1 of Phase 2 in Section 4.6 (this information is
secure).
More precisely, an intruder can gain the access to a protected entity in the
system if (s)he can provide the required secret information. The intruder has the
following possible options for the attack.
1. The intruder generates valid access key and an associated SIFF function,
and an access privilege key for entity j, Kf, hp, and K°v. This means that
the intruder is able to predicate the output of the pseudo-random function
and tofindcollisions for the SIFF function. This contradicts the assumption
that the pseudo-random function and SIFF are secure.
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2. The intruder can guess or disclose the login password of the owner or one
of the grantees of entity j, say Ui, so the intruder can compute nij =
fps{(Ui © Ej), and access the authorization-instance associated with £//.
This means that the user authentication system is insecure.

3. The intruder modifies his/her own privileges or someone else's. For example
the intruder modifies a partial authorization to a full authorization, changes
ownership, etc. If this happens, the ability of the intruder is equivalent to
breaking the cryptosystem which is used for D A C - I N F O encryption. This
contradicts our assumptions.
4. The inside intruder who is authorized to access a component of the object
hierarchy, accesses high-level objects. This means that the intruder has
succeeded to invert the SIFF function which contradicts to the one-wayness
of the hash function.

4.10 Complexity of The System

As discussed before, there are two hierarchies in an 0-0 data model: inheritan
and composite hierarchy. D B M S evaluates the authorizations along the object
hierarchies. The most efficient way of the evaluation is to employ the proposed
hierarchical access control. There are two different approaches to the solution
of hierarchical access control problem. The first is based on R S A cryptosystem.
The second uses one-way hash functions.
In 1982, Akl and Taylor [5] were thefirstwho proposed a solution to the hierarchical access control problem. Their solution is based on the R S A cryptosystem
[171]. There are several problems with this scheme. The scheme can work only
with rigid hierarchical structures and cannot be used in O O D B systems where
the database schema may evolve. Each node stores two integers. First integer
is a prime assigned to the node and the second integer is a product of primes
associated with other nodes that are not descendants of the given node. The
average length of the second component is large and hence expensive in terms
of the storage. Moreover, the entire system must be predefined by the trusted
central authority, and there is no way to expand or modify according to changes
of the hierarchy. Some other solutions to overcome these problems were proposed in [48, 104]. A c o m m o n drawback of these solutions is that they are based
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on the difficulty of breaking the RSA cryptosystem, and make heavy use of the
underlying algebraic properties of the crypto-function.
The SIFF solution has several attractive features. The SIFF construction is
based on the assumption of the existence of a one-way function. So the SIFF
can be based on fast hashing algorithms such as M D 4 ( M D 5 or H A V A L ) instead
of very slow R S A system. Each node in the hierarchical structure needs to keep
only one key of the length n (n — 128 bits), and hence the required storage is
low. Moreover, expansion of SIFF according to the change of the hierarchy is
straightforward and easy.
Let us give a brief comparison of the time and space complexity of the SIFF
construction with the R S A one. Let k be the number of objects in the hierarchical structure. Let n be the length of keys. Assume that M D 5 and polynomials of
degree k over finitefieldsGF(2n) (n = 128) are used to construct the SIFF hash
function. The system based on the SIFF requires O(log k) modular multiplications of 128 bits long for key derivation (see Appendix B). Note that because
computation time of the pseudo-random function and M D 5 is negligible, it is ignored. If the R S A approach is used for authorization derivation and generation,
the time complexity of the system will be 0((k + l)\ogk) modular multiplications of n bit long integer; n must be at least 512 bits long, that is four times
more. If the computation time of integers associated with objects is added up,
then the time complexity will be much higher. For example, if a typical size of
objects in the hierarchical structure is k — 2 1 0 then R S A would consume 1025.10
= 10250 modular multiplications of 512 bits while SIFF would take 10 modular
multiplications of 128 bits.
Let rn be the entire number of objects in the database. Each object in the
proposed system holds two keys and a hash function. Hence, the proposed SIFF
approach requires 0(3ran) space in total. Since n bit strings are compressed by
M D 5 , then it is sufficient that the length n be chosen close to 128 bits long. In
the R S A approach, each object holds a key. However the public parameters such
as integers must be stored too, then the total space is 0(3nmlog£;). Note that
n must be at least 512.
Finally, in order to increase the efficiency of the system and to benefit from the
order of access privileges, the lower access privilege can be inferred from higher
access privileges without the necessity of their storage. The access privilege keys
(Krd, Kr,..., Kc) can be chosen such that lower keys are computable from higher
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keys. This results in a shorter list of privileges. Also the SIFF function has
smaller number of collisions. For example, Equation (1) in Section 4.5.1 can be
simplified as:
hf(n3A\Kw) = hf(n3il\\Kc) = hf(nhi\\Kd) = Kf.

4.11 Conclusion and Remarks
This chapter proposes a cryptographic mechanism for discretionary access controls in O O D B systems. The mechanism is based on unique and secure access
keys for each entity (object or class). Owners and user groups are identified by
their unique passwords. Pseudo-random functions and SIFF are applied in such
a way that access keys can be derived by the objects which have relationship with
or by the user who are members of the group. W e use an authorization class (AC)
to store security information, the A C information is used during query processing
to evaluate access request and enforce the security policy. The security of the
system is based on the difficulty of predicting the output of pseudo-random functions andfindingextra collisions for SIFF functions, both of which are known to
be computationally difficult.
Object-instances based authorization system presents afinergranularity than
class-based authorization system and enables the control to be imposed for individual objects. Note that as the numbers of users and objects in the system
grow, the number of instances in the Authorization Class A C will increase and the
security enforcement and manipulation of the object structure become resource
expensive. To alleviate this problem, view mechanism can be used to define views
which contain objects with same owners or grantees. Views can be applied as the
units of authorization in the system.

Chapter 5
An Authorization Model Based
on Views
5.1 Introduction

A view or a virtual class can be used for protection by allowing subsets of da
to be seen/manipulated by users with required privileges. Views can be used
to provide the desired level of granularity if a powerful enough query language
is used for their definition. They can also provide an object content-dependent
authorization.
Several authorization models for O O D B systems, which support discretionary
or mandatory access control, have been defined [17, 78, 80, 114, 123, 130, 144,
149, 169, 160, 210](see Chapter 3 for detailed discussion). However, none of them
support content-based access control on instances of a class. Recently, several
authorization models based on methods, which support content-based authorization, have been proposed [4, 32]. This approach has the drawback that method
specification depends on authorizations. Therefore a change of the authorizations
requires a change in the specification of the methods. Bertino and Weigand [30]
used a constraint language to provide content-dependent authorizations for the
authorization model [169]. The main problem of this solution is how to efficiently
evaluate conditions associated with authorizations in the model implementation.
In particular, enforcing the conditions expressed in the authorizations by filtering the data prior to user access requires a double access to the object (one to
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evaluate the conditions and the other to evaluate the user query). A way to provide content-based authorizations is to define views containing conditions on the
values of specific instance-variables of the classes. In relational database systems,
queries are modified by adding the conditions expressed in the authorization to
the user query (this is known as the query modification mechanism). The view
based authorization ensures that the protection requirements are satisfied. At the
same time the access control is not overloaded. Moreover different levels of granularity (such as class-based, object-based, method-based, and instance-variable
based authorizations) can be provided by suitable view definitions which can be
adjusted to the user needs.
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss views in O O D B systems and their
application to enforce discretionary access control policies. In particular, we
are going to address the problem of time and content-dependent authorizations.
To improve the flexibility of the view model and consequently guarantee the
operational security of the system, parameterized views are introduced. Such
views extend the view model given by Bertino [31] with parameters which are fixed
at the time of a view evaluation. Four types of inheritance between base classes
(or views) and derived views are considered: specialization inheritance, constraint

inheritance, strict constraint inheritance, and proper specialization inherita
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides an overview of the
view model proposed by Bertino in [31]. Section 5.3 discusses how view hierarchies can be inferred from class hierarchies and view definitions. In Section
5.4, the access view as a tool for the access control is introduced and security
requirements for the discretionary access control are given. Section 5.5 formulates implicit authorization rules for each domain of authorization (user, view,
privilege). Section 5.6 presents the way how the validity of an access request can
be checked. Finally, Section 5.7 summarizes the chapter.

5.2 View Model
In the relational data model, a view is defined as a virtual relation derived
query on one or more stored relations. The relational operations join, select, and
project m a y be used to define a view. Views can be used in (almost) any query
where relations can also be applied. Furthermore, privileges may be granted and
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revoked on views as on ordinary stored relations. This feature allows the contentbased authorization on stored relations. Therefore, views can be used for both:
data protection and user convenience.
Views in an O O D B system model have been considered in a number of papers
[1, 31, 63, 107]. However, there is no consensus about the form of the view
model for O O D B systems. Until such standard becomes available, the choice of
a view model is to some extend arbitrary. Here, we consider the view model
which was developed by Bertino [31] and describe how security properties might
be incorporated into such model. Note that while the authorization model is
developed in the context of the view model proposed in [3.1], the essential ideas
are widely applicable.
In [31], Bertino provides a view model for O O D B systems that extends typical
view models of relational databases. In Bertino's model, as in relational systems,
a view is defined by a query on one or more classes, called base class(es). To
make the view model suitable for usage in O O D B systems, several additional
features are provided. Views with additional properties that are not derived from
the base classes are introduced (additional-properties). The view model is not
restricted to a structural model but also has behavioral features, i.e., a view may
have methods (methods). A method can be derived from the base class(es),
with the same or different name, or it can be created for the view. In order to
re-use existing view definitions in the specification of a new view, a new view
m a y be defined as a subview of other views (these views are called superviews).
For detailed discussion of the view model and its usage for user convenience, the
reader is referred to the Section 2.4 of Chapter 2.

5.3 Inferring the View Hierarchy

From Bertino's view model [31], two types of view hierarchies may be construct
Thefirstis the composite (or is-part-of) hierarchy. A n instance variable specification (provided with the keyword additional-properties) consists of the variable
n a m e and the domain where the domain can be a class or a view. Then an instance of a view m a y be the aggregation of a set of objects, each of which belongs
to some class or view. Such an aggregate view is sometime called a composite
object, and we call it a composite view.
The second view hierarchy is the inheritance (or is-a) hierarchy.

A view
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hierarchy can be defined for a view (using superviews), as well as being derived
from the view definitions which is called implicit (inferring) view hierarchy. In
this section, we develop and formalize the idea of derived view hierarchies.
As pointed out in [1], a view can be constructed in two distinct ways: top-down
or bottom-up. In the top-down approach, large classes are divided into smaller
ones via specialization (a similar operation in relational systems is the selection
operation). In the bottom-up approach, small classes are combined to form larger
classes via generalization (the analogous operation in relational systems is the
union operation). The following two examples illustrate the construction of a view
using the top-down or bottom-up approach. Note that for examples presented in
this chapter, the university database schema shown in the Section 2.2.7 of Chapter
2 is used.
Example 5.1 Construct a view which returns the information of postgraduate

students who are from Australia. It is required that name, idno, subject, Grad
ate-Date, and country are visible. •
One possible declaration of the view is as follows:
create-view Australian_Graduate_Students
select F.idno, F.name, F.Subject, F.GraduateJDate, F.country
from F-.FOREIGN
where F.status - "graduate" and F.country-"Australia";
This example shows how to construct a view using the top-down approach.
It illustrates the application of view mechanism that restricts the set of visible
object instances of a class (this is analogous to selection operation in the relation
systems). The view Australian-Graduate-Students contains a subset of object
instances of the class FOREIGN.

It also illustrates the possible usage of view

mechanism that restricts properties which are visible. This is similar to the
projection operation in the relational systems.
Example 5.2 Define three separate views such that the first two views contain

software supporters and programmers, respectively and the third one contains both
•
One possible way to define such views is as follows:
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create-view Software_Supporters

create-view Programmers

select E

select E

from E: E M P L O Y E E

from E: E M P L O Y E E

where E.profession= "software-supporter";

where E.profession=
"programmer";

The views Software-Supporters and Programmers contain object instances of
the class EMPLOYEE

that are software supporters and programmers, respec-

tively. They are examples of the top-down approach without projection operation. The next view contains object instances of both views. It is an example of
the bottom-up approach.
create-view Technical_Staff
select P, S
from P:Programmers, S:Software_Supporters;
In general, a view defined using top-down or bottom-up approach can be categorized as follows.
T. T o p - d o w n Approach. Suppose that a view V is derived from a class (or
a view) C. Then the view V:
Tl. inherits all properties of C, and the set of instances of V is a
subset of instances of C;
T2. has more properties and/or methods than C;
T3. has fewer properties and more methods (or vice versa) than C;
and
T4- has fewer properties and methods than C.
B. Bottom-up Approach. Suppose that the view V is defined over classes
(or views) Cx,..., Cn. Then one of the following cases may happen.
BI. V inherits all common properties and methods of the base classes
(or views). It contains all common

instances of C\,... ,Ck, and se-

lected instances of Ck+x,- • •, Cn. Note that if Ci,...,Ck are not required to have the same properties, then the view V may have fewer
properties and/or methods than the base classes (or views).
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V inherits all properties and methods of the base classes (or

views) ifCx,. ..,Ck have the same properties. V includes all instances
of Cx,... ,Ck, and selected instances of Ck+X,... ,Cn.
B3.

V contains all instances of Cx,...,Ck, and selected instances

of Ck+1,... ,Cn. V has more properties and/or methods than base
classes (or views).
Based on the above discussion, we can distinguish four types of inheritance
relationship among classes (or views) and derived views.
1. Specialization inheritance.

Views inherit all the properties of the base classes (or views), and they a
have some additional properties and/or methods. Examples are cases T2,
and B3. In the case T2, the view V is a specialization of C, or in other
words V is a subclass (or subview) of C. In the case B3, each Ci is a
subview (or specialization) of V for 1 < i < k. Moreover, if a class (or

view) D is a superclass (superview) of base class(es) (or views) then D is
also a superclass (superview) of V.

2. Constraint inheritance. Views consist of all instances of base classes (or

views) that satisfy given constraints (cases Tl, and B2). In other words,
every instance of the view is also an instance of the base classes (or vice
versa). Hence, the view is a subview of base class (or vice versa). For
example in case Tl, V is a subview of C as every instance of V is an
instance of C. In case B2, Ci (1 < i < k) is a subview of V since every
instance Ci (1 < i < k) is an instance ofV.
3. Strict constraint inheritance. Views not only consist of all instances of

the base classes (or view) that satisfy given constraint, but there are fewe
properties and methods than in the base classes (or views). In other words,

the view not only filters out the instances of the base classes (or views) bu

also projects the properties (see cases T4 and BI). V is a strict subview o
C

(case T4). In the case BI, V is a strict subview of d for 1 < i < k.

4- Proper specialization inheritance.

Derived viewsfilterout the in-

stances of the base classes and project the properties.

They also contain

new additional properties or methods (see the case T3). Views consist of
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all instances of the base classes (or views) that satisfy the given constraint.
They do not inherit all properties or methods of the base classes (this contradicts the principle that a subclass must inherit all properties and methods of
superclasses). They have new additional properties or methods. Therefore,
derived views cannot be specialization of the base classes because they do not
inherit all properties of base classes. Moreover, they cannot be strict subviews of base classes since they have additional properties and/or methods.
Hence, the view V is a proper specialization of C.

5.4 Authorization System
As described in the previous section, view definitions use predicates on the values of properties of a class, and combine the object values of several classes to
access objects that meet the specified conditions. If authorization is granted on
a view, the access is restricted to the object instances that arefilteredby the
view. Hence, views provide a powerful andflexiblemechanism for authorization
based on database contents. They can be used to provide the desired levels of authorization granularity such as class, object, instance-variable, or method-based.
Examples 5.3-5.6 show h o w a view model can be applied to provide different levels
of granularity.
E x a m p l e 5.3 Define a view Students Jnfo which contains all information related
to all students (class-based authorization) .•
create-view StudentsJnfo
select S

from S: STUDENT;
Example 5.4 Define a view which contains information related to a particular
student, say student with id number 9272860 (object-based authorization). •
create-view Student_9272860
select S

from S: STUDENT
where S.idno=9272860;
E x a m p l e 5.5 Define a view which contains name, subject, and Start-Date related to all students (instance-variable based authorization). •
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create-view Students_Name_Subject
select S.name, S.subject, S.Start_Date
from S: S T U D E N T ;

Example 5.6 Define a view which contains the method associated with cla
STUDENT,

Comp-GAP(). The method outputs the greatest average point (metho

based authorization). •
The method Comp-GAPQ computes the associated value with the instance
variable GAP

related to each student. Then, it is possible to define a view

Computing-GAP as follows:
create-view Computing_GAP
methods Comp-GAP()
from S T U D E N T ;
The view Computing-GAP can access only the method Comp-GAPQ. If a user
has execute right on the view Computing-GAP, (s)he can execute the method associated with the view. Therefore, a view model provides the facility which creates
different interfaces for a class and views can be used as units of authorizations.
Furthermore, views provide a useful mechanism for efficient access control
with less storage in an authorization system based on object instances. This is
true because view mechanism provides a facility to group objects which share
the same access control list. Hence, the maintenance of authorizations becomes
easier.
The access rule in a database with views, can be formally defined as follows.
Definition 5.1 An access rule is a triple (u,v,r) where
u G U, U is the set of users/roles in the system;
v G V, V is the set of views defined in the system; and
r G R, R is the set of privileges. •
The triple (u, v, r) means that a user/role u has an access right r on a view v.
Before we discuss the use of views in object-oriented databases to enforce the
discretionary access control, we need to answer the following questions: "who is
a user?", "what is the unit of authorization?", "what is the set of privileges?",
"who can grant/revoke authorizations?", "which security requirements must be
considered?", "how to enforce the security requirements?", etc.
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To answer these and other questions, wefirstintroduce the notion of access
view. Later, we use access views to give answers to the above questions. W e also
consider the impact of the hierarchical structure of each domain of access rule
(user, view, privilege) on the authorization system.
For the rest of the chapter, we assume that the proposed authorization system
uses positive authorization policy which requires explicit specification of allowable
access privileges. The lack of authorization for a user to a view implies no access
to the view. W e denote by u a user/role identity, v a view, r a privilege, t an
authorization type, op an access privilege (access mode), V the set of views, U
the set of users, and R the set of privileges.

5.4.1 Access Views
In order to enforce security requirements and to protect an object against an
unauthorized access, the authorization system has to know the exact users privileges. This can be accomplished by the creation of access views. A n access view is
an extended view that in addition to the view specification has an authorization
list for the discretionary access control.

Definition 5.2 An access view is a view that includes the view specification p

a discretionary access control list. The format of the access view is as follows
access-view Viewname[parameters]
- view specification as described in Section 2-4 of Chapter 2
Auth-Spec authorization-information
Viewname is the name of the access view, and must be different from the

names of other access views and classes. Auth-Spec specifies authorization in
formation which is an aggregation of the ownid and A C L . ownid denotes the

identity of the view owner and A C L indicates the access control list associated
with the view. •

To increase the flexibility of the view model and to provide possibility to de
time-dependent authorizations, we allow parameterized access view. Parameters
are bounded to the actual values at the time when the view is evaluated. Suppose
that we want every employee to be able to access their own personal information.
O n e way to do so is to define a view (see Example 5.4) for each employee. W h e n
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the number of employees are large, this implementation of access control is inefficient. A better way isfirstto define a view and later to create a role (or a group)
which specifies the collection of all employees who are authorized to access the
view.
E x a m p l e 5.7 Let a user Ux create a view Personal-Info which consists of idno,

name, address, age, and spouse. The user Ux gives privileges (t, read) to a role
(or a group) Employee. •
access-view PersonaLInfo(CurrentJdno)
select P.idno, P.name, P.address, P.age, P.spouse
from P : P E R S O N *
where P.idno = Current Jdno
Auth-Spec.ownid ux
A u t h - S p e c . A C L {(Employee, (t, read))};
The instance of the above view is based on the CurrentJdno which gives the
current identity number of an employee who uses it. If employees are allowed to
access their information only during working hours (9 a m to 5 p m ) , the following
modification of the above view is sufficient. Time gives the current system time.
access-view Personal_Info( Current Jdno, Time)
select P.idno, P.name, P.address, P.age, P.spouse

from P:PERSON*
where P.idno = CurrentJdno and Time > 9 and Time < 17
Auth-Spec.ownid ux
A u t h - S p e c . A C L {(Employee,(t,read))};
The authorization specifications can be read by users who have access to the
view but they can only be modified by the owner of the view, or users who have
the grant or revoke authorization.
In general, the meta-data of a database system in the view model consist of
two classes of data. Conceptual data are mapped to the stored data. In the
case of object-oriented databases, these are called classes which are mapped to
the stored objects. Each object is an instance of a class. Views are declared (or
created) based on the classes or pre-defined views. Therefore, there can be two
classes of users: those who are allowed to access/manipulate classes, and those
who are authorized to access objects through views only.
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Authorization Rule 1 There are two classes of users: security officers and

normal users. Security officers supervise the entire database activities and a

responsible for creating views based on classes. Furthermore, they create class
and perform schema changes. Normal users can only access data through access
views. •
Users may want to create subviews or superviews. They can create new views
based on pre-defined views if they have create-view or ownership privileges on the
base views.

Authorization Rule 2 A user can create an access view over other views if the
user owns the views, or has the create-view authorization on the base views. •
When a user creates a view, (s)he becomes its owner. This is specified by the
ownid. The owner has the full authorization to the view and determines who
can access it and how.
W e assume that there are two sets of privileges: view privileges, and viewinstance privileges.

View privileges are used to manipulate the view definitions

and typically are: delete-view, create-view, modify-view, grant, and revoke. Vie
instance privileges are used to access and manipulate the instances of a view. A
typical collection of privileges is: read-definition, read, write, and delete (see
Section 5.5.2).
Authorization Rule 3 The creator of a view is its owner. The owner of the

view specifies other user privileges for all view privileges but the owner can gr
other users only view-instance privileges that are authorized on based views. •
Authorization Rule 4 The ownership is transferable to other users. However,
at any time a view has a unique owner. •
The authorization system must check if users have suitable authorizations to
perform the requested operations on views. Hence for each view, a unique A C L
is defined. It lists who and how users can access the view.

Definition 5.3 The access control list (ACL) of a view v is a list of pairs (u

where u is the identity of a user(or role) and r is a privilege granted to the vie
v. •
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Views (consequently access views) can have additional properties whose types
can be pre-defined views or classes (composite views). Also w e m a y have a query
whose scope of access can be a view (class) and its subviews (subclasses). In such
cases, it is essential to determine whether an authorization to the root of a view
is to be extended to all its constituents.
Rabitti, Bertino, K i m , and Woelk [169] distinguished two types of authorization for composite objects and class-hierarchy object access. They called them
full and partial authorizations.
T h e full authorization implies the same privileges on each component of the
composite object or on each class of the hierarchy. However, the partial authorization does not extend privileges to the descendants of composite (or classhierarchy) objects. W e here employ the same concept.
Definition 5.4 A privilege r has a form of (t,op) where t denotes the type of
authorization, and op indicates the access privilege such as read-definition, read,
write, delete, execute, create-view, modify-view, delete-view, grant, and revoke. •
An access rule (u,v,(t,op)) states that a user u is authorized to execute an
access privilege op of type t on a view v.
There are three types of hierarchy: user-role, view, and composite hierarchy.
For every hierarchy, it is required to determine whether privileges to the root node
of hierarchy should be extended to its descendants. Consider the authorization
type t and h o w it can be extended. It is reasonable to assume that full (F) or
partial (P), can be applied to all three types of hierarchy. This approach is simple
but is notflexible.Alternatively, w e can determine authorization type t for each
hierarchy independently. In this case, the authorization type t will become a
triple such that each element determines the associated authorization type for
the three possible hierarchies. W e have chosen the second approach.
Definition 5.5 An authorization type t is a triple (tx,t2,tz) where tx indicates
the type of authorization for user-role hierarchy, t2 - for view-hierarchy, and £3 for composite hierarchy. t{ (i = 1,2,3,) can be either F (full) or P (partial). •
We assume that partial (P) authorization for each type of hierarchy will bec o m e effective unless full (F) authorization is explicitly specified, i.e., the partial
authorization is the default option.
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E x a m p l e 5.8 Let a user ux create a view Adult. Assume that Ux gives the fol-

lowing authorizations ((P, F, F), read), write, and ((, F, P), read) to users u2,u
and U4, respectively. •
The access view Adult may look like the following:
access-view Adult
select P
from P : P E R S O N *
where P.age > 21 and P.age < 95
Auth-Spec.ownid Ux
A u t h - S p e c . A C L { (u2, ((P, F, F), read)), (u3, ((P, P, P), write)),
(u4,((P,F,P),read))};
The view Adult is declared on the composite class P E R S O N (the components of
the class P E R S O N are classes N A M E and A D D R E S S and the component of the
class A D D R E S S is the class T E L ) . Therefore, the full read authorization for the
user w 2 implies that if2 can not only read the view Adult and consequently the
class P E R S O N but can also read the components of the class P E R S O N (ADD R E S S , N A M E , and T E L ) . The users u 3 and u4 can only access the view Adult
and consequently the class P E R S O N . Moreover as indicated by "*" in the view
definition, the view population might be all hierarchical instances of the class
P E R S O N . So the full authorization implies the same right on all instances of the
view subclasses (or subviews). As the result, the view population includes all
hierarchical instances. Otherwise, it would just include the object instances of
the root node of the hierarchy only. For instance, users u2 and w 4 can read all
constrained instances of the class P E R S O N including students, employees, suppliers, etc. However, the user u3 can only access constrained instances of the class

PERSON.

5.5 Implication Rules

In this section, we look at the impact of hierarchical structure (order) of do
of the access rule (if, v, r) on the authorization system. W e employ these hierarchical structures to provide deductive rules which improve the efficiency of the
authorization system. By applying deductive rules, implicit authorizations can
be derived from explicit ones .
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Authorization Users

To reduce the number of explicit authorizations in the system, we can group users
according to their roles. The roles are usually organized in some hierarchical
structure [13, 169]. Therefore an explicit inclusion of the same authorization for
more special (or higher-level) roles can be removed, because the higher-level roles
will inherit authorization from those given to more general (or lower-level) roles.
This is a result of the principles of generalization and specialization. In many
situations, a natural hierarchy of roles exists (see Figure 5.1). A node of the graph
Admirwnanager

Academic-manager

Academic-clerks

Accounts-clerks

Employee

Figure 5.1: A sample of user role hierarchy.
represents a role, and a directed arc from one role to another indicates that
authorizations for the higher-level role subsume the authorizations for the lowerlevel role. For example, the privileges for the role Personal-manager subsume
the privileges of the roles Academic-manager, Staff-manager, Academic-clerks,
PersonaLclerks, and Employee (see [169] for formal definition of role hierarchy).
Consider Example 5.7, having an explicit authorization rule (Employee, ((P, P,
F), read)) implies that all members of the role Employee can read Personal-Info.
It is clear that all higher-level roles must be allowed to read the view. If the
explicit authorization is the only way to allow users to access data, then the read
privilege must be replicated for all higher-level roles. The existence of many such
authorizations may lead to inefficiency. Therefore, this is a good idea to allow
higher-level roles to have all rights associated with lower-level roles. To derive
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implicit authorization for roles, we can use the following rule.

Implication Rule 1 An explicit authorization for a role results in implicit au
thorizations for all higher-level roles. •

In our example from Figure 5.1, all higher-level roles, Academic-clerks, Perso
clerks, Accounts-clerks, Accounts-employee, Academic-manager, etc., have read
privilege on the Personal-Info implicitly, by the above rule.
Because a role contains a set of users, it is possible to give privilege on a view
v to a role, rather than giving it individually to all members of the role.
Definition 5.6 The first element u in access rule (u, v, r) is either a user

or a role identity. If the role identity is determined, all users of the role u

have the privilege r on the view v. Otherwise the specific user has the privileg
•
Suppose the following view that contains information about casual employees
payments is defined. The required information are idno, name, rank, Hourly-Wage,
Weekly-Hours, and Weekly-Wage.
access-view CasuaLPayment( Current Jdno)
select C.idno, Cname, Crank, C.HourlyJWage, C.WeeklyJiours,
Weekly_Wage
from C C A S U A L
where C.idno = CurrentJdno
methods(numeric Weekly_Wage())
Auth-Spec.ownid ux
Auth-Spec.ACL {(Account-employee, ((P, P, P), read))};
where the method Weekly-Wage () computes the weekly payment of an employee.
read privilege for the role Account-employee means that members of roles
Account-employee, Account-manager, and Admin-manager can access the information (see Figure 5.1). Suppose we want that employees be allowed to access
their o w n information. If we grant read privilege to the role Employee (in fact
the tuple (Employee, ((P,P,P),read)) is added to A u t h - S p e c . A C L ) , then all
higher-level roles can also access it by Rule 1. The only way to solve this is to
grant read privilege to all individual employees. If the negative read authorization
for authorized roles is specified, conflicting authorizations m a y arise.
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However, in our model, the role identity is given, and the first element of
the authorization type t will determine the type of authorization associated to
the role hierarchy. Therefore, by assigning full read authorization to the role
Account-employee

((Account-employee, ((F, P, P), read))), the s a m e right will

be implied for the role Employee.
Implication Rule 2 Explicit full authorization for a role results in an implicit
authorization for all associated lower-level roles. •
For example, if the Academic-manager has full read privilege on a view v
(v can be considered to contain research area and grants associated with the
academic staff) then, all descendant roles of the Academic-manager

such as Aca-

demic-clerks, and academic employees will implicitly have the s a m e authorization
on v.
W e assume that partial authorization right for roles will b e c o m e effective
unless full authorization right is explicitly specified.

5.5.2 Authorization Access Privileges
A s observed, a privilege r in our authorization system is of the form (t, op) where t
denotes the authorization type, full or partial, and op denotes the access privilege.
So w efirstdefine allowable access privileges (access modes) and then consider the
effect of authorization type t on the authorizations.
W e assume that an O O D B system provides two sets of system-defined methods
(called access privileges): view, and view-instance privileges. A typical collection
of privileges for view are create-view, modify-view, delete-view, grant, and revoke.
A view-instance privileges are: create, delete, write, execute, read, and readdefinition.
A create-view privilege is used to create views. A modify-view privilege is used
to change the definition of a view. A delete-view privilege is used to delete the
definition of a view, grant and revoke privileges are used to grant and revoke both
the view privileges, and view-instance privileges to and from users, respectively.
T h e grant and revoke authorizations cannot be propagated. This m e a n s that
only the owner of a view is allowed to give the privileges grant and revoke to
other users, read and read-definition privileges are used to read the instances of
a view and read the definition of a view, respectively. A n execute privilege is
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used to perform the methods associated with a view. In other words, the execute
privilege can be considered as an invoker that can call methods associated with
a view. Write and create privileges are used to modify and to create an instance
of a view, respectively. A delete privilege is used to delete an object instance of
a view.
Definition 5.7 The set of privileges includes read-definition, read, write, delete,
execute, create-view, delete-view, modify-view, grant, revoke. We

assume these

privileges are partially ordered and:
create-view > read-definition
modify-view > delete-view > read-definition
grant > revoke
write > execute > read > read-definition
create > execute > read > read-definition
delete > read > read-definition. •
This m e a n s that the holder of an access privilege of a higher order possesses
privileges of the lower order. For instance execute implies that its holder (a user)r
has both read and read-definition privileges because the user must be able to read
the values and definitions associated with the parameters of a m e t h o d in order to
execute the method. T o delete an object instance, a user mustfirstaccess it and
later remove if. This implies read and read-definition authorizations. T h e access
right modify-view implies that the rights delete-view, and read-definition are also
allowed.
Using the above order and the following rule, it is sufficient to specify explicit
authorization only for the highest access privilege.
Implication R u l e 3 // an authorization is given for an access privilege in the
privilege hierarchy, then this implies the authorization of all privileges below it.

a
Implication R u l e 4 The full authorization for a privilege implies the partial
authorization for the same privilege. •

5.5.3 Authorization Views
In Section 5.3, w e considered four types of inheritance a m o n g views. T h e y were:
constraint, strict constraint, specialization, and proper specialization inheritance.
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In general, if the base views contain more information than the derived views,
is reasonable to assume that a user u has the privilege r on the derived view v
whenever the user has the privilege r on the base view w (constraint inheritance
and proper specialization inheritance).

However, in the case of the specialization inheritance and proper specialization
inheritance to preserve the view privacy, a privilege on a superview does not imply
the same privilege on the derived views because they contain more information
than the base views. If the full authorization for the superview is indicated, the
same authorization implies on the derived views as well. The following two rules
deal with this point.

Implication Rule § If a view v relates to a view w via either constraint inher

itance or strict constraint inheritance, then explicit authorizations on the vie
generates the same implicit right on the view v. •
The user has the same right on Software-Supporters and Programmers views
as the views relate to Technical-Staff'via the constraint inheritance (see Example
5.2).
Implication Rule 6 Assume that two views v and w are related via (proper or)

specialization inheritance, or composition. The explicit full authorization on
view w results in the implicit authorization on the view v with same collection
privileges. •
For example, the role Employee has the full read authorization on the view
Personal-Info (see Example 5.7). W h e n the view is evaluated, the components
of the class PERSON

(ADDRESS

and NAME)

are authorized for retrieval too.

5.6 Access Control

In the proposed system, the user's access to the database is controlled by a s
of access views (AV).
Definition 5.8 Let AV

be the set of all access views. AV

may only be accessed

or manipulated by the authorization system via the following commands:
grant(w,i>,r) - adds the pair (u,r) to the A C L of the view v.
revoke(u, v, r) - removes the (u,r) from the A C L of the view v.
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Own(vJ - retrieves the owner's identity of the view v.
change-own (v) - changes the owner of the view v.
Accesslist (v) - retrieves the authorization list associated with the view v
for every v G AV.

•

The only possible way for all users (except security officers) to access data
the database is via AV.

Definition 5.9 An access request is a triple (u,v,r) where u G U is a user who
requires the access r G R to a view v G AV

where U is the set of users/roles, and

R is the set of privilege in the system. •
Authorization Rule 5 An access request (u,v,r), v G AV, u G U, r G R is
valid, if the entry of the view v is in AV, and the pair (u,r) exists in the A C L
of the view v or can be derived by applying the implication rules 1-6. •

An access request (u, v, r) is valid if and only if the following function re
true.
function Access(w,i>,r)
begin
If u= O w n ( v ) V (u->r) £ Accesslist(i>)
then return true
else return(Implicit_Access(u, v,r));
end
function Implicit_Access(u,i;,r))
begin

/* checking access request against user authorization and privilege
hierarchies */

If V u3 role of the user u 3 (UJ, r) G Accesslist(u) V
V Uj descendant of the role of the user u
3 (uj,r) G Accesslist(i>) V
\/UJ ancestor of the role of the user if
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3 (u3,((F,,),op)) G Accesslist(v) V
V opj higher-level of the privilege op3(u,(t, op3)) G Accesslist(u)
then return true

/* checking access request against view authorization hierarchy */

else If 3w that v is (strict) constraint inheritance of w A
3(it,r) G Accesslist(u;)
then return true

else If 3u; that v is (proper) specialization inheritance of
w f\ 3(w,r) G Accesslist(w;) f\t2 = F
then return true
else If 3w that v is component of w /\
B(u,r) G Accesslist(u;) /\t3 = F
then return true
else return false;
end

Where V stands for "for all", V - OR logical operation, 3 - exist, and /\ - AN
logical operation.

5.7 Summary
The chapter discusses the use of views in OODB systems for the discretionary
access control. Special attention has been placed on time and content-dependent
authorizations. Parameterized views have been introduced to increase the flexibility of the view model. It has been shown how a view hierarchy can be inferred
from views. The inheritance hierarchies among views have been discussed. W e
have also defined access views as the mechanism for access control. W e have discussed discretionary security requirements for authorization systems. Rules for
computing an implicit authorization from the explicit ones have been formulated.
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The impact of three authorization dimensions, users, access privileges, and vi
on the access views has been examined. Finally, we have presented the form of a
valid access request and how the validity of requests can be verified.

Chapter 6
A Multi-level View Model for
Secure OODB Systems
6.1 Introduction

Several secure models for OODB systems are discussed in [33, 39, 114, 121, 12
123, 143, 144, 149, 150, 160, 210, 215]. The majority of models consider singlelevel objects only. This means that for every object, a unique security level is
assigned which applies to the entire object [33, 114, 149, 210]. This approach is
attractive for its simplicity and its compatibility with the security kernel. Moreover the multi-level update problem [210] does not exist.
However in the real world, there are situations where it is necessary to classify
instance variables of an object at different security levels. That is, the security
model has to support multi-level objects.

There are also models write a finer

grain of classification - the security level is assigned to each instance variable of
an object [122, 140, 160]. Unfortunately, these proposals require both a trusted
enforcement mechanism on the object layer and a complex security kernel.
In order to maintain the security kernel compatibility and to overcome the
difficulties with multi-level objects, some researchers proposed to design a schema
which handles various security constraints [114, 149, 210]. For example, if we want
the GAP

instance variable of the class STUDENT1

ate a class STUDENT-GAP

to be secret, we need to cre-

with security level S E C R E T .

is a subclass of the class STUDENT

STUDENT-GAP

(see Figure 6.1). If the security level of

^ h e specification of S T U D E N T and E M P L O Y E E have been shown in Figure 2.3 in Subsection 2.2.7 of Chapter 2
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STUDENT (U)
subject
Start-Date
Graduate-Date
takes*

COURSE (U)
is-a

STUDENT-GAP (S)

U: UNCLASSIFIED
S: SECRET

GAP
Comp-GAP()

Figure 6.1: A n example of the representation of simple constraint.

instance variable address depends on the value of instance variable professi
the class EMPLOYEE

(the security level of address is secret if the employee is a

chancellor or vice-chancellor, and otherwise is unclassified), then we shall create
two classes S-ADDRESS

and U-ADDRESS

to be subclasses of

EMPLOYEE.

Each of them contains addresses related to secret or unclassified employees, respectively (see Figure 6.2).
EMPLOYEE (U)
rank

U: UNCLASSIFIED

profession

S: SECRET

S-ADDRESS (S)

U-ADDRESS (U)

no

TEL (S)

•

TEL (U)

street

std

city

te!-no

state
zip-code

std

city

tel-no

zip-code
is-parl-of

phone

phone

Figure 6.2: A n example of the representation of content constraint.
There are several problems with this approach. If the value of an instance
variable is changed dynamically, the schema evolution should then reflect the
change. As object instances do not have to be at the same security level as their
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class, it may happen that there are object instances at levels higher than the
of the corresponding class. Therefore, certain object instances might end up in
unexpected locations and be inaccessible to authorized users. For example, if a
secret address object is created as an instance of U-ADDRESS
no reference to it would appear in the instance variables in the

by a secret user,
U-ADDRESS

object. As the result, secret subjects would fail to find it in the expected place
under the secret subclass

S-ADDRESS.

The view update problem disappears and views can almost freely be updated
in an O O D B system when a query language used for view definitions preserves
object identities [190]. Recall that in relational databases, views containing the
key of their (one) underlying base relation can be updated. W e assume that the
query language used for view definitions has the object preservation property.
The advantages of the usage of view approach are as follows:

1. View definitions can be regarded as subclasses, or superclasses of the base
classes (virtual subclasses or superclasses) [1, 21, 190]. Therefore, views
provide the facility for a dynamic modification of the database schema but
yet they retain their older versions. They also provide a tool to handle
various security constraints.
2. Views may be defined on arbitrary sets of classes and other views with
different security levels. These views are called multi-level views. So by
defining a multi-level view for unclassified and secret users, the possibility
of storing certain data in an unexpected location which is not accessible to
authorized users is eliminated.

3. A view definition can also be regarded as a constraint relating derived da
to other data (stored or derived). It can be used to restrict the user access
to the data that they actually need. Thus the view approach allows to
handle inference and aggregation problems or at least minimize difficulties
associated with them.
4. View definitions are independent of the underlying data. If the database
contents changes, it will not be necessary to reclassify the database because
views will enforce the required classification rules. For example, if an unclassified employee becomes a vice-chancellor or chancellor, his related data
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must be reclassified to secret. Having declared views U-ADDRESS and
S-ADDRESS,

it is not necessary to reclassify the data.

The objective of this chapter is to show how the view concept can be used to
implement a multi-level security policy on the top of a single-level O O D B system. In Section 6.2, we describe the basic concept of multi-level secure databases.
In Section 6.3, we discuss the essential features of the view model proposed by
Bertino [31]. Later we present possible extensions of the view model to incorporate the mandatory label-based security policy. W e show how the multi-level
view, the content, context, and dynamic classification can be supported by the
model. In Section 6.4, we develop a security model for O O D B systems based on
object views. Aggregation and inference problems are addressed in Section 6.5.
Polyinstantiation is discussed in Section 6.6. Section 6.7 provides an evaluation
of the model. Section 6.8 concludes the chapter.

6.2 A Multi-level secure Databases

A multi-level secure database contains information with different security (o
sensitivity) levels. The security levels may be assigned to the data depending
on the content, context, aggregation, or time. A n effective security policy for
multi-level databases must ensure that users have a suitable clearance before
they access the information. To fulfill this requirement, each entity is assigned
a security attribute. Attributes associated with active entities (or subjects) are
called clearance levels while attributes associated with passive entities (or objects) are termed security (sensitivity or classification) levels.

Subjects are

allowed to modify these attributes and their values. The modification of these attributes can only be done by the system security officers. The set of security and
clearance levels form a partially ordered lattice with ordering relation ">" (for
example, U N C L A S S I F I E D < C O N F I D E N T I A L < S E C R E T < T O P - S E C R E T ) .
For security levels Lx and L2 , Lx > L2 means that security level L1 dominates
security level L2 (if Lx > L2, it means that Lx strictly dominates L2).
The security attributes may be extended to include non-hierarchical cases that
incorporate the need-to-know requirements. For example, we m a y have a security level named [ S E C R E T , A S I A C R Y P T ] - users with clearance S E C R E T and
members of A S I A C R Y P T can access it. In other words, not all S E C R E T users
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are allowed the access. Such divisions create so-called compartments (or cate
gories). In O O D B systems, the encapsulation feature combined with the security
labels provides a natural protection for objects. However after the value leaves
the protection of the encapsulated object, the security cannot be guaranteed. To
ensure that the security will not be compromised, the flow of information has to
be restricted in some way. A number of models have proposed, the earliest and
the best known is the Bell-LaPadula model [26] (see also Section 3.7).
The Bell-LaPadula model is based on two properties: the simple security
property and the *-property. According to the simple security property, a subject
is allowed to read information from an object (or a passive entity) if the clearance
level of the subject dominates the security level of the object. The *-property
requires that a subject has the write access to an object if the subject clearance
level is dominated by the security level of the object. Informally, a subject can
read-down (simple security property) and can write-up (*-property). A number of
extensions to the Bell-LaPadula security model were proposed [69, 87, 114, 122,
140, 149, 160, 210, 223]. These extensions address some specific problems related
to database systems, for instance inferring unauthorized information from the
legitimate responses and the information flow that occurs as a result of inheritance
and the message passing in O O D B systems.

6.3 View Model
Smith in [196] identifies three "dimensions" of the protection:
1. the data itself may be classified,
2. the existence of the data may be classified, and
3. the reason for classifying the data may be classified.
W e define access-views to deal with thefirsttwo dimensions of the protection, The third security dimension is addressed by the introduction of securityconstraints. The sets of access views and security constraints constitute metaclasses A C C E S S - V I E W S and S E C U R I T Y - C O N S T R A I N T S , respectively. The
meta-class A C C E S S - V I E W S is used to enforce of the mandatory access control, and the meta-class S E C U R I T Y - C O N S T R A I N T S (which specifies restrictions that the view must satisfy) is used to control the security levels of views.
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Note that Bertino's conceptual model [31] is proposed for a context not relev
to security. A n instance of the A C C E S S - V I E W S has the following format:
access-view Viewname [parameters]
- view specification as described in Section 2.4 of Chapter 2
[avJevel view_security_level]
[av_range upper_andJower_securityJevel]
[mac-constraint set-of < S E C U R I T Y - C O N S T R A I N T S > macmames]
The Viewname is the unique name of the access view and must be different
from the names of other access views, security constraints, and classes. Parameters are fixed to the actual values at the time the view is evaluated, and
corresponding objects are evaluated dynamically.
av_range imposes restrictions on the range of security levels of base classes
(views) and properties used in the definition of a view. avJevel indicates the
security level of the name of the view. If the range is not indicated, then the
view can contain the single-level properties and base classes (or views) that is
indicated by avJevel.
mac-constraint stands for mandatory access control constraints and consists
of the set of security rules that the view must satisfy. Each element in this set is
an instance of the class S E C U R I T Y - C O N S T R A I N T S .
The concepts are illustrated on two examples which use a university database
shown in Figure 2.3 in Section 2.2.7 of Chapter 2.
Example 6.1 Define the multi-level class STUDENT whose instance variable
GAP

is classified SECRET

and others are UNCLASSIFIED.

•

The class STUDENT can be represented as two views: a view UStudent with
security level U N C L A S S I F I E D (containing the unclassified instance variables)
and a view SStudent with security level S E C R E T containing the secret instance
variable GAP

and superview UStudent.

access-view U_Student
select S.idno, S.name, S.age, S.status, S.address, S.spouse, S.sex,
S.subject, S.Start-Date, S.Graduate-Date, S.takes
from S : S T U D E N T
avJevel U N C L A S S I F I E D
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access-view S_Student
properties [Greatest Joint, S E C R E T ]
select S.GAP
from S-.STUDENT
superview UJStudent

avJevel SECRET
av_range [UNCLASSIFIED, S E C R E T ]
The access view UStudent is a single-level view, and contains all variable
instances of the base class S T U D E N T except G A P . It is labeled U N C L A S S I F I E D .
The access view SStudent which is defined on top of UStudent

is a multi-level

view because in addition to secret instance variable Greatest-Point it inherits all
properties of superview UStudent which are unclassified.
Example 6.2 Define the class EMPLOYEE such that the instance variable "address" is classified SECRET

if the value of the instance variable "profession

a "chancellor" or a "vice-chancellor" otherwise is UNCLASSIFIED.

•

One possible representation of that is to create two views, U-Employee and
SJEmployee, labeled U N C L A S S I F I E D and S E C R E T , respectively.
access-view UJEmployee
select E

from E: E M P L O Y E E
w h e r e not (E.profession = "chancellor" or E.profession = "vice-chancellor")
avJevel U N C L A S S I F I E D
access-view S-Employee
select E
from E: E M P L O Y E E
where (E.profession ="chancellor" or E.profession ="vice-chancellor")

avJevel SECRET
As shown in the above examples, the enforcement of security constraint has
been done without the redesign of the schema.
There is a problem with the above examples. Because the security level of
the view U-Employee is unclassified, unclassified users will know that there are
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expected employees who are classified at a higher level. In order to hide the
classification constraint but still enforce it (and also to simplify verification and
assurance process), we introduce the meta-class S E C U R I T Y - C O N S T R A I N T S
whose instances have the following format.
security-constraint sc-name [parameters]
[predicates] [property-name.level = property_securityJevel]
[predicates] [view-name.level = view_securityJevel]
[sc Jevel sc_securityJevel]
The sc-name is the unique name of the security constraint (it must be different from the names of other security constraints, classes, and access views).
Parameters arefixedat the time the view is evaluated. So when the values of the
parameters are determined, the corresponding security constraints are evaluated
for the view and its properties.
sc Jevel indicates the security level of the security constraint. Note that the
security level of properties and views can be indicated either in the access view
definitions or in the security constraint definitions.
Constraints can be simple, content, and aggregate security ones [79]. A simple
constraint classifies an entire view property or view. For example, the view property Greatest-point in view SStudent of Example 6.1 is secret (all Greatest-point
values will be secret). The view SStudent can be redefined as follows.
access-view S_Student

security-constraint Sc_S_Student

properties [Greatest Joint]

Greatest_Point.level= S E C R E T

select S.GAP

S.Sfudenf.avJevel S E C R E T

from S : S T U D E N T
superview U_Student
mac-constraint set-of < S E C U R I T Y - C O N S T R A I N T S > mac_S-Student
av_range [UNCLASSIFIED, S E C R E T ]
If the statement SStudent.macSStudent

= insert (ScSStudent) is executed,

the address of ScSStudent will be added to the set of macSStudent

automati-

cally.
A content-based constraint provides a means of classifying data at the object
or property value level by using a predicate based on the values of some objects
and/or properties. For example, the security-constraint Sc-Employee classifies the
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view Av-Employee at either secret or unclassified level depending on the valu
the property profession.

Using the security constraint definition, Example 6.2

can be redefined as follows.
access-view Av^Employee
select E

from E: E M P L O Y E E
mac-constraint set-of < SECURITY-CONSTRAINTS > macJEmployee
security-constraint ScJCmployee
if (E.profession ="chancellor" or E.profession ="vice-chancellor")
then A v Employee, level = S E C R E T
else AvJmployee.level = U N C L A S S I F I E D
If the statement Av-Employee.mac-Employee = insert (Sc-Employee) is executed,
then the address of Sc-Employee will be added to the set of mac-Employee automatically. Whenever the view Av-Employee is evaluated, the view is classified
secret if it contains instances with profession "chancellor" or "vice-chancellor",
otherwise is unclassified.
A n aggregate constraint classifies a collection of property values (say ten or
more/less) or relationship among data at a higher security level. For example, if
we define a view which retrieves accessories supplied by a specific supplier, the
associated security constraint can be declared. If the number of the accessories
is more than ten, the view is classified at a higher level say S E C R E T .

6.4 Secure Multi-level View Model

Let us emphasize two points. First, our design supports multi-level objects at
the view layer only. The multi-level views will be mapped onto single-level objects. Second, our design for mandatory access control relies on the underlying
mandatory security kernel. A n O O D B system is considered secure if (see [160]):
1. no subject is able to obtain information without authorization,
2. no subject is able to modify information without authorization,
3. no mechanism exists whereby a subject authorized to obtain information
can communicate that information to a subject not authorized to obtain it,
and
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4. no subject is able to execute a method without authorization.
Requirements (1), (2), and (4) are usually addressed by the discretionary access control while properties (1) and (3) are normally addressed by the mandatory
access control. Our concern in this chapter is to enforce mandatory security policy using a secure multi-level view object model. Discretionary access control
through view object models is discussed in Chapter 5.
W e assume that the entities of the security classification are all kinds of objects. The entities include access views, security constraints, classes, objects,
methods, and instance variables. Each entity in the database (except atomic
objects) and each user has an associated security level. W e also assume that the
following methods are available to retrieve security information associated with
an entity e.
Level(e) - displays the security level of entity e.
Lower(e) - displays the lower level range of entity e.
Upper(e) - displays the upper level range of entity e.
Denote by L U B the least upper bound, and G L B the greatest lower bound.

6.4.1 View
In general, a view can be constructed in two distinct ways [1, 21]: top-down or
bottom-up. In the top-down approach, large classes (or views) are divided into
smaller ones via specialization (a similar operation in relational systems is to
define a view by selecting a subset of tuples from a large table). In the bottomup approach, small classes (or views) are combined to form larger classes via
generalization (the analogous operation in relational systems is to define a view
as the union of several tables). A view constructed in the latter case may contain
more information of various levels of security and hence, it must be classified at
the highest of these levels.
Classification Rule 1 (View Property). If an access view v is constructed on
classes (or views) Vx,v2, ...,vn, the security level of v must satisfy:
v.avJevel > LUB{vx.avJevel,v2.avJevel,... ,vn.avJevel}.
The view range must contain the security level of v,
Lower(u) < v.avJevel < Upper(t>).D
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From now on we refer to properties and methods of an access view as view
facets. View facets can be derived from the base views or classes, or can be defined
independently. Moreover, the security level associated with each facet can also
be derived or defined.
Classification Rule 2 (View Facet Property). If x is a facet of a view v and is
derived from a base view w, the security level of x must satisfy both
Level(t;.x) > v.avJevel,
and
Leve\(v.x) > Leve\(w.x).

If x is defined or redefined in v, the security level of x must dominate the secu
level ofv, i.e.,
Level(u.x) > v.avJevel. •
Classification Rule 3 The security range of a view must contain the security

level of all facets contained in the view, i.e., if xi,x2,... ,xn are facets ofv,
the following must be held:

GLB{Level(v.xx), Level(u.a:2),..., Level(v.xn)} > Lower(v).
and
L(/5{Level('u.a:i),Level(t>.a;2),...,Level(t;.xn)} < Upper(u).D
A view name is the external representation of an access view. W h e n a user
wants to access a view definition, they mustfirstbe authorized to access view
name. Every access view v is defined by a view specification which has a security
level, avJevel. A user is able to access the view if the security level of the view
is dominated by the security level of the user.
Classification Rule 4 (Subject Property). A user u can access an access view
v if one of the following holds:

a) if the view v is a single-level view, and the security level of the user u domin
the security level of the access view v, i.e., (v.avJevel < Leve\(u));

b) if the view v is a multi-level view, and the lowest security range of the view
is dominated by the security level of the user u (Xower(v) < Level(u),j.

The user u is able to access facet x of the view v if the security level of x i
dominated by the security level of the user u, i.e., Level(v.x) < Level(w). •

Chapter 6. A Multi-level View Model for Secure OODB

Systems

134

Rule 4 is the simple security property specified in the Bell-LaPadula model.
Only the read-up is permitted. Users with security level lower than the security
level of a view are not able to access the view definition and consequently the
view instances.

Classification Rule 5 (View-instance Property). If a view v consists of object
Ox, o2,..., on, then the security level of the view v must satisfy:
v.avJevel > LUB{Leve\(ox), Level(o2),..., Level(on)}.D
The set of database objects contained in the view instance is controlled by
the view specification and a set of associated security constraints. Every securityconstraint is defined by a set of constraints, and a security level (sc Jevel).
Classification Rule 6 (Security-Constraint Property). If Xx, x2,..., xn, and

Si, 52,..., sm are facets and their nominated security levels contained in the secu
constraint sc, respectively then the following must be held:
a) The nominated security levels Si (1 < i < n) for the facets contained in con-

straints of a security-constraint must dominate the security levels of the facet
i.e., Si > Level(xj) for all i, 1 < i < n;

b) the security level of the security-constraint is the least upper bound of the
security levels of all facets and all nominated security levels contained in the
straints, i.e.,
5c.scJevel > Z,t/I?{Level(xi),Level(2:2), • ••, Level(xn),5i,52,... ,sm},
and
Level(sc) > Level(u)
where v is the view associated with sc. •

The above rule indicates that the security level of a security constraint must
be at least equal to the least upper bound of security levels of information contained by the constraints. Moreover, the security level of this must dominate the
security level of the associated view. For example, by applying the above rule to
Sc-Employee in Example 6.2 of Section 6.2, the security level of the Sc-Employee
must be at least S E C R E T . If the sc Jevel is not indicated by the user, the computed security level will be considered for sc Jevel.
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Classification Rule 7 A user u can access a security constraint sc if the security level of sc is dominated by the security level of the user u, Level(u) >
sc.scJevel. D

There are four types of inheritance among views: constraint, strict constraint,
proper specialization, and specialization inheritance (for detailed description see
Chapter 5). In the constraint inheritance, views consist of all object instances of
base classes (or views) that satisfy given constraints. W e only use selection operation. In the strict constraint inheritance, not only the set of database objects
contained by a view is constrained, but the base classes (or views) properties are
also projected. W e apply selection and projection operations. In the specialization inheritance, not only views inherit all the properties of the base classes (or
views), but they also have some n e w additional properties and methods. In the
proper specialization inheritance, viewsfilterout the object instances of the base
classes and project the properties. They also contain n e w additional properties
or methods.
In the case constraint and strict constraint inheritance, the amount of information provided by a sub-view is smaller than the information contained in the
base view. So the security level of the sub-view m a y be the s a m e as the security
level of the base view.
Classification Rule 8 (Hierarchy Property). Suppose a view v is derived from
a view w, then their security levels must satisfy one of the following:
Level(f) = Level(u>); if the relationship is the strict constraint or constraint
inheritance,
or Level(u) > Level(iu), if the relationship is the proper specialization or
specialization inheritance.
The set of the constraints of the view v must contain the set of constraints of
the view w.

•

A view may inherit or derive the facets from one or more super-views or the
base-views. In the case of a conflict, the following rule will be used to resolve the
conflict.
Classification Rule 9 (Multiple Inheritance). Assume a view v inherits the
facet x from views v1:v2,... ,vn, then the security level of x in v must dominate
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the least upper bound of the security levels of x in Vi (1 < i < n),
Level(t>.;r) > LUB{Leve\(vx.x),Level(v2.x),..., ~Level(vn.x).}
The view v inherits the facet x with the highest security level in Vi (1 < i<
If there are more than one such x, then a priori rule2 must be enforced to resolve
the conflict. •
It is possible to define composite (or aggregation) hierarchy on views. The
domain of the instance variable can be a view or a class. The instance variable is
provided with the keyword additional-properties for a view property. A view
v m a y then be a composite of views vx, v2,..., vn.
Classification Rule 10 (Composite Property). Let a view v be a composite view

of the views (or classes) Vx,v2,... ,vn, then the security level ofv must satisf

v.avJevel > LUB{vx-avJevel, v2.avJevel,..., t>n.avJevel}.•

6.4.2 Derivation Rules
The next two rules are needed to obtain a view from a single-level database.
Classification Rule 11 (Single-level View Instantiation).

If an object in the

database has a security level dominated by the security level of a view, the obj
may be derived as an instance of the view. •
Note that a view may be evaluated dynamically [31]. Then view instances are
created only if a user or process requests it.
Classification Rule 12 (Multi-level View Instantiation). If the security level

the view property dominates the security level of the corresponding property val

of an object in the database, then that object is derived as an instance of the v
from the database. •
All derived single-level objects corresponding to the view properties are joined
to instantiate a multi-level view. As said in Rule 5, the security level of derived
data is greater than or equal to the least upper bound of the security levels
associated with the derived data. Those derived data will be presented to a user
whose security levels are dominated by the security level of the user.
2

For example, the facet x associated with the view which is closer to the view v, dominates

other views.
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6.4.3 Updates and Object Creation
In relational databases, updates of any views are impossible due to the so-called
view update problem (if views only contain the key of their (one) underlying base
relation; they can be updated). A s shown by Scholl, Laasch and Tresch in [190],
the view update problem disappears in O O D B systems, if the query language
preserves object identities. This happens because objects have an identity independent of their associated values. Views can almost freely be updated since the
objects contained in the result of a query are the base objects. For detailed discussion of the properties of the query language that allows the updates of views,
the reader is directed to [190].
Classification Rule 13 (Insertion). The security level of the inserted object is
computed according to a set of security constraints associated with views. If the
computed security level for the entire object is unique, then the single security level
is assigned to the object and the single-level object is stored into the database. If
the computed security levels are different for every properties, the inserted datum
is decomposed to single-level objects according the computed security levels, and
then stored. •
According to the above rule, if the inserted object is multi-level (note that the
underlying database is single-level), the object must be decomposed into several
single-level objects. T h e solution to the object decomposition was proposed in

[38].
Classification Rule 14 (Updating). For every view property value, the value
with the computed security level is stored back into the database if either
1) the computed security level dominates the security level associated with the user
on whose behalf it was computed, and the computed security level is equal to the
security level of the corresponding property in the database; or
2) the downgrade of the property value is authorized and confirmed by the security
officer. •
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6.5 Aggregation and Inference
6.5.1 Aggregation
The aggregation problem occurs when a user can collect some data of low security
classification and deduce other data with higher security classification.
E x a m p l e 6.3 Personal specification and monthly wage of the academic staff are

unclassified, but the association of a particular monthly wage with a specific i
dividual academic staff is classified secret. •
One possible solution is that the unclassified view U-AcademicStaff iox personal

specification of

the academic

staff and

the

unclassified

view

U-Monthly-Wage for monthly wage of the academic staff are declared. The secret
view S-Academic-Monthly-Wage is declared to protect the association of academic
staff with their monthly wages.
Note that, by declaring the above views, the protection against inference may
still fail. For example, if there were only a few academic staff members and their
rank was known or could be guessed, the association could be reconstructed. In
such cases, the preferred solution would be to classify one of the two entities in
the relationship at the higher level. For example, putting the monthly wages in a
separate view at the secret level would protect the association, but it would also,
in effect, classify the monthly wages.
If a view v is the aggregate of views Vx, v2,..., vn and the security level of v
strictly dominates the security level of all Vi (1 < i < n), then the aggregation
problem occurs, and v.avJevel > u;.avJevel for all i, 1 < i < n. To solve that,
the following rule must be fulfilled.

Classification Rule 15 // a view v is the aggregate of views Vx, v2,..., vn, t

there should exist at least a single Vi such that its security level is equal t
security level of the v and v.avJevel = ^-.avJevel for some i, 1 < i < n. •

6.5.2 Inference
The inference problem occurs when a user can deduce (or infer) information
from a collection of individual inquires. Solutions to the inference problem were
proposed in [70, 60, 111, 209] in the context of statistical and relational databases.
Some typical approaches to handle the problem are:
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1. the introduction of restrictions on the set of allowable queries generated by
a user,
2. the addition of "noise" to the data, and
3. the augmentation of a database with a logic-based inference engine to detect
security violations.
Views provide exactly the right basis to address the inference problem or at
least to decrease the "size" of the inference problem. If properly used, views impose restrictions on the derived data which are extracted from the base data. T h e
derived data are visible to the user (via the view) and can be tailored to the user
needs. Views represent the real-world semantic relationship a m o n g data. This relationship is usually exploited during the inference process. A user is constrained
to a smaller portion of the database through the proper use of the views. This
reduces the n u m b e r and types of queries issued by the user. Therefore views can
be used to impose thefirstand the second approaches of handling the inference
problem (the introduction of restriction on the set of allowed queries and the
addition of noise to the data). T h e multi-level security model can be augmented
with logical-based inference engine which will detect security violations.
Note that some researchers believe that aggregation and inference are the
different faces of the same problem [132].

6.6 Polyinstantiation
Polyinstantiantion generally occurs when two subjects at different security levels
see two different forms of a single entity in the real world. In a multi-level view
model, the different forms of an entity could relate to different view definitions, to
the s a m e view-name with different security-levels, and to different entity values.
So w e have three possible polyinstantiations.
• View-definition polyinstantiation. A view m a y contain different facets with
different security-levels. For instance, an unclassified user sees a view v
which contains the properties (idno, name) and has a method change-name.
A secret user sees v which contains (idno, name,
methods change-salary and change-name.

salary), and has two
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• View-name polyinstantiation. An actual view is identified by the pair: a
view-name v and the security-level (av-level). So that there m a y be several
views identified by the same view-name v which correspond to different
security-levels.
• View-instance polyinstantiation. An object is identified by an object identifier ( O I D ) and an associated security-level, so that a multi-level view
m a y contain several object instances for an O I D corresponding to different security-levels.
A polyinstantiated view-name may arise whenever an unclassified (or confidential) user requests to use the same n a m e for defining a view which is already
used by a secret user. T o handle this type of polyinstantiation, w e suggest that
a view n a m e associated with the security-level of the user is used to n a m e the
view. For instance, for a view v, the unclassified user will use U-v and the secret
user will use S-v.
A polyinstantiated view-definition m a y occur whenever an unclassified user
modifies the view definition and includes the same facets which already exist at
higher security level. This type of polyinstantiation will not occur in our model
as the security level of a view must be the least upper bound of the security levels
of all facets contained in the view (Rule 1). T h e view can be accessed by a user
u if the security level of u dominates the security level of the view (Rule 4).
A polyinstantiated view-instance m a y happen if two subjects at different security levels request the same identifier for two different objects which represent
two different entities. Therefore, if globally unique object identifiers are used to
identify objects, the polyinstantiation will not occur in the model.
Boulahia-Cuppen et. al. in [38] presented a decomposition algorithm for
O O D B systems which provides the possibility of choosing globally unique object
identifiers (by partitioning the set of object identifier into several pairwise disjoint
subsets associated with each security level). For instance a multi-level object 0 ,
which is an instance of a multi-level view SStudent, will be decomposed to U-0,
C-0, and S-0. Each of them is actually a single-level object corresponding to
unclassified, confidential, and secret which is physically stored in a single-level
database. D y n a m i c links are also created between these objects. For example, in
the S-0, there are pointers to the confidential properties stored in the C-0. In
the C-0, there are pointers to unclassified properties of the U-0. This means that
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if a classified user updates the unclassified properties of U-0, the update w
automatically propagated to the instances of C-0 and S-0. Note that the values
of the properties which point to low-level objects can be updated by the users
cleared to access them. If this happens, the pointer to the low-level database is
broken, and the value of the object in the low-level database stands as a cover
story. For detailed discussion, the reader is directed to [38].
Therefore by employing the above approach to decompose multi-level views
into single-level objects and selecting object identifiers corresponding to each
security levels, view-instance polyinstantiation does not occur in our model. Furthermore, there is no referential ambiguity as all references to an object use the
unique OID.
Note that although there is no view-instance polyinstantiation because OIDs
are unique, but it is possible that the value of the property idno is not unique. One
way of avoiding this is the use of security constraints that requires all instances
of PERSON

to have the same security level.

6.7 Evaluation of the Proposed Model

Gajnak in [87] chooses a view of a multi-level secure database as a set of as
facts, and presents three general principles for a well formed multi-level secure
database. They are: the granularity principle, the dependency principle, and the
determinacy principle. The granularity principle states that thefinestlevel of
granularity for the protection purpose should be a structure which correspond to
atomic facts. The dependency principle requires that the security level of a fact
dominate the security level of any other fact it depends upon. The determinacy
principle states that factual dependencies should not be ambiguous.
A fact is an encapsulated unit of information. Facts which do not depend on
other facts, are called atomic. Six types of atomic facts can be distinguished in
the multi-level view model. They are:

1. the fact of the object existence (which is presented by the object identif
2. the association between an object and the values of its properties,
3. the association between an object and a view-instance,
4. the association between a view definition and a view name,
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5. the association between a view definition and the corresponding security
constraint, and
6. the hierarchical association (inheritance or composite).
The following four factual dependencies also exist among these facts.
1. The fact of association of a property value with an object depends on the
existence of the object.

2. The fact of association of a view-instance with object depends on the existence of objects.
3. The fact of association of a view-name with a view-definition depends on
the existence of the view definition.

4. The fact of association of a security constraint with a view definition depends on the existence of the view definition.

Now, consider the three principles, granularity, dependency, and determinacy.
The granularity principle states that thefinestlevel of labeling granularity must
cover all the above mentioned facts. This is exactly the entities that we have
assumed for labeling.
The dependency principle states that the security level of an association must
dominate the security level of its components. Rules 1-2, 5-6, and 8-10 take care

of that.
The determinacy property addresses the problem of interpreting the database
in the face of polyinstantiation. As discussed before because we assume that
globally unique object identifiers (OID) are used to identify objects, then the
polyinstantiation will not occur in the model.
W e believe that the proposed multi-level view model is practical as it maps
its components to the set of associated facts and it directly supports the three
principles of multi-level data: granularity, dependency, and determinacy.

6.8 Conclusions and Remarks

In this chapter, our objective was to provide a multi-level view model derive
from a single-level secure O O D B system. The model allows us to use the existing
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security kernel. It also overcomes the difficulties of handling OODB systems
multi-level objects. One distinct advantage of our approach is that the multilevel view model relies on an underlying security kernel for the enforcement of
mandatory security properties.
Our model can be seen as an extension of the view model proposed in [31]. W e
have introduced the notion of security constraint which is associated with each
view. W e have also discussed the usage of views and security constraints to handle
simple, content-dependent, and context-dependent classifications. W e have then
described the multi-level security properties for a secure multi-level view model
based on a secure single-level O O D B system. Finally, we have discussed issues
such as aggregation, inference, and polyinstantiation.
Note that two types of users require access to views: the database security
officers and users. It is clear that the security officers require unrestricted access
to the views in order to define and maintain the database. Users require some
access to the view definitions in order to be able to query the database. T w o
policies of access control have been proposed. Thefirstone allows users to browse
through the external schema. The second policy assigns discretionary access
rights to views. As thefirstpolicy violates the least privilege principle, the
second policy is recommended. In other words, the discretionary access control
should be implemented on the top of the multi-level view model.

Chapter 7
Summary, Results and Future
Directions
7.1 Summary

The main goal of the thesis was to investigate the access control model for o
oriented databases. The motivation for the project was the lack of an acceptable
O O D B model which could be used for the access control. Chapter 2 presented
key concepts of 0-0 models such as types/classes, objects, complex objects, aggregation, and discussed 0-0 properties such as inheritance, encapsulation, and
methods. Persistence, secondary-storage management, security, authorization,
concurrency, and transactions in O O D B systems were also examined. Chapter 2
was concluded by a survey of view models in O O D B system. Their properties
were also pointed out.
Review of security in databases was given in Chapter 3. Security models for
relational and object-oriented databases were presented. C o m m o n threats to the
database and possible countermeasures were also considered. A security policy
specifies security requirements which must be satisfied by database management
system. A list of security policies for the design of the access control were provided. The two major access control models, mandatory access control ( M A C )
and discretionary access control ( D A C ) were described. The access matrix and
Bell-LaPadula models were presented. The security issues in the 0-0 environment such as access privileges (or access modes), propagation of authorizations,
degree of granularity, control of authorizations, etc. were also discussed. The
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ORION, Irish, DAMOKLES, SORION, SODA and several other access control
models were presented. Those models were selected as they, in our view, offer some partial solutions to the security issues present in O O D B systems. W e
also discussed c o m m o n security drawbacks of those models. A list of classification rules for secure O O D B systems were provided. Examples of architecture to
construct secure multi-level databases were given. They were: Trusted Subject,
Kernelized, Replicated, and Integrity Lock.
The 0-0 concept allows expression of rules for computing implicit authorizations from the explicit ones. It is necessary to have an efficient mechanism to
evaluate implicit authorizations each time an access request is checked for validity. Chapter 4 provided a cryptographic mechanism which was based on unique
and secure access keys for each access entity (object or class). In this mechanism,
owners and user groups are identified by their unique passwords. Access keys
and passwords for implicit authorizations are derived from related entities by
applying pseudo-random and SIFF functions during the query processing. The
security of the system is based on the difficulty of predicting the output of the
pseudo-random function andfindingextra collisions for the SIFF function, both
of which are known to be computationally difficult.
Chapter 5 addressed content-dependent authorizations in O O D B systems. W e
used the view model proposed by Bertino and showed how discretionary security
requirements for authorization systems can be incorporated into the model. Parameterized views were discussed. W e described how a view hierarchy could
be inferred from views. Four types of inheritance among views were discussed:

constraint, strict constraint, proper specialization, and specialization inheri
Rules for computing implicit authorizations from the explicit ones were also formulated.
In Chapter 6, a new design approach for a secure multi-level object-oriented
database system based on views were proposed. The central idea was to provide
the user with a multi-level view derived from a single-level secure object-oriented
database. The database operations performed on the multi-level views are decomposed into a set of operations on the single-level objects which can be implemented
on any conventional mandatory security kernel. W e also presented security properties for a secure multi-level view model. W e showed that this approach allowed
us to overcome the difficulties of handling content and context dependent classification, dynamic classification, aggregation and inference problems in multi-level
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object-oriented databases.

7.2 Results
Results achieved during the work over the project have been published or submitted for publication. The complete list of papers published or submitted is as
follows:
• "A Cryptographic Solution to Discretionary Access Control in Structurally

Object-Oriented Databases," based on Chapter 4 (published in Proceedings
of the 6th Australian Database Conference (ADC'95) (R. Sacks and J. Zobel,
eds.), vol. 17(2), (Adelaide, Australia), pp. 36-45, Australian Computer
Science Communications, Jan. 1995);
• "A Cryptographic Mechanism for Object-Instance-Based Authorization in
Object-Oriented Database Systems," based on Chapter 4 (published in Proceedings of The 14th International Conference on Object-Oriented & Entity
Relationship Modeling, Queensland,(M. P. Papazoglou, ed.), vol. 1021 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, (Queensland, Australia), pp. 44-54,
Springer-Verlag, Dec. 1995);
• "A Model of Authorization for Object-oriented Databases based on Object
Views, based on Chapter 5 (published in Proceedings of The 4th International Conference on Deductive and Object-Oriented Databases, Singapore
(T. Ling, A. Mendelzon, and L. Vieille, eds.), vol. 1013 of Lecture Notes in
Computer Science, (Singapore), pp. 503-520, Springer-Verlag, Dec. 1995);
and
• "A Multi-level View Model for Secure Object-Oriented Databases," based
on Chapter 6 (accepted for publication by the Journal of Data & Knowledge
Engineering, 1996).
• "Modeling A Multi-level Secure Object-Oriented Database Using Views",
based on Chapter 6 (Pre-proceedings of the Australian Conference on Information Security and Privacy, The University of Wollongong, N S W , Australia, M a y 24-26, 1996 (accepted)).
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7.3 Future Direction

Some aspects of the research presented in this thesis need further investigat
This section outlines some of these directions which need to be addressed.
1. Implementation and Experimentation
In Chapter 4, a cryptographic mechanism for O O D B systems was proposed.
Since a normal proof of the mechanism is impractical and impossible to
achieve for the scale and difficulty of the problem, there is a need to implement a prototype of the cryptographic access control mechanism to investigate its applicability, efficiency, and performance. Also a more robust
database management system needs to be implemented to experiment with
authorization administration. This will give a clearer picture on how complex the administration becomes in real life. Moreover, an insight may be
gained into what other requirements are essential for a successful cryptographic access control mechanism. W e assumed that there were two types
of access: partial and full. In the full authorization, a lower-node is accessed
by all higher-level nodes of the hierarchical structure. In the partial authorization, a specific node is accessed only. There is also a need for further
study of a situation where a lower-level node in the hierarchical structure
m a y be accessed only by some higher-level nodes.
2. View-based Protection and Negative Authorization
Positive authorizations only were considered in the view-based authorization model proposed in Chapter 5. Our consideration could be extended by
taking into account negative authorizations as well. Access control models
with both positive and negative authorizations are lacking the consistency
and completeness of the authorizations. This is due to the fact that satisfaction of the conditions in the views depends on the values of object
properties that can change over time. Suppose that a user ux has a positive
read privilege on a view vx which contains all students with start date later
than "Feb 19, 1993". The user ux is forbidden to access all foreign students.
The user ux has a negative read privilege on a view v2 which contains all
foreign students. If no foreign student with start date later than "Feb 19,
1993" exists, the access control state is consistent. However, since property values can change and new objects can be added, access control may
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become inconsistent. Therefore, the need for consistency and completeness
criteria, and mechanisms to enforce them requires more investigation.
3. Inference Detection and Elimination
Chapter 6 mentioned a number of ways in which views m a y be used to
restrict the inference problem (for example, we may impose restrictions on
the set of allowable queries generated by a user, or to add noise to the
data). But these solutions are not sufficient to protect database against all
inference threats. Therefore, there is a need for a further study of how to
augment the secure multi-level view model with a logical-based inference
engine as to provide protection against security violations during query
processing.
4. Implementation Strategies
Any security model adds overhead costs to the operation of a database
system. If the security model adds too much overhead costs, the model
is not practical. The security model must be simple to implement. Only
if simple implementation strategies exist, it will be possible to trust that
the implementation accurately reflects the model. Hence, there is a need
for a study to find implementation strategies that economically and correctly implement the security model proposed in Chapter 6. Examples of
implementation strategies for conventional databases are found in [127].

This is a sample only of possible directions future work in this area. We hop
that contributions presented in this thesis, will encourage and stimulate other
researchers working in the area to advance the theory and practice of the access
control in 0-0 environments.

Appendix A
Hardjono et. al.'s Database
Authentication based on SIFF
Hardjono, Zheng and Seberry [101, 102] have suggested a method of the authentication of data in database systems based on the use of pseudo-random function
families and the SIFF. The scheme employs a trusted central authority (or party)
which holds a database secret key Kdb and the secret information Sdb necessary
for the checksum generation and validation and for the encipherment and decipherment of data in the record. In addition it is assumed that record i has a
unique record identifier Ri and field j has afieldidentifier Fj. Mi3 denotes the
actual value offieldj in record i. Let H = {Hn\n £ K} be a (t-hl)-SIFF mapping
n-bit input to n-bit output strings. Furthermore, assume that F = {Fn\n £ H}
is a pseudo-random function family, where F = {fxlfx • E'^n) —*• J2n,K £ £ n }
and each function fix £ Fn is specified by a n-bit string K.
To construct authenticator (checksum) for each record i, an instance of SIFF
hi is chosen uniformly and randomly from Hn such that:

hi(f.JRi\M) = ht(fKdb(Mtx\\R%\\Fx)) = ... = hiUK^MitWIUWFt)) = £,

where S; is a randomly chosen n-bit string, the checksum for record i. Figure
shows this process.
One advantage of the method is that the checksum is calculated for each
record. However, it is possible the authentication of each data element M 4J (1 <
j < t) is performed by checking
hiifKjMijWRiWFj)) = Si.
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Figure A.l: Using SIFF for Record Authentication.
Another advantage is the possibility to place the description of the instances
of SIFF associated with each record in the same storage as records. Finally, the
authentication of data elements could be done without any secret cryptographic
information. For a detailed discussion, the reader is directed to [101, 102]
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Appendix B
An Improvement of
Implementation of k-SIFF
Assume that a polynomial P(x) of degree k over finite GF(2n) has k colliding
points.
P(x) = a0 + axx + ... + ak-xxk~l = (x + b0)(x + bx)... (x + bk-i)
where a0, ax,... ,ak-x, b0, bx,..., bk-x £ GF(2n).
W h e n it is evaluated, the evaluation costs k modular multiplications, O(k). In
order to convert P(x) in such a way that the number of modular multiplications
is reduced, we can apply the approach depicted in Figure B.l. The O W H F is
any one-way hash function such as M D 4 , M D 5 [172, 173], or H A V A L [226]. The
U H F is any universal hash function with the collision accessibility - this is our
polynomial P(x)
In thefirstlayer, polynomials of degree two are defined or in other words they
have two collisions. It is then required to calculate k/2 polynomials Plf2(x), P3t4(x),

..., P{k~x),(k)(x) such that Px,2(dx) = A,2(4) = ^1,2, ^3,4(4) = ^3,4(4) = 4,4, • • •
In the second layer, again k/A polynomials of degree two are defined such that
they collide each pair outputs of the polynomials of thefirstlayer, i.e., the polynomials PX,2,Z,A(X),PS,6,7,S(X),..., P(k-3),(k-2),(k-l),(k)(x) SUch that Pi,2,3,4(dl,2)
-^1,2,3,4(4,4) = 4,2,3,4,-^5,6,7,8(4,6) = -^5,6,7,8(4,8) = 4,6,7,8, • • •

If this is continued, the resulting last polynomial will generate the key K.
Thus, the above approach provides this possibility to get the same number of
collisions (k) while derivation for a given key will take O(log A;) modular multiplication (each polynomial has degree two so its calculation takes 0(1) modular
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Figure B.l: Some improvement of implementation of k-SIFF.
multiplication).
There is however one problem to be solved; as there are many different polynomials and only one "path" is used, the system must know which key is being
used. To clarify this, P(x) generates the proper key as long as we plug in the
correct key (one from Ki,K2,. • -,Kk)- In order for key K{ the proper path is
chosen, it is suggested that if i is odd, Pz^i+x)(x) is used. In case that i is even,
P(i-i),i(x) is used.
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